This is a termination of parental rights case, focusing on Allyanna C., the minor child (“the Child”) of Allen C. (“Father”) and Annaliza H. (“Mother”). The Child was taken into protective custody by the Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”) on July 27, 2011, upon its investigation of environmental dangers in Mother’s home and subsequent determination that placement with Father was unsuitable. On April 16, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of both parents.

At issue in this conservatorship action is the amount and type of support the spouse of a ward is entitled to receive from the ward's estate pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 34-3- 109, which authorizes the court to “establish the amount of financial support to which the spouse . . . [is] entitled.” The ward's son and step-son from a previous marriage filed a petition for the appointment of a conservator; the ward's wife opposed the conservatorship. A conservatorship was created, and the court appointed third-party conservators for the ward's estate and person.

The Defendant, Jarus Smith, appeals as of right from his jury convictions for facilitation of attempted second degree murder, possession of contraband in a penal institution, and two counts of aggravated assault. One count of aggravated assault was merged into the facilitation conviction, and the trial court imposed consecutive terms of ten years for each of the remaining three convictions, resulting in a total effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration.

The defendant, Frederick DeWayne Gross, filed a motion to correct illegal sentences under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that his sentences were improperly ordered to be served concurrently. The trial court reviewed the motion and dismissed it without holding a hearing, having determined that the defendant did not present a colorable claim because there was no statute mandating consecutive sentencing in his case. The defendant appeals the trial court’s dismissal.

Defendant, Elashanti Dean, pled guilty to five counts of aggravated robbery in 1998. He filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, alleging that his concurrent sentences were illegal because he was released on bond in one case at the time he committed the crimes in four other cases. The trial court summarily dismissed the motion. Upon our thorough review of the record, we determine that Defendant has not presented a colorable claim for relief because the judgments are silent as to whether his sentences were to run concurrently or consecutively.

This appeal results from the trial court’s entry of a default judgment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The petitioner, Travis Ware, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because he received illegal concurrent sentences for crimes that he committed while released on bail. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The petitioner, Travis Ware, appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because he received illegal concurrent sentences for crimes that he committed while released on bail. Following our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant-Appellant, Jonathan Lavelle Ewing, appeals the trial court’s revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his effective eight-year sentence in the Department of Correction. He previously pled guilty to two counts of sale of .5 grams or more of cocaine and received concurrent eight-year sentences. He was ordered to serve one year in confinement with the remainder suspended and Ewing placed on probation. On appeal, Ewing argues that the trial court abused its discretion in reaching a decision that was unsupported by the evidence.

The trial court approved Petitioners’/Conservators’ petition to establish a Supplemental Needs Trust for their Ward but declined to approve a proposed remainder provision naming two charities as beneficiaries. The trial court ruled that any amounts remaining in the Trust when it terminated would be distributed under the laws of intestate succession. The trial court also excluded evidence offered by Petitioners to demonstrate what they asserted was the Ward’s intent. We affirm, as modified.