A Sevier County jury convicted Defendant, Gabriel Enrique Turcios, of first-degree premeditated murder. At sentencing, the jury found that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death, and sentenced him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he claims the evidence is insufficient to support the application of the aggravating circumstance for the sentence. After a thorough review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Anthony D. Martin, Petitioner, was convicted of rape of a child and sentenced to 40 years in incarceration. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. State v. Anthony Martin, Alias, No. E2018-01066-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 2714379, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 28, 2019), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Oct. 11, 2019). Petitioner sought post-conviction relief based on several alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. The post-conviction court denied relief and dismissed the petition after a hearing. This appeal followed. After a review, we affirm the denial of post-conviction relief.

Mother appeals the termination of her parental rights on five grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to visit the children; (2) abandonment by failure to financially support the children; (3) substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; (4) persistence of conditions; and (5) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the children. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from the dismissal of a petition for common law writ of certiorari in which the petitioner, an inmate in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”), appeals a disciplinary conviction for “unauthorized financial transactions activity” by the Disciplinary Board at the Turney Center Industrial Complex. The respondents, the State of Tennessee and several governmental officials, filed a joint motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the petition was not properly verified as required by Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-104 and the petitioner failed to pay the mandatory initial filing fee pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807. The chancery court granted the motion and dismissed the petition with prejudice on the grounds “the statutory requirements of T.C.A. § 27-8-104 and § 41-21-807 are mandatory and have not been met in this case, and failure to comply results in a defective filing by the Petitioner[.]” This appeal followed. We reverse the decision to dismiss based on the filing fee requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated § 41-21-807. Nevertheless, we affirm the dismissal of the petition with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the petitioner’s failure to file a petition that complied with the verification requirements under Tennessee Code Annotated § 27-8-104 within 60 days of the entry of the judgment of which the petitioner seeks review.

This appeal concerns the approval of a site plan. William Foehring, Janice Foehring, William Best, Mary Beth Best, Ron Terrill, and Sandra Terrill (“Petitioners”) filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari against the Monteagle Regional Planning Commission (“the Commission”) and RBT Enterprises, LLC (“RBT”)1 (collectively, “Respondents”) in the Chancery Court for Marion County (“the Trial Court”). Petitioners alleged that the Commission acted illegally, arbitrarily, and capriciously in approving the site plan at issue because the underlying zoning for one of the parcels is invalid. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Respondents. Petitioners appeal. In a parallel declaratory judgment action case arising out of the same facts, we determined that the underlying zoning is valid, which is dispositive of this appeal. We affirm the Trial Court.

This is an appeal arising from allegations of fraud and breach of contract in a dispute surrounding a stock transfer agreement that, among other things, provided for the transfer of controlling interest in a law firm from attorney Robert Hill to attorney Ricky Boren. Whereas many claims were resolved at summary judgment, others were tried before a jury and resolved in the Plaintiffs’ favor. The parties present a plethora of issues for our consideration, and for the reasons stated herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Nashville”) passed a “sidewalk ordinance” that imposes sidewalk-related conditions on landowners who seek building permits. To obtain a permit, owners must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere. This ordinance implicates a question about the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause that has divided state courts. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).

In particular, the parties here disagree over the “test” that we should use to judge whether the sidewalk ordinance commits a taking. The landowner plaintiffs ask us to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted to assess conditions on building permits in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nashville responds that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville says, we should turn to the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

We side with the landowner plaintiffs. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test thus should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. Because the district court reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse its grant of summary judgment to Nashville and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Mario Banuelos-Jimenez petitions for review of the Immigration Judge’s and Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA’s) decisions denying cancellation of removal. The immigration judge concluded, and the BIA affirmed, that his state conviction for third-degree assault on a family member was a crime of violence and, therefore, he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. We agree and deny the petition for review.

The Defendant, Michael Wojnarek, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court erred by considering evidence found in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Miron D. Johnson, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of evading arrest, a Class D felony; misdemeanor evading arrest; felony reckless endangerment; and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony evading arrest and felony reckless endangerment. Relative to his felony evading arrest conviction, the Defendant specifically argues that his conduct did not create a risk of death or injury to others. For his felony reckless endangerment conviction, the Defendant argues that his vehicle was not used as a deadly weapon and that the threat of death or serious bodily injury was not imminent. The Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing fines without making findings regarding the Defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.