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Posted by: Kreis White & Christy Gibson on Sep 10, 2012

DKB TRUCKING COMPANY, LLC v. JNJ EXPRESS, INC.
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Timothy A. Housholder, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, DKB Trucking, LLC.

Trevor L. Sharpe and Raymond G. Lewallen, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, JNJ Express, Inc.

Judge: BENNETT

Plaintiff sued for damages for the destruction of a tractor and trailer and for the loss of its use. Defendants moved for a directed verdict, arguing that loss of use and/or loss of profits cannot be recovered because the property was destroyed and it was not unique. The jury found liability for the destruction of the property and for loss of use and/or loss of profits. The trial court then granted a directed verdict on the loss of use/loss of profits, stating that such damages cannot be recovered for destroyed property. Plaintiff appeals. We reverse.

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Posted by: Kreis White & Christy Gibson on Sep 5, 2012

DORIS HINKLE, ET AL. v. KINDRED HOSPITAL, ET AL.
With a concurring in part and dissenting in part opinion

Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Bede O. M. Anyanwu, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Doris Hinkle, Executrix of the estate of Muriel Jesse Hinkle deceased, and Doris Hinkle.

Heidi Anne Barcus, Hillary Browning Jones, Daniel T. Swanson, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Dr. Tuan Quoc Nguyen; Harry Peoples Ogden, Kenny L. Saffles, Carrie C. McCutcheon, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Kindred Hospital.

Judge: COTTRELL

The widow of a man who suffered a devastating injury while undergoing a medical procedure in the defendant hospital filed suit against the hospital and the doctor who ordered the procedure, claiming medical malpractice, failure to obtain informed consent, and battery. The defendant hospital filed a motion for summary judgment, and the defendant doctor filed a motion to dismiss, both arguing that the plaintiff’s malpractice claims had to be dismissed because she failed to strictly comply with requirements of the Medical Malpractice Act, specifically Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-121 (a)(1) (60-day notice) and §29-26-122(a) (certificate of good faith). The trial court granted both motions in part and denied them in part. We reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the medical malpractice claims against both defendants as well as the related claims. We also reverse the trial court’s dismissal of the claim against the defendant doctor for failure to obtain the patient’s informed consent, but we affirm its dismissal of the medical battery claim against the defendant doctor.

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Posted by: Kreis White on Sep 5, 2012

JEFFERY SMITH and BRENDA K. SMITH v. METHODIST HOSPITALS OF MEMPHIS, ET AL.
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Lenal Anderson, Jr., Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellants, Jeffery Smith and Brenda K. Smith

Jill Steinberg, John R. Branson, Mason W. Wilson, Ormonde B. DeAllaume, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Methodist Healthcare - Memphis Hospitals

Judge: HIGHERS

This lawsuit originated as a medical malpractice action that was filed against the Hospital and other defendants in 2000. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on the medical malpractice claim in 2003 because Plaintiffs had failed to come forward with competent testimony from a medical doctor regarding causation. Thereafter, Plaintiffs filed a supplemental complaint to allege that the Hospital had tortiously interfered with the Plaintiffs’ contract with a nurse expert witness. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital on this claim in 2010. Plaintiffs appealed. We affirm the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the issue of tortious interference with contract, but we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary judgment on the medical malpractice claim and remand for further proceedings

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Posted by: Kreis White & Christy Gibson on Sep 5, 2012

ANNA PARKER, ADMINISTRATOR OF ESTATE OF WANDA FAYE DOBBS, DECEASED ET AL. v. PORTLAND NURSING & NURSING REHAB ET AL.
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Deborah Truby Riordan, Little Rock, Arkansas; Cameron C. Jehl and Carey L. Acerra, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Anna Parker, Administrator of the Estate of Wanda Faye Dobbs, deceased, and on behalf of the wrongful death beneficiaries of Wanda Faye Dobbs.

Heidi A. Barcus, Jennifer Pearson Taylor, and Ian P. Hennessey, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Portland Nursing and Rehab Center, Inc. D/b/a Highland Manor Nursing & Rehab Center, Sunbelt Health Care Centers, Inc. A/k/a Adventist Care Centers, Adventist Health System Sunbelt Healthcare Corporation, and Adventist Health System/Sunbelt, Inc.

Judge: CLEMENT

In this action, the plaintiff has attempted to assert claims for ordinary negligence and medical malpractice against nursing home defendants by filing two separate actions and then seeking to consolidate the cases or to amend the complaint to assert both types of claims in one case. The first complaint filed only asserted claims for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants. Sixty days after having given the statutory notice to the healthcare providers of her intent to file medical malpractice claims, the plaintiff commenced a separate action against the same nursing home defendants and an additional defendant, a physician who treated the nursing home patient, by filing a complaint for medical malpractice. Upon motions of the nursing home defendants, the trial court refused to consolidate the cases, dismissed the medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants upon the ground of a prior suit pending, and denied the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in the first case to add claims for medical malpractice against the nursing home defendants. Having determined that the plaintiff complied with Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-26- 121(a) by giving the requisite 60 days notice to the medical providers and that the statute of limitations had not run, we have concluded that the trial court erred in denying the plaintiff’s Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 15.01 motion to amend the complaint. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to grant the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint for ordinary negligence against the nursing home defendants thus allowing the plaintiff to assert medical malpractice claims against the nursing home defendants and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion

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Posted by: Kreis White on Aug 30, 2012

SAPINDER SINGH v. LARRY FOWLER TRUCKING, INC.
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Charles H. Barnett, III and Sarah E. Barnett, Jackson, Tennessee, for the appellant, Sapinder Singh.

Nicholas E. Bragorgos and Pam Warnock Blair, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellee, Larry Fowler Trucking, Inc.

Judge: STAFFORD

This case arises from an accident involving two semi-trucks. The truck owned by Appellee trucking company rear-ended the truck driven by Appellant, causing injury to Appellant’s back. Litigation ensued and the Appellee filed a motion in limine to exclude portions of Appellant’s medical expert’s testimony concerning Appellant’s possible future need for surgery and the costs thereof. The trial court granted the motion, and Appellant appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm.

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Posted by: Kreis White & Christy Gibson on Aug 29, 2012

TERESA HOLT, ET AL. v. THE DOLLYWOOD COMPANY
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

John D. Agee and Bradley D. Williams, Clinton, Tennessee, for the appellants, Teresa Holt and Archie J. Holt.

Daniel M. Gass, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, The Dollywood Company, a joint venture between Dolly Parton Productions, Inc. and Herschend Family Entertainment Corp.

Judge: SWINEY

Teresa Holt and Archie J. Holt (“Plaintiffs”) sued The Dollywood Company, a joint venture between Dolly Parton Productions, Inc. and Herschend Family Entertainment Corp. (“Defendant”) with regard to injuries Ms. Holt received as a result of her fall on a Dollywood tram. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. After a hearing, the Trial Court granted Defendant summary judgment finding and holding, inter alia, that Ms. Holt’s own negligence was the primary cause of her fall and that Ms. Holt was at least 50% at fault. Plaintiffs appeal to this Court. We find and hold that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Holt was less than 50% at fault. We, therefore, reverse the Trial Court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.

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Posted by: Kreis White & Christy Gibson on Aug 29, 2012

ELLIOT H. HIMMELFARB, M.D., ET AL. v. TRACY R. ALLAIN
Court: TN Supreme Court

Attorneys:

Christopher Kim Thompson, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Tracy R. Allain

M. Todd Sandahl, Franklin, Tennessee, for the appellees, Elliot H. Himmelfarb, M.D., Elliot H. Himmelfarb, M.D., P.A., and Douglas C. York, M.D.

Judge: HOLDER

A patient discovered that a guide wire had been left in her vein during a prior medical procedure. She filed a medical malpractice action against the doctors who performed the procedure and the hospital where the procedure was performed. The patient voluntarily dismissed the medical malpractice suit pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41 when she was informed that another party was responsible for the presence of the guide wire. The doctors named in the original suit filed a malicious prosecution action against the patient. The patient filed a motion for summary judgment alleging that the doctors could not prove that the prior suit had been terminated in their favor. The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial. We hold that a voluntary nonsuit taken pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41 is not a favorable termination on the merits for purposes of a malicious prosecution claim. We reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court for entry of summary judgment in favor of the patient and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
 

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Posted by: Kreis White & Christy Gibson on Aug 29, 2012

A good treatment of the cancellation rule and equitable ownership of personal property:
 
JAMES LYNCH, SR. v. CLEON PORTIS
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Ricky E. Wilkins and Sharon Harless Loy, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, James Lynch, Sr.

C. Michael Becker, Germantown, Tennessee, for the appellee, Cleon Portis.

Judge: FARMER

The trial court awarded summary judgment to Defendant on Plaintiff’s claim for property damages arising from a motor vehicle collision, finding that Plaintiff did not own the vehicle allegedly damaged. On appeal, Plaintiff asserts the trial court erred by awarding summary judgment to Defendant where ownership of the vehicle is a genuine issue of material fact. We reverse the award of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings.

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Posted by: Kreis White on Aug 28, 2012

Dementia Extends the Statute of Limitations in Conversion Suit

ANN LANGFORD ET AL. v. JEANE CLARK
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Gregory D. Smith and Travis N. Meeks, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jeane Clark.

Roger Alan Maness, Clarksville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Ann Langford, Russell Adkins and John Adkins.

Judge: CLEMENT

In this conversion action, the trial court entered judgment against the defendant upon findings that she abused a confidential relationship, exerted undue influence, and improperly converted funds of her sister while she had dementia. The defendant appeals contending the action is time barred; she also contends the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidence the deposition of her sister’s physician because she did not receive notice of the deposition. We have determined that the statute of limitations was tolled from the accrual of the claim of conversion until the death of the defendant’s sister due to the sister being of unsound mind and that the action was timely filed after her death. We also find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the deposition into evidence because the trial court afforded the defendant the opportunity to depose the physician but she failed to do so. Accordingly, we affirm.

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