This is an action for malicious prosecution of an attorney’s fee claim. The plaintiffs contend that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment to the defendant under the oneyear statute of limitations in Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1). The court held that the plaintiffs’ cause of action accrued when the allegedly-malicious prosecution terminated, and it held that the prosecution terminated when the first court denied the defendant’s motion to alter or amend the judgment under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 59.04. The plaintiffs contend that this is wrong because the defendant was a party to and participated in the appeal of those proceedings. They assert that the defendant’s action did not terminate until he exhausted his appellate remedies. We agree and hold that the defendant’s cause of action did not terminate until his time for filing an appellate brief expired. Thus, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand with instructions to reinstate the complaint and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. For nearly three years, seven sovereigns have been embroiled in negotiations over who gets to manage the Great Lakes fisheries. The merits of those negotiations aren’t before us, only an antecedent question of civil procedure: is the Coalition to Protect Michigan Resources (“the Coalition”) entitled to intervene in those negotiations just as the parties are approaching a deal? Under our precedent, the answer is no. Because the district court properly denied the Coalition’s motion to intervene, we affirm.

The Appellee, Joseph Lester Haven, Jr., was originally convicted of rape of a child and two counts of aggravated sexual battery for crimes committed against his stepchildren, for which he received an effective forty-year sentence. After his convictions were affirmed, State v. Joseph Lester Haven, No. W2018-01204-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 3410242, at *1- 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 19, 2020), the Appellee filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief based on trial counsel’s failure to challenge the State’s compliance with the Tennessee Code Annotated section 24-7-123, the statute which authorizes a video recording of a child to a forensic interviewer to be introduced as evidence at trial, but only when certain requirements are met. The Obion County post-conviction court granted relief, and the State now appeals. Following our review, we reverse the judgment of the postconviction court, reinstate the Appellee’s convictions, and remand for execution of judgments consistent with this opinion.

This appeal primarily concerns the compulsion of a physician’s deposition testimony in a health care liability action. In 2014, a child was born via cesarean section and suffered permanent brain damage and severely debilitating injuries. By and through her next friend and mother Brittany Borngne (“Plaintiff”), the child sued the doctor who delivered her and the certified nurse midwife who was initially in charge of the birthing process, among other defendants. The trial court dismissed all claims of direct negligence against the defendant physician but allowed the plaintiff to proceed against the physician on a vicarious liability theory as the midwife’s supervising physician. However, during his deposition prior to trial, the physician refused to opine on the midwife’s performance outside of his presence. The trial court declined to require the physician to do so, and after a trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants. The Court of Appeals, in a divided opinion, partially reversed the judgment. The intermediate court concluded, among other things, that the trial court committed reversible error in declining to order the physician to answer the questions at issue in his deposition and remanded for a new trial. After review, we hold that a defendant healthcare provider cannot be compelled to provide expert opinion testimony about another defendant provider’s standard of care or deviation from that standard. We therefore conclude that the trial court here properly declined to compel the defendant physician’s testimony. Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

For the week of May 15, 2023 - May 19, 2023

SILER, Circuit Judge. Western & Southern Financial Group Flexible Benefits Plan (the “Plan”) and the Benefits Committee of the Plan (together referred to as “W&S”) appeal the district court’s 2019 remand order and 2022 judgment in favor of Western & Southern Financial Group’s former employee, Sherry Laake. While W&S asserts several challenges on appeal, the central issue throughout the course of this litigation is whether Laake qualifies for long-term disability (“LTD”) benefits extending beyond 24 months pursuant to the terms of the Plan—an employee welfare benefit plan as defined under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”). The district court determined that she does, and it imposed penalties against W&S and awarded Laake attorney’s fees and costs. We AFFIRM.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Sarah Hohenberg and Joseph Hanson did not maintain their homes or keep them up to code. Unhappy neighbors set the enforcement wheels in motion for actions in the Shelby County Environmental Court, proceedings that eventually cost them their homes and more. Hohenberg and Hanson sued Shelby County and the Environmental Court for violating their due process rights. The district court dismissed their case for lack of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), see Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), and for failing to state a claim. We reverse the jurisdictional ruling, affirm the failure-to-state-a-claim ruling in part, and remand.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), plaintiffs may litigate federal minimum-wage and overtime claims on behalf of other “similarly situated” employees. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). At issue here is the showing of similarity that is necessary for a district court to facilitate notice of an FLSA suit to employees who were not originally parties to the suit. District courts nationwide have had little guidance as to what that showing should be. We adopt a standard different than the one the district court adopted here, and remand for the district court to apply it.

A Maury County jury convicted Stacy Matthews, Defendant, of two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of a school zone and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. At sentencing, the trial court struck the school zone sentencing aggravator for two of the convictions and entered judgments on three counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine. The trial court imposed three concurrent sentences of twelve years, as a Range I, standard offender, in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant argues: he was prejudiced by the language of Counts 1 and 3 of the indictment; that the trial court imposed an excessive sentence; and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal as of right pursuant to § 2.02 of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 10B from the trial court’s denial of a motion for recusal. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal, pursuant to the de novo standard as required under Rule 10B, § 2.01, we affirm the trial court’s decision to deny the motion for recusal.