This appeal arises from a suit to rescind a contract for the sale of a home due to fraud. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence of fraud justifying rescission. It ordered the buyer to convey the property back to the sellers, with the sellers returning the purchase price, minus the fair rental value of the property, with a credit to the buyer for various expenses he had incurred. However, the trial court declined to award any offset to the buyer for improvements he had made to the property. It also declined to award punitive damages but did award the buyer attorney fees. Taken together, the parties present twentyfive issues for review on appeal. We vacate in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Ruby Tuesday, a restaurant proprietor, leased property in Maryville, Tennessee to support its corporate operations. The company thought it had said goodbye to the property when it agreed to transfer its interest to BNA Associates, a real estate developer. But a new day brought a new development. As a debtor to Goldman Sachs, Ruby Tuesday, per the parties’ credit agreement, was required to get Goldman’s consent before transferring any property subject to the agreement. And when Goldman refused to consent, Ruby Tuesday and BNA missed out on closing their deal. Unable to put its name on the property, BNA sued Goldman, alleging intentional interference with business relations under Tennessee law. The district court dismissed BNA’s complaint. We affirm.

Defendant, Lester Tolliver, appeals as of right from his jury conviction for aggravated rape, for which he received a sentence of twenty-five years. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by (1) admitting hearsay statements, specifically the victim’s reporting the rape to a friend and the victim’s statement to a police officer; (2) admitting the victim’s testimony that she had been sexually assaulted previously; (3) admitting testimony from an expert witness regarding why a victim might lie about having had sexual activity in the days preceding a sexual assault; and (4) denying Defendant’s request for a special jury instruction. Following our review, we affirm.

The Defendant, Antwain Tapaige Sales, appeals the Bedford County Circuit Court’s order dismissing his claim that his judgments of conviction for second degree murder and attempted second degree murder are fraudulent and void. After review, we conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.

A Madison County jury found the Defendant, Montreal Portis Robinson, guilty of felony murder in the perpetration of a theft, especially aggravated kidnapping, robbery, and theft of property. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for especially aggravated kidnapping and robbery. However, we also conclude that the evidence is insufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for theft and felony murder in the perpetration of a theft. Accordingly, we dismiss the theft charge, and we modify the Defendant’s conviction for felony murder to that of second degree murder as a lesser-included offense. We respectfully remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, including the entry of a modified judgment and a sentencing hearing on the conviction for second degree murder.

The Petitioner, Tyler D. Bolton, appeals the Washington County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions for possession of twenty-six grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, unlawful possession of a firearm, and two counts of aggravated burglary. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred by denying his motion in limine to exclude jail call recordings from the post-conviction hearing. The Petitioner also argues that the post¬ conviction court erred by denying relief on his claims alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of trial counsel by trial counsel’s failing to adequately investigate the Petitioner’s mental health history and request a mental health evaluation prior to advising him to accept a plea offer. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Plaintiff alleges she was injured from a fall at a skilled nursing facility while using a defective shower chair with a broken lock and torn netting. The circuit court concluded the Plaintiff did not need to file a certificate of good faith under the Tennessee Health Care Liability Act because the common knowledge exception is applicable and the complaint’s negligence allegations do not require expert testimony. The nursing facility appeals, arguing expert testimony is required to establish both the standard of care and proximate causation; therefore, a certificate of good faith must be filed. Because the allegations set forth in the complaint do not require expert testimony to maintain the Plaintiff’s claim, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

In this case involving a petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights to her child and to allow the petitioners to adopt the child, the trial court determined that one statutory ground for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. However, the trial court further determined that the petitioners had failed to establish clear and convincing evidence that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The trial court accordingly dismissed the petition and remanded to the juvenile court’s protective jurisdiction. The petitioners have appealed the best interest determination, and the mother has raised an issue regarding the statutory ground. We affirm the trial court’s finding as to the statutory ground of failure to support. However, having determined that under the facts of this case the trial court erred in applying the statutory best interest factors applicable to the initial termination petition rather than those applicable to the amended petition, we reverse the trial court’s best interest finding and remand for reconsideration applying the amended best interest factors contained in Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-1-113(i) (Supp. 2022).

The employee reported back pain after moving several large tables at work. The employer provided a panel of physicians, and the selected provider referred the employee to an orthopedic specialist. The orthopedist referred the employee to a physiatrist, who released the employee at maximum medical improvement, assigned a permanent impairment rating, and referred him to a chiropractor and a neurologist due to ongoing symptoms. The neurologist placed the employee at maximum medical improvement, assigned a permanent impairment rating, and testified that further medical treatment was not primarily related to the work injury. The employee sought additional medical benefits. The trial court denied the request, determining that the employee had not produced sufficient evidence that he was likely to prove an entitlement to the benefits being sought. The employee has appealed. After careful review of the record, we affirm the part of the trial court’s decision addressing the employee’s request to see a specific doctor, and we remand the case for the trial court to consider whether the employee is entitled to an appointment with an orthopedic physician. Judge Meredith B. Weaver

SUTTON, Chief Judge. The False Claims Act imposes civil liability for “knowingly present[ing], or caus[ing] to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim [to the government] for payment or approval.” 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). The Act allows individuals with knowledge of false claims to bring private lawsuits, known as qui tam lawsuits, on behalf of the government. Id. § 3730(b). Among other types of false claims, the Act covers claims for “items or services resulting from a violation” of the Anti-Kickback Statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g), which prohibits medical providers from making referrals “in return for” “remuneration,” id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1)(A). At issue in this case is (1) whether a hospital’s decision not to hire an ophthalmologist in return for a general commitment of continued surgery referrals from another ophthalmologist for patients from the local community counts as the kind of “remuneration” covered by the Anti-Kickback Statute and (2) whether claims from such continued referrals “result[] from” violations of the statute. Id. § 1320a-7b(b)(1), (g). Because we agree with the district court that this kind of claim does not establish a cognizable kickback scheme, we affirm the dismissal of this qui tam complaint.