Petitioner, Roger Terrell, appeals from the Madison County Circuit Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, Petitioner contends he received the ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Craig Markeem Taylor, appeals the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the habeas corpus court erred by summarily dismissing the petition without an evidentiary hearing or the appointment of counsel. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A federal judge ruled yesterday that the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Western District of Tennessee must hand over all available information on expert witnesses to defense attorneys representing former officers charged with violating Tyre Nichols' civil rights. The Commercial Appeal reports that after lead prosecutor David Pritchard confirmed his office plans to call experts, Judge Mark Norris questioned why corresponding documents had not yet been handed over to the defense, calling the omission “troubling.” Pritchard argued that the prosecution’s disclosure of hospital records, autopsy report and FBI interviews adequately provided a preview of upcoming expert witness testimony.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Joshua Steven Sullivan, of two counts of rape of a child, one count of attempted rape of a child, and one count of aggravated sexual battery. The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty-two years. The Defendant argues that the trial court committed several evidentiary errors, including by admitting evidence that (1) the victim made statements to her sister and best friend as excited utterances; (2) he told officers they needed a warrant to enter the house and that he was on his way to his attorney’s office; (3) he had prior convictions for purposes of impeachment; and (4) he removed his GPS monitoring bracelet and left the jurisdiction while on pretrial release. The Defendant also asserts that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding flight and that the cumulative effect of these errors entitles him to a new trial. Finally, he asserts that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. Upon review, we conclude that harmless errors exist in the admission of the Defendant’s statements related to his purported exercise of constitutional rights. Otherwise, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The Lauderdale County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Eric Pike, on one count of attempted second degree murder, one count of aggravated assault by strangulation, and one count of violating an order of protection. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Defendant pleaded guilty to the count of aggravated assault by strangulation, and the remaining counts were dismissed. Per the parties’ agreement, the trial court classified Defendant as a Range III persistent offender and imposed a ten-year sentence. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve this sentence in custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) and consecutively to an existing sentence for initiation of the process to manufacture methamphetamine. Defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial court denied. Defendant appeals, arguing: (1) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea; and (2) the trial court abused its discretion by ordering Defendant to serve his sentence consecutively to his existing sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Kennath Artez Henderson, appeals the Fayette County Circuit Court’s summary denial of his petition for a writ of error coram nobis, challenging the sentence of death that the trial court imposed after his guilty plea to the first degree premeditated murder of a law enforcement officer. On appeal, the Petitioner claims that newly discovered evidence of severe brain damage and serious mental illness at the time of the offense may have resulted in a different judgment if presented at trial, that he was without fault in failing to present the evidence at the proper time because trial counsel were ineffective for failing to discover and present the evidence at sentencing, and that due process requires tolling the statute of limitations. Based on our review of the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the coram nobis court.

Ronald P. Ellis, Petitioner, sought post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel after this Court affirmed his first degree murder conviction. State v. Ellis, No. W2017-01035-CCA-R3-CD, 2018 WL 4584124, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 21, 2018). The post-conviction court denied relief. Petitioner appealed, arguing that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to include proof in the motion to suppress his statement to authorities about whether Petitioner was brought before a judge or magistrate before making his statement and whether Petitioner’s cognitive abilities prevented him from adequately waiving his rights. Because the evidence does not preponderate against the post-conviction court’s findings and conclusions, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Alexander Ruben Carino, filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. He alleged that his consecutive sentences were illegal because the trial court made no findings that consecutive sentences were appropriate. The trial court denied the motion after finding that the sentences were imposed pursuant to the Defendant’s valid plea agreement. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This is a termination of parental rights case. The trial court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights on the ground of severe child abuse, and on its finding that termination was in the child’s best interest. The trial court also terminated Father’s rights on the additional ground that he was sentenced to incarceration for more than ten years when the child was under eight years of age. Mother and Father appeal. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal concerns a claim for declaratory judgment and counterclaims for intentional misrepresentation and breach of contract arising from a series of agreements related to the development of a hotel and conference center in Cookeville, Tennessee. The developed property was to be owned by a limited liability company, and the plaintiffs sought a declaration that they had a right to buy the defendants’ interest in that company pursuant to an option in the operating agreement, which was to become effective upon a determination that the hotel project could not be completed with two identified, adjoining pieces of property. For their part, the defendants sought awards of compensatory and punitive damages based on allegations that the plaintiffs misrepresented their ability and intent to assist with financing and development tasks and then failed to perform those tasks as required by the parties’ development agreement. After the defendants filed their answer and counter-complaint, the plaintiffs moved for judgment on the pleadings based, in principal part, on the “undisputed” fact that the real estate purchase agreement for one of the two development properties had terminated. The plaintiffs also moved to dismiss the defendants’ intentional misrepresentation counterclaim for failure to state the allegations of fraud with particularity. But after the motions were filed and before they were heard, the defendants filed an amended answer with leave of the court in which they denied that the real estate purchase agreement had been properly terminated and asserted more particularized facts in support of their misrepresentation counterclaim. Nonetheless, the trial court granted the plaintiffs’ motions, declared that the real estate purchase agreement had been terminated, and dismissed the misrepresentation counterclaim. The plaintiffs then filed a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the remaining counterclaim for breach of contract, along with a motion for judicial notice of several public records. The trial court granted the motion under Rule 12.02 and, in the alternative, Rule 56. The defendants appeal. We vacate the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to judgment on the pleadings because the defendants denied that the real estate purchase agreement had been properly terminated. But we affirm the dismissal of the misrepresentation counterclaim because the defendants failed to allege facts to establish the elements of their claim. We also affirm the trial court’s denial of the motion to continue because the record shows that the defendants were dilatory in prosecuting their contract claim. But we disagree with the court’s decision to take judicial notice of two newspaper articles, and we vacate the trial court’s ruling that the plaintiffs were entitled to dismissal of the contract counterclaim under Rule 12.02 and Rule 56. Thus, the decision of the trial court is vacated in part and affirmed in part, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.