THAPAR, Circuit Judge. When Ronald Lee Jacobs learned there was a warrant out for his arrest, he voluntarily went to the police station. There, an officer questioned him in a manner consistent with due process, and Jacobs confessed. The district court suppressed his confession. We reverse.

Michael Mosley, Defendant, claims the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of attempted aggravated assault, that the trial court erred by not requiring the State to make an election as to the precise definition of serious bodily injury for which a conviction was being sought, and that the trial court erred by denying Defendant’s request for two special jury instructions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Frank M. Green, was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4 and was acquitted of the charge of aggravated kidnapping in Count 5. The Defendant filed a post-trial motion for judgment of acquittal as to the rape conviction in Count 3 and the assault conviction in Count 4. The trial court denied this motion but merged Count 3 with Count 1 and merged Count 4 with Count 2. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed a sentence of ten years for each of the rape convictions and a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days for each of the assault convictions and ordered the rape and assault convictions served concurrently, for an effective sentence of ten years. On appeal, the Defendant argues: (1) the State’s faulty election of offenses led the trial court to provide erroneous and misleading jury instructions, which undermined the integrity of the jury’s verdict; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the convictions in count 3 for rape and count 4 for assault; and (3) the convictions in Counts 2 and 4 reflect the incorrect offense class and sentence. Because the State failed to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that errors regarding the election, the charge, and the supplemental jury instructions were harmless, we reverse the Defendant’s convictions and remand the case for a new trial on the offenses of rape in Counts 1 and 3 and the offenses of assault by extremely offensive or provocative physical contact in Counts 2 and 4.

The plaintiffs, Martina and Eddie Smith (“Buyers”)1, filed suit in the Madison County Circuit Court (“Trial Court”) regarding their purchase of a piece of real property from the defendant, Donna Jean Walker (“Seller”). Buyers alleged intentional misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and failure to disclose the presence of mold within the home. The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Seller. Buyers previously filed an appeal to this Court regarding the grant of summary judgment. During that appeal, this Court held that the Trial Court had not provided a sufficient basis for granting Seller’s motion for summary judgment and remanded for entry of a new order explaining its reasoning. Thereafter, the Trial Court entered a revised order providing detailed reasoning for its grant of summary judgment in favor of Seller on each of Buyers’ claims against her. Buyers timely appealed the revised order to this Court. During this second appeal, Buyers filed essentially the same brief as in the previous appeal despite entry of the Trial Court’s revised order following remand. Because Buyers failed to address the revised order in their appellate brief and failed to cite to the record submitted to this Court in this appeal, Buyers waived their issues for appeal by failing to comply with Tenn. R. App. P. 27 and Tenn. Ct. App. R. 6. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the Trial Court in its entirety.

This is a conservatorship action initiated by University of Tennessee Medical Center with respect to one of its patients. The trial court granted the hospital’s petition for conservatorship based in part on a physician’s affidavit and medical examination report attached to its petition. The respondent has appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by considering the physician’s affidavit and report, by denying her motion for a continuance, and by finding clear and convincing evidence that she was disabled and in need of a conservator. Given that no party introduced the physician’s affidavit and report into evidence, we conclude that the trial court erred by considering these documents as evidence. We further conclude that the trial court’s final judgment is deficient due to its dearth of factual findings. We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment appointing a conservator for the respondent and remand for a new hearing on the petition.

This appeal concerns a father’s continued failure to remit payment for his child support obligation. Following the mother’s contempt petitions, the trial court determined the father’s current child support obligation and arrearage amount and awarded the mother her attorney fees. The father appeals arguing that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, erred in awarding the mother attorney fees, and erred in setting the arrearage payment amount. We affirm the trial court’s rulings on these issues.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to dismiss an action under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 34A.02 and the doctrine of unclean hands. The plaintiff is a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist who alleges that she was harassed and discriminated against while working for the defendant, a prominent physician group in Memphis, Tennessee. The trial court found that dismissal was warranted because the plaintiff “willfully deleted text messages from her personal electronic devices after being placed on notice regarding her preservation obligations, resulting in the deletion, and therefore spoliation, of critical evidence that cannot be recovered.” This appeal followed. We conclude that the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply in this case because the plaintiff’s misconduct relates to the litigation as a whole, not to her claims. Nonetheless, we also conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by dismissing the case as a sanction for the plaintiff’s intentional spoliation of evidence under Rule 34A.02.

The employee was a delivery driver for the employer when he reported what he believed to be a sprain to his left great toe as a result of pushing the clutch pedal. The employer provided a panel, and the selected physician diagnosed the employee with gout. The employer denied the claim, and the employee filed a petition for benefit determination. After the entry of a scheduling order, the employer obtained the deposition of the treating physician and filed a motion for summary judgment. The employee did not respond to the motion but later filed a motion for an extension of time after the deadline had passed to respond to the summary judgment motion. The trial court denied the motion for extension of time and granted the motion for summary judgment. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s decision, find the appeal to be frivolous, and certify the decision as final.

McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Following the Flint Water Crisis,1 thousands of cases were brought by minors, adults, property owners, and business owners against alleged tortfeasors for the harms they endured as a result of lead-contaminated water. Putative class action lawsuits and individual lawsuits were consolidated in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. There, the district court appointed Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel to represent the putative class and individual plaintiffs, respectively. After years of negotiation, Co-Lead Class Counsel and Co-Liaison Counsel, together with the Settling Defendants, reached a record-breaking settlement.

In connection with the work they performed in reaching the settlement, Counsel requested attorneys’ fees and reimbursement for expenses. The court approved the underlying settlement and awarded Counsel attorneys’ fees. Three Objector-Appellant groups, the Hall Objectors, the Chapman Objectors, and the Roberts Objector, now appeal that award. Together they allege that they were entitled to more detailed discovery of Counsel’s billing and costs records, that the fee award’s common benefit structure constitutes an abuse of discretion, and that a $500 charge for bone lead scans performed by Co-Liaison Counsel was unreasonable.

We conclude that the Objectors are not entitled to the discovery they seek, that they lack standing to appeal the common benefit structure of the district court’s attorneys’ fee award, and that the district court did not otherwise abuse its discretion in awarding Counsel fees and expenses. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. The Warden appeals the district court’s grant of petitioner Steven Moss’s habeas petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel analyzed under United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984). The Warden argues that the district court erred in three ways: (1) finding that Moss’s untimely petition was entitled to equitable tolling; (2) excusing the procedural default of Moss’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim based on the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; and (3) granting Moss habeas relief on his claims, rather than deferring to the state court’s adjudication of the issues under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

Because the state court’s denial of Moss’s ineffective assistance claims under Strickland was not contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, we defer to its decision that Moss is not entitled to habeas relief. We therefore hold that the district court erred in granting Moss relief and reverse and remand with instructions to deny the petition with prejudice.