THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Darrin VanPelt tried to escape while under arrest. So Officer Aaron Layne tackled him and physically tried to lift him up. Now, VanPelt claims that he was tackled and then lifted and dropped in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment, concluding Officer Layne was entitled to qualified immunity. We affirm. 

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. In 1996, nine-year-old Jacqueline Beard left her mother’s watchful gaze to pick blackberries. William Glenn Rogers made sure she never returned. After stalking Jackie for days, he kidnapped, raped, and murdered her. Then he disposed of her body in the woods, where hunters found her remains four months later.

At trial, a jury found Rogers guilty and sentenced him to death. Since then, Rogers has spent more than two decades challenging his conviction and sentence. In a thoughtful and exhaustive opinion, Chief Judge Waverly Crenshaw denied Rogers’s federal habeas petition. We affirm.

This is the second appeal of this case. It concerns an employee who asserted she suffered from noise-induced hearing loss caused by exposure to loud machinery over the course of thirty-three years of employment, which ended in 2016. The employer, in denying her claim, asserted the employee knew or reasonably should have known she had a work-related hearing loss, at the latest, when she was diagnosed in 2019 and that she failed to give proper notice of her alleged injury and failed to file her claim timely. Following a compensation hearing, the trial court found the employee’s notice of injury was timely and that her claim was not barred by the statute of limitations, and it awarded permanent partial disability benefits, medical benefits made reasonably necessary by the employee’s work-related hearing loss, and discretionary costs. In the first appeal, the employer challenged the trial court’s determination that the employee had given timely notice of her alleged work injury. We concluded the employee had not provided timely notice, but we remanded the case for the trial court to make additional findings of fact regarding whether the employee had offered a reasonable excuse for her failure to give proper notice and whether the employer had suffered any prejudice caused by the lack of notice. In a subsequent compensation order, the trial court determined the employee had offered no reasonable excuse for her late notice but that the employer had likewise offered no evidence that it was prejudiced by the lack of timely notice. It therefore reiterated its original award in favor of the employee. The employer has appealed again. Upon careful review of the record, statutory language, and relevant precedent, we reverse the trial court’s order and certify the reversed order as final.

After a fire at a rental home, suit was brought against the tenant. During discovery, the tenant sought admissions related to the landlords’ insurance coverage and as to whether the suit was actually a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured. As a result of resistance to disclosure, the tenant moved to compel. The trial court granted the motion. Following admissions indicating that this suit is a subrogation action by the insurer brought in the names of the insured, the tenant moved for summary judgment asserting that under the Sutton Rule she is an implied co-insured under the landlords’ insurance policy. Opposition to summary judgment was advanced based upon the purported inapplicability of the Sutton Rule and the purported applicability of the collateral source rule. The trial court granted summary judgment to the tenant. This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court’s grant of the motion to compel and summary judgment in favor of the tenant.

The Petitioner, Floyd Hall, III, appeals the Haywood County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his conviction for second degree murder. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his claim that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s failure to file a motion to suppress a statement the Petitioner gave to the police. We affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This appeal involves the denial of a Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 motion. In the original action, the trial court granted summary judgment to the City of Mount Carmel, Tennessee (“the City”), finding that it had negated an essential element of the plaintiff’s claim against it. In the summary judgment pleadings, the City presented expert evidence concluding that the retaining wall in question was failing due to lateral earth pressure and not a problem with the foundation. In that report, the expert stated that the backfill of the retaining wall was red clay but that regardless of whether the backfill consisted of red clay or crushed stone, the wall would fail. The plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut this opinion. The plaintiff filed a Rule 60.02 motion seeking to be relieved of the grant of summary judgment after discovering that the backfill of the wall was crushed stone and not red clay as stated in the expert’s report.1 The trial court denied the Rule 60.02 motion upon its determination that even with a backfill of crushed stone, summary judgment still would have been granted. Discerning no error, we affirm.

A Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr., of being a convicted felon in possession of a firearm, evading arrest while operating a motor vehicle, reckless driving, driving while unlicensed, violation of the registration law, and disobeying a stop sign. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for felony possession of a weapon and that an item of evidence was erroneously admitted. He further contends that the jury instructions were inaccurate and incomplete. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

Article II of Tennessee’s Constitution vests legislative authority in the General Assembly. We have held, however, that the General Assembly may “grant an administrative agency the power to promulgate rules and regulations which have the effect of law in the agency’s area of operation.” Bean v. McWherter, 953 S.W.2d 197, 199 (Tenn. 1997). The General Assembly frequently has done so. But it also established important guardrails for administrative agencies by enacting the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act. One of those guardrails is the requirement that agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking: a process that gives the public and other affected parties an opportunity to weigh in. Here, we consider whether a reimbursement cap imposed by TennCare is a “rule” within the meaning of the Uniform Administrative Procedures Act that should have been promulgated through the notice-and-comment process. We hold that it is and reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision.

Defendant, Latrice Rogers, appeals the trial court’s order denying her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. Defendant pled guilty to multiple charges as indicted with sentencing to be determined. One week after the trial court sentenced Defendant to three years’ imprisonment, Defendant filed a motion to withdraw her plea. Before the trial court ruled on the motion, Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment. The trial court later denied the motion to withdraw the plea. Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Steven Craig Griffin, Petitioner, claims the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his petition for writ of habeas corpus and/or Rule 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence. Discerning no error we affirm.