In this interlocutory appeal, the employer asks whether the trial court had the authority to order it to provide personal contact information of company employees who are potential witnesses when no motion to compel discovery was pending. The employee suffered fatal injuries in a fall from a ladder, and the employer denied the claim, asserting a defense of willful misconduct. During a deposition, a company supervisor identified five employees who may have information regarding the existence and/or enforcement of the employer’s workplace safety rules. The claimant’s attorney requested these individuals’ contact information, and the employer’s attorney indicated he would provide that information voluntarily. After several status conferences, during which the employer’s counsel indicated he had not yet provided the requested information, the trial court entered an order compelling the employer to provide the requested information by a date certain. Three days prior to the deadline, the employer filed a motion for relief from the order and provided information needed to facilitate scheduling the depositions of these witnesses through the employer. The claimant’s attorney filed a responsive motion, indicating this information was neither responsive to her request nor compliant with the court’s order. The court issued a second order requiring the employer to provide the requested contact information “by the close of business” that day. The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we affirm in part and modify in part the trial court’s order and remand the case.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Since his lawyer didn’t file a notice of appeal, Michael McCormick moved to vacate his conviction. The district court denied the motion, and we affirm. 

The Appellant, Gregory Lavelle Lilly, appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for a reduction of sentence. Tenn. R. Crim. P. 35. Upon review of the motion filed by appointed counsel, and in light of the record on appeal, the Court hereby affirms the order of the trial court.

Petitioner, Ladon Antoine Doak, appeals the denial of his post-conviction petition, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

For the week of June 19, 2023 - June 23, 2023

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Early on a February morning in Lansing, Michigan, an officer noticed a man, later determined to be Jaron Morgan, seemingly passed out at the wheel of a stopped, still running, car. Without knocking on the car door, shining a flashlight into the car, or otherwise trying to arouse Morgan, the officer opened the car door and asked Morgan whether everything was okay. Morgan was groggy, and the officer asked for his identification. An altercation ensued. The officer arrested Morgan and found a firearm in the car and drugs on him, prompting a criminal indictment. The district court denied Morgan’s motion to suppress under the Fourth Amendment based on the community-caretaking doctrine, Morgan conditionally pleaded guilty, and the court sentenced him to 204 months. We reverse the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Under Tennessee’s version of the Uniform Commercial Code, when is a bank entitled to a remedy (here, restitution) from a payee for mistakenly paying a negotiable instrument (here, a check)? And when does a payee take a check in “good faith” and “for value,” enabling the payee to defend against a payor bank’s claim for restitution? Those questions are posed here, as they were before the district court. At summary judgment, the district court held that two checks cashed at Commercial Bank and Trust were paid to Doug Goodman by “mistake” within the meaning of Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-3-418(b), and that Goodman could not demonstrate that he took the checks in good faith and for value, see id. § 47-3-418(c), entitling the Bank to restitution. We agree and thus affirm.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs are adherents to Christian Identity, a religion that is “explicitly racist.” Fox v. Washington, 949 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 2020). In its view, Caucasians are “God’s chosen people.” Id. at 274 (internal quotation marks omitted). After the Michigan Department of Corrections refused to recognize Christian Identity as a religion for purposes of the Michigan prison system, plaintiffs brought this declaratory judgment action under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Person Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq. (RLUIPA), requesting that the Department be directed to recognize Christian Identity as a religion. The district court affirmed the Department’s denial, and plaintiffs appealed.

In Fox, we held that plaintiffs satisfied the first two parts of the three-part RLUIPA test, but we remanded to the district court for the Department to sustain its “heavy burden” under a strict scrutiny analysis to show that its refusal to recognize Christian Identity as a religion furthered a compelling governmental interest, and, if so, that its denial was the least restrictive means of furthering such a compelling interest. 949 F.3d at 283.

On remand, the district court concluded that the Department met its burden and that refusing to recognize Christian Identity was the least restrictive means to ensure its compelling governmental interest. We disagree and hold that the Department failed to satisfy its burden of showing that its denial of recognition was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Alternatives, other than to simply accept or reject recognition, were available and included in the Department’s policies, but never considered by it.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand for entry of judgment in plaintiffs’ favor.

Defendant, Deshawn Eugene Williams, appeals from the Davidson County Criminal Court’s revoking his probation and ordering him to serve his previously ordered probationary sentence of ten years in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by failing to give him credit for time successfully served while on probation. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Michael E. Odom, was convicted by a Houston County jury of assault and elder abuse. The trial court imposed a two-year sentence, suspended to supervised probation after sixty days of incarceration. Defendant appeals the trial court’s order denying his motion for a new trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that the jury instruction on elder abuse was incomplete and that the trial court improperly commented on matters of fact during trial testimony. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and oral argument, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.