TBA Law Blog


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Posted by: John Day on May 1, 2013

The roots of the Tennessee state tree, the tulip poplar, grow into the earth in search of water and minerals. When confronting poor soil conditions or physical impediments, the roots typically change direction to accomplish their mission of absorbing and storing nutrients and providing a solid anchor for the tree. The above-ground result: trees of 10 stories or more that bloom with glorious flowers each spring and provide a ready source of fine lumber for home and other construction.

Posted by: John Day on Jan 1, 2013

Pick up a complaint in any automobile wreck case where the defendant driver was not the owner of the vehicle operated at the time of the wreck and you will almost certainly see a reference to Tenn. Code Ann. § 55-10-311(a). This article will discuss the benefit of this statute and its limitations.

The portion of Section 311(a) that is used the most frequently[1] provides as follows:

Posted by: John Day on Sep 1, 2012

The conventional wisdom is that net proceeds[1] from wrongful death cases in Tennessee are distributed under the law of intestate succession. However, while our wrongful death statutes expressly tell us that wrongful death proceeds are free from the claims of creditors,[2] they do not mention use of the law of intestate succession as a method of distribution of the monies.

Posted by: John Day on May 1, 2012

‘Mills v. Fulmarque’ Reinforces Importance of Strategic Thinking in Tort Cases

Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-1-119 is one of the most important statutes for tort law practitioners in Tennessee. The statute, which defines the circumstances under which a plaintiff can add a party defendant to a tort case notwithstanding the expiration of the statute of limitations, plays a potential role in virtually any case in which comparative fault is an issue.

Posted by: John Day on Jan 2, 2012

One of the little-discussed changes to Tennessee tort law contained in the Tennessee Civil Justice Act of 2011 is a change of the law concerning the liability of sellers of defective or unreasonably dangerous products.

Under the previous version of Tenn. Code Ann. §29-28-106, a seller of a product could be sued for strict liability under very limited circumstances. Lawyers representing plaintiffs were able to avoid the limitation on seller liability by filing breach of implied warranty claims against sellers.

Posted by: John Day on Sep 7, 2011

On Sept. 1, 2011, the Tennessee Supreme Court is set to hear oral arguments in a very significant case. At issue: whether vicarious liability will be imposed on an employer for the negligence of an independent contractor.

Posted by: John Day on Apr 28, 2011

On May 11 the Tennessee Supreme Court will hear oral argument on a case that has profound implications for all tort lawyers and their clients. The court’s resolution of this case will explore the difference between “facts,” “data” and “opinions,” and will determine whether an expert witness should be permitted to testify about the expert’s conversations with another expert who was not called as a witness.

Posted by: John Day on Dec 22, 2010

As we leave the holiday season behind, we notice that the Court of Criminal Appeals left two gifts behind the tree to lawyers who practice personal injury law on behalf of plaintiffs. These are unusual gifts from an unusual source, but they have the propensity to impact tort lawyers and their clients.

Posted by: John Day on Sep 24, 2010

The opinion in Cox v. M.A. Primary and Urgent Care Clinic[1] does more than tell us who can testify on the standard of care of a physician's assistant in a medical malpractice case. It also reminds us of the risk of attempting to push the envelope without a parachute.

Posted by: John Day on Apr 27, 2010

The Tennessee Supreme Court's opinion in Banks v. Elks Club Pride of Tennessee 1102 [1] is full of lots of interesting things, one of which can be addressed in the space provided for this article. The Banks Court delivered a death blow to the odd notion that the affirmative defense of comparative fault of a nonparty should be treated differently than any other affirmative defense and that the party asserting it did not have the burden of proof.


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