In September 2014, the Madison County Grand Jury indicted the Defendant, Elahu Hill, Jr., for simple possession of marijuana, tampering with evidence, and violation of the open container law. Following a trial, the jury found the Defendant guilty of simple possession of marijuana and tampering with evidence, for which he received an effective five-year sentence.1 On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction for tampering with evidence and that his five-year sentence for tampering with evidence was excessive.

This case involves the modification of a permanent parenting plan naming Mother the primary residential parent. Father petitioned to be named the primary residential parent after Mother moved with the child out-of-state without providing prior notice. After a one-day hearing, the trial court found a material change in circumstance and that naming Father the primary residential parent was in the best interest of the child.

This is a declaratory judgment action. Appellant?s application for a permit to erect a sign was denied by Appellee, the Memphis and Shelby County Office of Construction Code Enforcement. Appellant petitioned the trial court to declare that Code Enforcement was estopped from denying the permit. As grounds for estoppel, Appellant cites a letter issued to the Appellant five years earlier by an assistant county attorney when Appellant sought advice on erecting multiple signs at its location. After a hearing, the trial court granted the Appellees? motion for involuntary dismissal.

The petitioner, Ronald Leslie McKnight, appeals the denial of his bid for post-conviction relief from his 2011 Davidson County Criminal Court jury conviction of aggravated burglary, claiming that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this appeal, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, breach of contract by the insurance carrier. Pursuant to settled law in this state, the plaintiff had one year plus sixty days to institute suit on the policy. This action was filed one year and 134 days after the fire loss. The trial court found the lawsuit was not timely filed. The plaintiff appeals. We affirm.

Plaintiff and his former wife purchased a house together in 2002. The former wife moved out of the house with all of her belongings in 2009, and the house suffered damage from a fire in 2010. The former wife was a named insured on the house, and each of the insurance checks issued to cover property loss and living expenses was made payable to both Plaintiff and his former wife. The president of the bank that held a mortgage on the house had a separate business relationship with the former wife.

This appeal involves a long-term ground lease and leasehold financing. After numerous assignments to successor tenants and several foreclosures, Citizens National Bank (“the Bank”) became the successor tenant under the ground lease. After a fire at the property, the Bank notified the landlord that it intended to surrender the leased property and cease paying rent, according to its interpretation of a separate agreement executed by the parties. The landlord denied that the Bank was entitled to unilaterally surrender the leased property and cease paying rent.

This post-divorce case involves issues concerning reimbursement for the parties’ children’s uncovered medical expenses and an award of attorney’s fees in favor of Mother. Father/Appellant contends that he is not responsible for the uncovered medical expenses on grounds that Mother/Appellee failed to timely send him copies of the bills as required under the permanent parenting plan. Father also contests the award of attorney’s fees and costs. Discerning no error, we affirm and remand.

We granted permission to appeal in this healthcare liability action to reconsider the summary judgment standard adopted in Hannan v. Alltel Publishing Co., 270 S.W.3d 1 (Tenn. 2008). The Court of Appeals concluded that the Hannan standard requires reversal of the trial court‘s decision granting summary judgment to the defendants on certain of the plaintiffs‘ claims. We hereby overrule Hannan and return to a summary judgment standard consistent with Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.