Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby County convictions for two counts of conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone and two counts of possession of 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone. Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to: (1) object to irrelevant and prejudicial text messages introduced at trial; (2) file a Bruton motion; (3) contest that Petitioner tracked the package containing the methamphetamine; (4) adequately prepare for trial; (5) object when the State argued that Petitioner’s silence implied guilt; (6) object when the prosecutor “testified during closing argument in order to bolster his own credibility”; and (7) object when the prosecutor intentionally misrepresented evidence during closing argument. Petitioner further asserts that she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal concerns whether a municipality must have a general plan for development before it can exercise its zoning power. William Foehring, Janice Foehring, William Best, Mary Beth Best, Ron Terrill, and Sandra Terrill (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued the Town of Monteagle, Tennessee (“the Town”) and RBT Enterprises, LLC (“RBT”)1 (collectively, “Defendants”) for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Marion County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs challenged the rezoning of a certain parcel which allowed for the development of a truck stop near their homes. Plaintiffs argued that the zoning ordinances at issue, 05-21 and 12-21, were invalid because the Town had no comprehensive or general plan in effect. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold, inter alia, that no comprehensive or general plan was required before the Town could exercise its zoning powers. It was sufficient that the Monteagle Regional Planning Commission (“the Commission”) transmitted to the Town Board of Mayor and Aldermen (“the Board”), the Town’s chief legislative body, the text of a zoning ordinance and zoning maps, which comprised the zoning plan. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal involving the termination of parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother and the fathers of the children on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. Only the mother appeals. We affirm.

Following a bench trial, the Appellant, Charles Rutledge, was convicted of second-degree murder, for which he received a sentence of twenty-eight years’ imprisonment. In this appeal, the Appellant presents two issues for review: 1) whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his conviction, and 2) whether the State failed to disclose witness information in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Upon our review, we affirm.

Defendant, Ricky Anderson, appeals his Shelby County convictions for two counts of first degree premeditated murder, for which he received concurrent life sentences. Defendant contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting photographs of one of the deceased victims. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Defendant, Tinisha Nicole Spencer, appeals her jury conviction for driving under the influence, fifth offense. The trial court sentenced her to two years suspended after service of 150 days in jail. On appeal, the Defendant challenges whether the State established an unbroken chain of custody for her blood sample, whether the sentence enhancement counts were void because they included the dates of the prior offenses rather than the dates of conviction as required by statute, and whether the sentence enhancement counts vested the trial court with jurisdiction to sentence her as a multiple offender because they incorporated a facially void judgment. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this post-conviction appeal, the Petitioner-Appellant, Gregg Merrilees, seeks relief from his original convictions of aggravated robbery and robbery in concert with two or more persons, for which he received an effective sentence of sixteen years’ imprisonment. He subsequently filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief, which was denied by the postconviction court. The Petitioner now appeals and raises a stand-alone challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. In addition, the Petitioner argues four grounds in support of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1) trial counsel’s failure to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence based on the lack of accomplice corroboration in a motion for judgment of acquittal or on direct appeal; (2) trial counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on accomplice corroboration; (3) trial counsel’s failure to object based on speculation to the hotel clerk-victim’s accusation that the Petitioner was involved in the offenses based on the hotel clerk-victim’s “gut”; and (4) trial counsel’s failure to object to “the unconstitutional show-up” identification of the Petitioner by the hotel clerk-victim at trial. Upon our review, we affirm.

Appellants filed a petition for common law writ of certiorari, seeking judicial review of Appellee Fayette County Board of Zoning Appeals’ grant of a special exception to other Appellees for the construction of a solar farm. The trial court denied the writ of certiorari. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights as to two of her children. The trial court found as grounds for termination abandonment for failure to provide a suitable home, persistent conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume legal and physical custody of the children. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of both children. We find clear and convincing evidence supports the trial court’s findings as to the grounds for termination and the best interests of the children. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.