Petitioner, Cayetano Flores, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by operating under a conflict of interest, inadequately discussing various aspects of the case and the details of the plea agreement, and failing to file a motion to sever. After a careful review of the record, we affirm the prost-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

We granted this appeal to determine whether a party filing a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) states a colorable claim for relief for correction of an illegal sentence by alleging that the trial court increased his sentence above the statutory presumptive minimum sentence but failed to find enhancement factors justifying the increase.

We granted this appeal to determine whether Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 (“Rule 36.1”) permits parties to seek correction of expired illegal sentences. We hold that Rule 36.1 does not expand the scope of relief available for illegal sentence claims and therefore does not authorize the correction of expired illegal sentences. We also conclude that a Rule 36.1 motion alleging that a trial court failed to award pretrial jail credit is insufficient to state a colorable claim for relief from an illegal sentence.

Petitioner, Douglas Zweig, was convicted in 1981 of attempt to commit a felony: to wit, third degree burglary. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-603 (1975). He was sentenced to serve eleven months, twenty-nine days in the Shelby County Correctional Center, but the trial court suspended his sentence to two years of probation after service of thirty days in confinement. In 2014, he filed a motion under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36, requesting that the trial court correct the judgment to reflect that he was convicted of a misdemeanor rather than a felony.

This is an interlocutory appeal as of right, pursuant to Rule 10B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, from the denial of a motion for recusal filed by Timothy Messmaker (AFormer Husband@) in the parties= post-dissolution modification proceedings. Having reviewed the petition for recusal appeal filed by Former Husband, and finding no error in Trial Court=s ruling, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a judgment for a post-foreclosure deficiency owing on a promissory note. The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ motion for relief under Tenn. R. Civ. P. 60.02 from the final judgment. After Defendants filed an answer to the complaint, they subsequently failed to comply with orders of the court, and, upon motion of Plaintiffs, a default judgment on liability was entered in 2012.

Three children were removed from their home as a result of a petition filed by the Department of Children’s Services, alleging that the stepfather was guilty of sexual abuse of the oldest child. After the children were removed from the home, it was found that the Mother knew of but had failed to report previous abuse. The children were subsequently adjudicated dependent and neglected; the Department later filed a petition for termination of the Mother’s parental rights.

In this divorce action, Husband appeals the trial court’s decision to invalidate the parties’ antenuptial agreement and the trial court’s classification and division of the marital estate. The trial court declined to enforce the antenuptial agreement because, inter alia, Wife could not read the agreement - she could not speak or read English - and she was not represented by counsel. Finding that the evidence does not preponderate against any of the trial court’s findings, we affirm.