Today the coram nobis (“before us”) remedy helps a few clients convicted of crimes. We’ve had it in Tennessee since 1955, and it’s now codified at Tenn. Code Ann. §40-26-105. Although that statute purports to incorporate procedures governing the writ in civil cases, the civil statutes were superseded in 1971 by adoption of Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 and the Advisory Commission Comment. Confusingly, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 27-7-101 through 108 are still in Volume 4A of the official Code.

By Bryan A. Garner | Oxford University Press | $42.84 | 991 pages | 2011

I am nutty enough to enjoy reading dictionaries. Three are at my left hand: the one I’m reviewing and Black’s (edited by Garner) and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate. A fourth is within left arm’s reach: the compact OED.

Why do smart appellate judges write “pled guilty?” I see that sin constantly in my weekly stack of slip opinions. Professor Garner gently suggests that pleaded guilty should be used.

The Civil War Sesquicentennial has caused a revival of interest in Abraham Lincoln. Let’s examine some evidentiary issues that arose before, during, and after his presidency.

For transitory actions generally, a plaintiff has two venue choices. The plaintiff can commence the action in the county where the defendant resides or in the county where the cause of action arose. Tenn. Code Ann. §20-4-101(a). What about suing in any county where the defendant can be served with summons and complaint (“is found”)? This third choice is slowly fading from practice. If your client’s cause of action accrued on or after Oct. 1, 2011, this option is unavailable. Chapter 510 of the 2011 Public Acts so provides.

John George Haigh was born in England on July 24, 1907, to religious parents. But the only child embarked on a life of crime when he reached adulthood. Honest blue collar and white collar jobs bored him. Criminal financial fraud schemes struck his fancy.

In a medical malpractice action the plaintiff must have a doctor from Tennessee or a border state testify to “the recognized standard of acceptable professional practice in the profession and the specialty thereof, if any, that the defendant practices in the community in which the defendant practices or in a similar community at the time the alleged
injury or wrongful action occurred.”[1]

The quoted locality rule holds the defendant doctor to the standard of care in his or her local community. In contrast, we lawyers are held to a statewide standard of care.[2]

On Monday, April 25, 1938, Justice Louis Dembitz Brandeis issued his last major opinion. It was Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64. He and five colleagues overturned Swift v. Tyson, which had been around for almost a century and can now be found at 41 U.S. 1 (1842).

In Hughestown, Pennsylvania, at a little past midnight on Friday, July 27, 1934, Harry James Tompkins was walking home along a footpath parallel to the railroad tracks. He was struck by something protruding from a passing train and fell beneath the wheels; his right arm was severed.

We usually consult Civil Procedure Rule 15.03 when we have sued the wrong defendant. As I wrote back in April 2006, we should act fast to remedy the situation. Amend to substitute the correct defendant and serve a new summons and complaint within 120 days after commencement. That’s conclusive proof that the correct defendant knew of the mistake.

Mary Pullins was a young mother (age 22) in July 1973 when she was admitted to Fentress County Hospital complaining of chest pain. During the evening of July 20 she was bitten on the left thigh by a brown recluse spider. These deadly pests infested the exterior of the hospital; some crept inside through crevices. The All-American Extermination Company had failed to eradicate them.

By Joshua Kendall | G.P. Putnam’s Sons | $26.95 | 355 pages | 2010