The TBA’s Labor and Employment Forum provides timely, specialized and practical information on a range of topics presented by Tennessee’s premier labor and employment practitioners. This year’s topics include legal developments in the practice area, the Affordable Care Act’s impact on employment, ADR, wage and hour issues from both sides of the bar, ethics, and much more. Continental breakfast will also be provided.

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CHRISTINA A. BROWN, ET. AL. v. MARISOL JUAREZ, ET. AL.
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Carl R. Ogle and C. Scott Justice, Jefferson City, Tennessee, for the appellants, Christina A. Brown, individually and as next friend of Joshua S. Brown and Jaleigh J. Brown, and Daniel Robert Nevins, personal representative for the Estate of Barbara Ann Monnett.

Joseph M. Huffaker and John C. Howell, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, Marisol Juarez, Advance Auto Parts, Inc., and Advance Stores Company.

Judge: MCCLARTY

This appeal involves Plaintiffs’ motion to set aside an order to dismiss for failure to prosecute in a personal injury action. The trial court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

.PDF Version of Case

Comment on this Article

ESSE BENTLEY V. WELLMONT HEALTH SYSTEM, ET. AL.
Court: TN Court of Appeals

Attorneys:

Carroll C. Johnson, III and Timothy R. Holton, Memphis, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jesse Bentley, by and through his next friend and mother, Tonie Bentley.

Robert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter, Joseph F. Whalen, Assistant Solicitor General, and Stephanie A. Bergmeyer, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

Jimmie C. Miller and Meredith B. Humbert, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, Wellmont Health System d/b/a Wellmont Bristol Regional Medical Center.

Charles T. Herndon, IV and Elizabeth M. Hutton, Johnson City, Tennessee, for the appellee, Jeffrey McQueary, M.D.

Andrew T. Wampler, Kingsport, Tennessee, for the appellee, David O. Marden, D.O.

Judge: MCCLARTY

This is a health care liability action in which Defendants sought dismissal, claiming that the action was barred by the three-year statute of repose, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26-116, as interpreted by Calaway v. Schucker, 193 S.W.3d 509 (Tenn. 2005). Plaintiff alleged that the Court’s interpretation of the statute was unconstitutional as applied to his case. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the case. Plaintiff appeals. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

.PDF Version of Case

Comment on this Article

By Jeb Gerth*

The first quarter of 2014 has been marked by significant activity in the world of organized labor, both in highly publicized organizing efforts by unions, and in activity with the current National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”).  In the world of union organizing efforts, anyone watching national news a couple of months ago saw a hotly contested, and highly-publicized union election at Volkswagen in Chattanooga, Tennessee.  That election resulted in a defeat to the United Auto Workers Union, in a rather odd election where Volkswagen management was accused of colluding with UAW to coerce employees to accept representation, while many state politicians publicly opposed organizing efforts, sparking a post-election challenge to the results of the election.  This post-election challenge is still pending. 

Several weeks ago, the Regional Director of the NLRB in Chicago ruled Northwestern University football players are university “employees” within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act, and are thus entitled to petition for an election to determine whether they can collectively bargain with the university.  This decision is being appealed to the full NLRB, but regardless of the outcome, there can be little question that union organizing will continue to catch the attention of the popular media, not just labor and employment lawyers, for the foreseeable future.

Less prevalent in the popular news media this year, but of likely broader potential impact to employers and unions, are the NLRB’s newly proposed “Quickie Election” rules, announced by the NLRB on February 5, 2014, sometimes referred to by critics as “ambush election” rules.  According to the NLRB, these new proposed rules are designed to speed up and streamline the process of conducting union elections.  This is not a new concept with the current NLRB.  In June 2011, the NLRB proposed this same set of rules.  The proposed rules were followed by a public comment period and two days of hearings after which a three-member board revised the rules to reflect the input provided.  The revised rules, supported by only two members of the NLRB, were quickly struck down by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in May 2012 when the Court concluded that the NLRB, with only two participating members, lacked a quorum to adopt and implement new rules.  See Chamber of Commerce v. NLRB, 879 F. Supp. 2d 18 (D.D.C. 2012).  On January 22, 2014, the NLRB, now at “full strength” with five members, rescinded its “Quickie Election” rules consistent with the district court’s decision in Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. NLRB setting aside that rule.

Just weeks later on February 5, 2014, the NLRB announced its new proposed “Quickie Election” rules, which are identical to the “Quickie Election” rules proposed in June 2011.  Notably, the NLRB did not incorporate into its newly proposed rules the changes it incorporated after the nearly 66,000 comments it received in response to its 2011 proposed rules or the two days of hearings conducted.  It instead re-proposed the same original rules.  It has assured interested parties that it will reconsider the previously submitted comments, and has encouraged new, previously un-submitted comments only.  In support of this approach, NLRB Chairman Mark Gaston Pearce states the rules proposed in June 2011 “continue[] to best frame the issues and raise[] the appropriate concerns for public comment …. Reissuing the 2011 proposal is the most efficient and effective rulemaking process at this time.” 

The proposed election rules that are “back on the table” would, among other things:

·               Require that all pre-election hearings take place seven days after a petition, cutting the current 14-day period in half; and require elections to be held at the “earliest date practicable.”

·               Require the applicable employer to provide the union with an Excelsior list setting forth names, home addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, work locations, shifts, and job classifications of all employees eligible to vote in the election.  Absent the agreement of the union, the employer would be required to provide the Excelsior list within two days of the approval of an election agreement or Direction of Election.

·               Defer the employer’s right to request pre-election review of the Regional Director’s decision, until after the election.

·               Require the applicable employer to file with the NLRB a “statement of position” by the hearing date, setting out the employer’s position on multiple, identified legal issues, such as the composition and/or scope of the bargaining unit.  Any issues not addressed would be waived by the employer.  

Under the current rules, elections typically take place within about 39 days of the filing of the petition.  The new rules would speed that process up significantly, to something closer to two to three weeks. 

So would this “Quickie”  election procedure, which in part speeds up the process by moving many pre-election challenges to after the election, actually speed up the process or instead result in post-election delays due to increased litigation and post-election adjudication?  Additionally, what would the impact be on employee privacy were employers required to turn over employee phone numbers and email addresses, all upon two-days notice?  These issues have been raised in prior comments and will likely be raised again. 

The public comment period closed on April 7, 2014, and the NLRB is conducting hearings on the proposed rules during the week of April 7, 2014.  We will have to wait and see what changes, if any, the NLRB makes to the rules before adoption and implementation.  It appears that the NLRB is committed to implementing new rules as quickly as possible in light of its refusal to entertain congressional requests to extend the public comment period by 30 days.

Critics in Congress are not waiting to see what the NLRB ultimately proposes after the public comment period and hearings conclude.  On March 27, 2014, Republican lawmakers in the House and Senate announced the introduction of legislation to counteract the key provisions in the NLRB’s proposed rules in two separate bills, the “Workplace Democracy and Fairness Act” (HR 4320), and the “Employee Privacy Protection Act” (HR 4321).  Under the Workplace Democracy and Fairness Act, the timing of elections would have to be at least 35 days after the filing of the election petition (about the time it currently takes to hold an election), employers would have at least 14 days to prepare and challenge a union petition at a pre-election hearing, and the NLRB would be required to rule on pre-election challenges before certifying the results of an election.  Under the Employee Privacy Protection Act, employers would not be required to provide contact information for employees until seven days after the NLRB identified the appropriate bargaining unit, and even then, employees would be able to choose the contact information shared with the union, in contrast to the proposed rule requiring early disclosure of employee phone numbers and email addresses.

Lest there remain any doubt that all interested constituencies have the broader labor relations landscape in mind as battle lines on the proposed “Quickie Election” rules are drawn, consider the recent statement of Congressman George Miller of California, the senior Democrat on the House Education and the Workforce Committee:

 [The proposed Republican legislation] is a cynical effort to kill a modest, common sense rule that will give workers a fair, modern and standardized process for deciding whether they want to be represented by a union.  As we saw during the recent union vote at Volkswagen’s Chattanooga, Tenn., plant, the current process is flawed, allowing bad actors to interfere in elections and delay workers’ ability to exercise their fundamental rights.

Congressman Miller’s statement arguably concludes the “current process is flawed” based on his disagreement with the outcome, and his reference to “bad actors” sounds a bit like additional politicking in what was a highly politicized union election.  Setting party affiliations, political ideologies, and perspectives on labor relations aside, there can be no doubt that the current proposed rules have become a political battle line, and the ultimate result will be hotly contested in Congress or in court, regardless of the particular rules the NRLB ultimately adopts.

_______________________________________

*John “Jeb” Gerth is a partner at Waller Law Firm in Nashville, Tennessee. Jeb is the incoming Chair of the Labor & Employment Law Section. He is a graduate of University of Tennessee Law School. Jeb may be reached at jeb.gerth@wallerlaw.com or (615) 850-8180.

By Laura Anthony*

On January 14, 2014, a divided Sixth Circuit panel in Deleon v. Kalamazoo County Road Commission[i] ruled that a lateral transfer constituted an adverse employment action, reversing the district court’s decision that granted summary judgment to the employer on the employee’s federal race, national origin, and age discrimination claims.  In so doing, in my opinion, the Sixth Circuit improperly applied a broader definition of adverse employment action to the employee’s discrimination claims.

Timing is Everything

In Deleon, the employee applied for a job transfer to Equipment and Facilities Superintendent position in November 2008 because he viewed the new position as providing better potential for career advancement. The posting for the open position described the working conditions as “primarily in the office and in garage where there is exposure to loud noises and diesel fumes.”[ii] The employee did not receive the position, but the successful applicant left the position shortly thereafter.  In 2009, the employer transferred the employee to the same Equipment and Facilities Superintendent position for which he had previously applied.  Shortly after his transfer, he began to complain about the diesel fumes and alleged he suffered from bronchitis and sinus headaches.

Four days after the employee had a contentious meeting with his supervisor involving the redesign of a truck, the employee was hospitalized for five days, which he attributed to work-induced stress and a stress-related mental breakdown. The employee then took leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act. When he was cleared to return to work by his psychiatrist, the employee learned he had been terminated for exhausting all of his leave.  He then filed charges for race, national origin, and age discrimination, asserting that the job transfer was an adverse employment action.[iii] The lower court disagreed and granted the employer summary judgment because it determined that transferring the employee was not an adverse action. 

The Sixth Circuit’s (Mis)reliance

The Sixth Circuit, while recognizing that a “mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities” was not enough to constitute an adverse employment action, nevertheless concluded a voluntary transfer may constitute an adverse employment action if there is a “less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.”[iv] In making this distinction, the Sixth Circuit relied heavily upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s reasoning in Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company v. White, [v] a Title VII retaliation case.

In Burlington Northern, the Supreme Court concluded the determination of whether the reassignment of an employee from a forklift operator to a track laborer position rose to the level of a materially adverse employment action was for the jury, given the evidence that the forklift operation position had a higher prestige, was considered a better job, and was less arduous than the track laborer position.[vi] The Supreme Court specifically noted that the scope of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision was broader than Title VII’s discrimination provision, in that it was not limited to the employer’s actions that affect the terms, conditions, or status of employment.[vii] Rather, the Supreme Court held in a Title VII retaliation claim that an employee must show that a reasonable employee would have found the employer’s challenged action “materially adverse.”[viii]  The Supreme Court noted that, while the terms “hire,” “discharge,” “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” “employment opportunities,” and “status as an employee” are in Title VII’s anti-discrimination provision, the anti-retaliation provision has no such limiting words.[ix] The Supreme Court reasoned the anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not discriminated against because of their status, while the anti-retaliation provision seeks to prevent an employer from interfering with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance enforcement of Title VII’s basic guarantees.[x]

The Sixth Circuit in Deleon, in concluding that the employee had made his threshold showing at the summary judgment stage, found there was a question of fact as to whether the transfer was materially adverse to a reasonable person, “especially in light of the factual similarities between the instant case and Burlington Northern.”[xi] In relying upon Burlington Northern, the Sixth Circuit specifically noted “an employer’s transfer may constitute a materially adverse employment action, even in the absence of a demotion or pay decrease, so long as the particular circumstances present give rise to some level of objective intolerability.”[xii] However, it appears the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on Burlington Northern was misplaced because that caseanalyzed a retaliation claim, not a discrimination claim. 

Moreover, other cases that the Sixth Circuit relied upon to support its holding that a lateral transfer constitutes an adverse employment action in a discrimination case  —  such as Hollins v. Atlantic Company,[xiii] Strouss v. Michigan Department of Corrections,[xiv] and Mattei v. Mattei[xv] — also analyzed retaliation claims.  Informatively, the discrimination cases the Sixth Circuit relied upon — Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.[xvi] and Policastro v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.[xvii] — all concluded the reassignments at issue were not adverse employment actions because, in relevant part, they did not involve a reduction in salary or benefits. 

Bad Decision for Employers (in more than one way)

The Deleon case is a concerning decision for at least two reasons.  The more obvious reason is that employers may face liability when they refuse to transfer an employee to a position for which they applied, or when they actually do transfer an employee to a position for which they applied.

Perhaps the less obvious reason is that it appears that the Sixth Circuit has broadened the definition of adverse employment action in discrimination cases, so it is effectively the same definition applied in retaliation cases.  Not only was this not the Supreme Court’s intention in Burlington Northern, but, more importantly, the Sixth Circuit has given more protection to employees than was originally intended by the legislature.  Given the Sixth Circuit’s mixed jurisprudence in these cases, later decisions may finally and conclusively show Deleon to be an outlier.  Until then, though, employers in the Sixth Circuit need to take special care in dealing with employees who may perceive an employment action taken against them as adverse.  Similarly, attorneys representing employers in discrimination cases need to be aware of the judicial landmine that is the Deleon decision — and have a plan for showing it to be the misapplication that it is.

By H. Rowan Leathers III*

On March 4, 2014, in Lawson et al. v. FMR LLC et al,[i] the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the scope of protection afforded to whistleblowers by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”).  In reversing the First Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held the whistleblower protections afforded by SOX extend to employees of contractors and subcontractors, who perform work for a public company, as well as the employees of that public company.  The significance of this decision is that individuals, employed by contractors for public companies who “blow the whistle” or engage in other protected activities, are now covered by the anti-retaliation provisions of SOX.  Contractors and subcontractors, according to the Supreme Court, include individuals and entities such as outside lawyers, accountants, portfolio managers, and other consultants and advisors. 

SOX, through 18 USC § 1514A, addresses the protections afforded to whistleblowers and provides in relevant portion as follows:

No [public] company … or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any other manner discriminate against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment because of [whistleblowing or other protected activity].

The public company involved in Lawson was a mutual fund that was part of the Fidelity family of mutual funds.  The plaintiffs, Jackie Hosang Lawson and Jonathan M. Zang, were employees of two private contractors that provided advisory and management services to the Fidelity fund involved. 

Lawson worked for FMR, LLC and its predecessors for 14 years, eventually serving as a Senior Director of Finance.  She alleged that, after she raised concerns about certain cost accounting methodologies, believing that they overstated expenses associated with operating mutual funds, she suffered a series of adverse actions, ultimately amounting to constructive discharge. 

Zang was employed by FMR Co. and its predecessors for eight years, having most recently served as a Portfolio Manager for several funds. He alleged he was fired in retaliation for raising concerns about inaccuracies in a draft SEC registration statement concerning certain Fidelity funds. 

Both Lawson and Zang filed administrative complaints with the U.S. Department of Labor and then ultimately lawsuits in district court. FMR moved to dismiss the lawsuits arguing that § 1514A protected only employees of public companies, not employees of private contractors.  The district court rejected FMR’s interpretation and denied its motion to dismiss. 

FMR filed an interlocutory appeal with the First Circuit Court of Appeals.  The First Circuit, with a divided panel, agreed with FMR and concluded “an employee” within the context of § 1514A referred only to employees of public companies and did not cover a private contractor’s own employees.[ii]  Judge Thompson, who dissented, viewed the majority as having “impose[d] an unwarranted restriction on the intentionally broad language of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act” and “bar[red] a significant class of potential securities-fraud whistleblowers from any legal protection.”[iii]

The Supreme Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the judgment of the First Circuit.  Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the majority.  The Court focused on the “ordinary meaning” of the statutory provisions.  Justice Ginsburg borrowed from the First Circuit’s dissenting opinion in stating, “boiling [§ 1514A(a)] down to its relevant syntactic elements, it provides that ‘no … contractor … may discharge … an employee.’”  The Court determined the ordinary meaning of “an employee” in this proscription is the “contractor’s own employee.”[iv]

Through Congress’ enactment of the anti-retaliation provisions of SOX, the Supreme Court noted:

Of particular concern to Congress was abundant evidence that Enron succeeded in perpetuating its massive shareholder fraud in large part due to a ‘corporate code of silence’; that code, Congress found, ‘discouraged [the] employees from reporting fraudulent behavior not only to the proper authorities, such as the FBI and the SEC, but even internally.’  Congress identified the lack of whistleblower protection as ‘a significant deficiency’ in the law, for a complex securities fraud investigation, employees ‘are [often] the only firsthand witnesses to the fraud.’[v]

The Court additionally stated that “[a]lso clear from the legislative record is Congress’ understanding that outside professionals bear significant responsibility for reporting fraud by the public companies with whom they contract, and that fear of retaliation was the primary deterrent to such reporting by the employees of Enron’s contractors.”[vi]   The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of outside professionals “as gatekeepers who detect and deter fraud.”[vii]

Concluding its analysis, the Supreme Court stated Congress modeled § 1514A(a) after the Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century, 49 USC § 42121 (“AIR 21”), and borrowed the § 1514A prohibition against retaliation from the wording of AIR 21.[viii]  The anti-retaliation provision of AIR 21 provides “No air carrier or contractor or subcontractor of an air carrier may discharge an employee or otherwise discriminate against an employee with respect to compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment” (emphasis added) for engaging in protected activity.  The Supreme Court noted that AIR 21 has been read to protect, in addition to employees of air carriers, employees of contractors and subcontractors of the carriers.  Relying on AIR 21, the Supreme Court stated “[t[he provisions’ parallel text and purposes counsel in favor of interpreting the two provisions consistently.” 

The Supreme Court’s decision in Lawson reflects what appears to be a continuing trend to protect whistleblowers.  Employers must be sensitive to those concerns raised by employees regarding matters such as financial improprieties, safety and the like, and not simply view these employees as troublemakers or as possessing a bad attitude. 

By Michael Russell*

On January 27, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its decision in Sandifer, et al. v. United States Steel.[i] In Sandifer, the Supreme Court addressed the definition of “clothes” for purposes of section 3(o) exemption in the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Legal background

As a general proposition, the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) entitles employees to a certain minimum wage and overtime premium when they work more than 40 hours in a work week. The FLSA did not, however, define the words “work” or “work week.” According to Justice Scalia, this was “an omission that let loose a landslide of litigation.” [ii]

As a result, the Supreme Court handed down the 1946 case of Anderson v. Mount Clemmons Pottery.[iii]  In Mount Clemmons Pottery, the Supreme Court said the “statutory work week includes all time during which an employee is necessarily required to be in the employer’s premises, on duty or at a prescribed work place.”[iv] This included pursuing “certain preliminary activities after arriving … such as putting on aprons and overalls [and] removing shirts.”[v] The court held that these activities were work.

Congress, as it often does, did not like the Supreme Court’s holding. Therefore, they responded by passing the Portal-to-Portal Act. The Portal-to-Portal Act excluded from compensable time “activities which are preliminary to or post-liminary to [the] principal activity or activities” that begin the day.[vi] In the interpreting the Portal-to-Portal Act, the Department of Labor announced what has become known as the “continuous work day rule.”[vii] This rule basically says that the compensable work day begins at the point of the employee’s first principal activity. The gravamen of the continuous work day rule is it does not matter that the employee did not engage in work during the entire time period between his first and last principal activity. Under the “continuous work day rule,” the work day continues from the time of his principal activity to the time of his last principal activity.

In 1949, Congress once again amended the FLSA to include what is known as the section 3(o) exemption.[viii] Under the 3(o) exemption, time spent changing clothes can be excluded from the work day pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement or by custom or practice between the employer and union.

What the Court’s Holding Means

In Sandifer, the employees argued the word “clothes” should be construed to exclude items “designed and used to protect against work place hazards.” The clothing at issue was “a flame retardant jacket, pair of pants, and a hood; a hard hat; a snood; wristlets; work gloves; leggings, metatarsal boots; safety glasses, ear plugs; and a respirator.”[ix]The employees argued that there is a difference between “clothes” and “safety gear.”

The Supreme Court disagreed. They held “protective gear” is generally included within the meaning of “changing clothes” for purposes of the section 3(o) exemption. The Court acknowledged that such items as glasses and ear plugs are not “clothes.” However, they held that time spent changing those small items were de minimis. [x]

The takeaway from the Court’s holding is, quite simply, most protective gear falls within the definition of clothes for purposes of the section 3(o) exemption. Therefore, in a union workforce with an appropriately tailored collective bargaining agreement, the time spent putting on this safety gear will not be compensable. It will therefore not trigger the “continuous work day rule.”

What the Court’s Holding does not mean

While Sandifer could have far reaching consequences for the union workforce, one should be careful not to read it too broadly. There are a number of things that Sandifer does not mean. First, the Sandifer decision specifically recognizes that putting on the safety clothes at issue in this case would be compensable in a non-union work place. Justice Scalia recognized that for the company’s reliance on the section 3(o) exemption, this “donning-doffing time would otherwise be compensable under the Act.”[xi]

Second, the Court also recognized that the time donning other substantial tools and equipment would not be excluded from compensable work time, regardless of whether the employer is unionized. The Court specifically recognized that “[o]ur definition leaves room for distinguishing between clothes and wearable items that are not clothes, such as equipment and devices.”[xii]

Conclusion

In summary, the Sandifer decision was justifiably greeted with a positive reaction from employers with unionized workforces. It clears any ambiguity. To the extent it has an application to non-unionized workplaces, it merely clarifies that donning safety equipment generally is a compensable activity that begins the work day under the “continuous work day rule.”

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*Michael Russell is a partner in the law firm of Gilbert Russell McWherter in their Brentwood, Tennessee office. Michael is a graduate of University of Memphis Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law. He writes a blog on Tennessee workplace issues, located at http://www.tennesseeworkplacelaw.com/. Michael may be reached at mrussell@gilbertfirm.com or (615) 354-1144.

Here’s the latest newsletter from TBA’s Labor and Employment Section.  I want to thank this issue's authors for their well-written articles – Michael Russell, Rowan Leathers, Jeb Garth and Laura Anthony. If you have an article or idea for an article, I urge you to e-mail me at bbuchanan@visalaw.com or call me at 615-345-0266.

Bruce Buchanan

Each bar year the Executive Council is tasked with developing a CLE on behalf of TBA Law Office Technology/Management Section, sending out news to its section members, and responding to legislation.

Do you have an idea for a topic or speaker that you would like to see at our 2014-2015 CLE?  Do you have news that you think would be beneficial to section members or would be interested in contributing articles during the upcoming bar year?  Do you have concerns about legislation that may need to be reviewed during the upcoming bar year?  If so, send an email to cgibson@tnbar.org either now or anytime during the bar year and we will be happy to review your suggestions.  

It is important that our section members feel that they can contact us with concerns or suggestions.   

We look forward to hearing from you!

We would like to extend a special thanks to the TBA Law Office Technology/Management Section Executive Council for their dedication and hard work during the 2013-2014 Bar Year. 

2013-2014 Executive Council

Chair
Mark Donahoe
Hardee, Martin & Donahoe
Jackson, TN


Immediate Past Chair
Brandon Gibson
Pentecost & Glenn, PLLC
Jackson, TN


Middle TN Delegate
Bill Ramsey
Neal & Harwell PLC
Nashville, TN


Middle TN Delegate
Kate Scarbrough
Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP
Nashville, TN


Middle TN Delegate
Phil Walker
Waddey & Patterson, PC
Nashville, TN
 

Middle TN Delegate
Eddie Davidson
Law Office of R. Eddie Davidson
Nashville, TN