CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. District courts, it is broadly accepted, enjoy tremendous freedom in managing their caseload. That flexibility stems in part from the fact that no two district courts are the same. Nor do any two courts employ the same exact practices in overseeing their dockets. Those practices can reflect more art than science, given the unique demands each court faces. But at times, art must yield to science, so to speak. That is the case with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. As an overarching goal, the Rules seek to promote procedural uniformity across the federal courts. As a result, the conventions those Rules set out may cede only so much to the whims of a particular district court. Sometimes, a district court can deviate so far from the Rules that its practices amount to an abuse of discretion.

This is such a case. The district court utilized an “administrative closure” to suspend and ultimately dismiss this suit. That practice comes from judicial fiat, not the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which articulate different procedures for dispensing with a case. In this instance, the district court’s deployment of local practices is irreconcilable with the requirements set forth in the Rules. Accordingly, we reverse the district court and remand the case for further consideration.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Four employees of the J.M. Smucker Company sought religious exemptions from the company’s vaccine requirements. When the company refused, they filed this free-exercise claim under the First Amendment against Smucker’s. Constitutional guarantees conventionally apply only to entities that exercise sovereign power, such as federal, state, or local governments, and, in some other instances, tribal governments. Smucker’s may be a big company. But it is not a sovereign. Even so, did Smucker’s become a federal actor—did it exercise sovereign power?—for purposes of this free-exercise claim when it sold products to the federal government and when it imposed the vaccine mandate because the federal government required it to do so as a federal contractor? No, as the district court correctly held. We affirm.

In this divorce case, Wife/Appellant appeals the trial court’s: (1) pre-trial rulings concerning certain entities; (2) denial of her motions for leave to amend the complaint for divorce; (3) pre-trial procedural rulings; (4) evidentiary rulings; (5) designation of Husband/Appellee as the primary residential parent and parent with sole decision-making authority over the parties’ child; (6) child support award; (7) alimony award; (8) denial of retroactive temporary support; and (9) denial of her request for attorney’s fees. Wife also asks this Court to award her attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we vacate in part, reverse in part, and affirm in part. Wife’s request for appellate attorney’s fees is denied.

Appellant seeks to appeal a decision regarding a Criminal Injuries Compensation Act claim on the small claims docket of the Tennessee Claims Commission. Because appeals of decisions from the small claims docket are prohibited by Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-403(a)(2), the chancellor granted the Claims Commission’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.

A mother obtained an order of protection against her son in general sessions court. The son appealed to circuit court. Through the parties’ inaction, the case languished for more than five years, leading to the circuit court dismissing the case. In response, the son filed various motions and documents seeking restoration of the case to the docket and further relief, which resulted in a hearing and additional orders being entered by the circuit court. Through these orders, the circuit court ruled in accordance with the son’s position that the order of protection was no longer in effect and had not been in effect for years. The circuit court also concluded that, given the parties’ inaction and because the case had become moot, dismissal rather than restoration to the docket was appropriate. The son appealed. We conclude that for purposes of this appeal the case is moot.

This case involves the termination of a mother’s parental rights. The trial court’s order concluded that the child at issue was a victim of severe abuse perpetrated by the mother and that termination of her parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother now appeals. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Wendy Reinberg pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. She claims that she was entitled to a shorter sentence under the safety-valve provision. But to receive the benefit of that provision, she had to show by a preponderance of the evidence that she disclosed everything she knew about her crime and the surrounding circumstances. The district court concluded that Reinberg failed to carry her burden. We affirm.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. When Stephen Akridge requested resentencing under the First Step Act, he represented that he remained a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Citing Akridge’s concession, serious criminal conduct, and post-sentencing misconduct, the district court declined to reduce his sentence. We affirm.

The Defendant, Harrison Alexander Mason, was convicted in the Fayette County Circuit Court of three counts of rape of a child, three counts of aggravated sexual battery, and one count of solicitation of a minor and received an effective sentence of fifty-seven years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by failing to exclude statements made by the victim during her forensic interviews pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b); that the trial court committed plain error by giving a “vague” curative instruction and waiting until the final jury charge to give the instruction; and that the trial court’s errors require reversal of the convictions under the cumulative error doctrine. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a breach of contract case that concerned whether the contract at issue lacked consideration due to an illusory promise. Specifically, the terms of the contract provided that the plaintiff would produce as many programs “as is feasible.” The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment. The claims commission granted the State of Tennessee’s motion for summary judgment finding that the contract between the parties was devoid of consideration due to an illusory promise and was therefore unenforceable. Additionally, the claims commission denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to liability and denied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment as to damages finding that the issue was moot. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.