RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Paul Cash died when a hammermill shredder exploded at his workplace. The Tennessee Occupational Safety and Health Administration (TOSHA) determined that the explosion was primarily caused by the accumulation of combustible aluminum dust produced by the shredding process. Cash’s sister, Terry Cash-Darling, brought this lawsuit as the personal representative of his estate against Recycling Equipment, Inc. (REI), the company that assembled and sold the shredder to Lighting Resources LLC (LR), Cash’s employer.

The estate asserts four product-liability claims. REI moved for summary judgment, arguing that because it “did not design the hammermill system at issue, and instead assisted LR with locating primarily used components that LR requested based on the design of LR’s existing system, REI is not legally responsible for any alleged defect in the system as a whole.”

The district court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of REI, dismissing all of the estate’s claims. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

The trial court dismissed Appellant’s action for aggravated perjury for failure to state a claim under Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(6); the trial court dismissed Appellant’s action for spoliation of evidence as barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court also assessed sanctions against Appellant’s attorney pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. Discerning no error, we affirm.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Ricky Simmonds claims that during his sentencing hearing, the district court improperly relied on the Presentence Report’s recommendation rather than the parties’ non-binding plea agreement. Because the district court didn’t plainly err, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a series of civil actions between a tenant and its landlord. The first action resulted in a ruling that the landlord was “merely a sham or dummy corporation” and “the alter ego” of its sole shareholder. See Dog House Investments, LLC v. Teal Properties, Inc., et al., 448 S.W.3d 905, 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2014). The second action resulted in a settlement agreement that entitled the prevailing party in future lease disputes to an award of related attorney’s fees. The third and present action commenced in 2017 with each party suing the other on various grounds in different courts. Following a consolidation of the pending actions, the case was tried by a jury, which ruled in favor of the tenant, Dog House Investments, LLC, (“Dog House”) on the merits. Thereafter, Dog House filed a motion to recover its attorney’s fees and costs as the prevailing party pursuant to the 2014 settlement agreement, and the trial court awarded Dog House $292,168.84 in attorney’s fees and costs. This appeal followed. The sole issue on appeal is the amount of the attorney’s fees awarded. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm. Because Dog House is also entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees it incurred in successfully defending this appeal, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

In this divorce action, the trial court distributed the parties’ marital assets and debts, fashioned a parenting plan naming the mother primary residential parent and providing the father with fifty-five annual days of co-parenting time, and set the father’s child support obligation. The father has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. Deeming this to be a frivolous appeal, we grant the mother’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal and remand this issue to the trial court for a determination regarding the amount.

ALAN C. STOUT, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. This appeal involves a bankruptcy case with a protracted history including multiple appeals. The crux of the current appeal is the Debtor’s assertion that she requested dismissal of her chapter 13 case prior to its conversion to chapter 7 and that the bankruptcy court erred by failing to dismiss the case at that time or after one of her post-conversion motions to dismiss. Having examined the record thoroughly, the Panel concludes that the Debtor’s assertion that she requested dismissal of the chapter 13 case prior to conversion is false. Additionally, 11 U.S.C. § 1307 does not grant a debtor an absolute right to dismiss a case post-conversion. Therefore, the bankruptcy court’s order denying relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), at issue in BAP Case No. 22-8018, is AFFIRMED. The Panel also GRANTS the trustee’s motion to dismiss BAP Case No. 22-8020.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s decision to dismiss an action under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 34A.02 and the doctrine of unclean hands. The plaintiff is a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist who alleges that she was harassed and discriminated against while working for the defendant, a prominent physician group in Memphis, Tennessee. The trial court found that dismissal was warranted because the plaintiff “willfully deleted text messages from her personal electronic devices after being placed on notice regarding her preservation obligations, resulting in the deletion, and therefore spoliation, of critical evidence that cannot be recovered.” This appeal followed. We conclude that the doctrine of unclean hands does not apply in this case because the plaintiff’s misconduct relates to the litigation as a whole, not to her claims. Nonetheless, we also conclude that the trial court did not exceed its discretion by dismissing the case as a sanction for the plaintiff’s intentional spoliation of evidence under Rule 34A.02.

This is a breach of contract action between a lender, borrower, and guarantor on a promissory note. When the borrower ceased payment on the promissory note and the borrower and guarantor failed to cure the default, the lender commenced this action against the borrower and the guarantor. After extensive discovery, the lender passed away, and the personal representatives of the lender’s estate were substituted as the party plaintiffs. The estate filed a motion for summary judgment based on two grounds. The first ground was that in their discovery responses, the defendants admitted that they failed to remit payments as required by the promissory note. Second, the defendants’ discovery responses denied that the defendants had any facts or evidence upon which to support the affirmative defenses that the lender violated the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing and/or that the note was unenforceable. The defendants filed a response in opposition to the summary judgment motion, supported by the affidavit of the president of both defendants. Relying on the affidavit, the defendants asserted, for the first time, that neither defendant was ever liable for the debt because the lender had never remitted the loan proceeds to the borrower. The trial court ruled that the bulk of the affidavit was inadmissible on three grounds. First, it found the officer’s testimony regarding conversations with the deceased lender inadmissible under the Dead Man’s Statute, Tennessee Code Annotated § 24-1-203. Second, it found certain statements were directly contradictory to previous discovery responses, so the court accordingly rejected the evidence under the Cancellation Rule. Third, it found the business records the affiant referenced in his affidavit but did not produce failed to satisfy the best evidence rule. After considering the statement of undisputed facts, discovery responses, and the defendants’ admissions, the trial court concluded that the material facts were undisputed and that the estate was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, it granted the estate’s motion and awarded a judgment for the outstanding principal and interest totaling $260,710.00 and $12,445.28 in attorneys’ fees and expenses. The defendants appealed. We affirm.

In a prior appeal involving this case, this Court vacated the trial court’s decision to require the Appellants herein to interplead funds, but we otherwise affirmed the trial court’s actions, including the dismissal of the underlying case. Following our remand for further proceedings consistent with the appellate opinion, such as the collection of costs, the trial court ruled, notwithstanding our prior affirmance of the case’s dismissal, that the case “shall be Dismissed With Prejudice” but upon the payment of $300,000.00 into the registry of the court. The trial court further dismissed, without prejudice, a petition to enforce an attorney’s lien that plaintiff’s former attorneys had attempted to get the trial court to adjudicate in the present litigation. Because this Court’s prior opinion affirmed the trial court’s previous dismissal, thus ending the underlying case, we conclude that the trial court’s efforts to condition dismissal of the case on remand was in error. Regarding the petition for enforcement of an attorney’s lien, the issue raised for our review on appeal is whether the trial court should have transferred the matter to another court division as opposed to dismissing the petition without prejudice. For the reasons stated herein, we discern no error with the trial court’s disposition on that issue.

This is the second appeal involving the termination of a mother’s parental rights to this child. Following a bench trial, the court found that clear and convincing evidence existed to support termination but failed to identify any specific statutory section in support of its decision. We vacated the trial court’s decision and remanded for sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. Upon remand, the court offered additional findings of fact and conclusions of law before ultimately holding that the evidence presented established the following statutory grounds of termination: (1) abandonment and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to care for the child. The court also found that termination of the mother’s rights was in the best interest of the child. We now affirm the court’s ultimate termination decision.