Longtime Lawrenceburg attorney Paul Alan Bates died Nov. 8 at age 75. He served in the U.S. Navy from 1967–1971. He attended law school at the University of Memphis and practiced law in Lawrenceburg from 1976 until he retired in 2010. Bates was also a substitute Lawrenceburg city judge for 15 years, a past president of the Lawrence County Bar Association, and a past member of the TBA, ABA, Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association and The Association of Trial Lawyers of America. A funeral service will be held on Nov. 13 at 1 p.m. CST at Heritage Funeral Home in Columbia with visitation beginning at 11 a.m. Following the service, Bates will be interred in Maury Memorial Gardens with military honors.

Cassidy Busbin, an active-duty U.S. Army solider at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, was arrested this week on charges of cyberstalking after allegedly making threatening social media posts targeting judges, including one involved in his divorce and child custody proceedings. That post referenced a news story about a family court judge in Maryland who was murdered after granting full custody to the mother in the case. Court records say that Montgomery County Circuit Court Judge Kathryn Olita “felt that if she continued to do her job, she may suffer the same fate as the Maryland judge,” and she felt “her life was in danger.” CNN has the full story.

Harris Shelton Hanover Walsh PLLC yesterday announced that Memphis lawyer Christopher S. Campbell has been selected as chief manager of the firm. Bringing more than 25 years of diverse litigation and appellate expertise to the position, he becomes the first African American attorney to lead the law firm. “As we move into next year, so much is happening in our area – Blue Oval City is making a billion-dollar investment just north of Memphis, Nashville is growing rapidly, and Oxford continues to steadily grow and diversify,” said Campbell. “As we add new attorneys, we do so with the mindset of meeting the growth and innovation across different industries. The law continues to evolve, and so do we.” The firm has offices in Memphis, Covington and Nashville and Oxford, Mississippi. Read the firm's press release.

After more than two decades with the Tennessee Bar Association, Assistant Executive Director Barry Kolar is transitioning from the organization at the end of the year. He will remain active in Nashville’s non-profit community, continuing to serve with Sister Cities of Nashville, the YMCA, Urban Bicycle Food Ministry and other organizations. “It has been a privilege to be a part of the Tennessee legal community through the good works of the TBA. I will miss the many friends I have made on the staff and among the membership, and I hope to keep in touch with you,” Kolar said. During his time at the TBA, Kolar has been involved in the launch of TBA Today and TBA Leadership Law, the expansion of online CLE programming and a number of other programs. The TBA is now accepting applications for the assistant executive director position. Learn more here.

This is your last chance to register for CLE Ski 2024 in beautiful Snowmass, Colorado! You can view more information and register for the course here. To reserve your room at the Stonebridge Inn, call 970-429-5055 and identify yourself as part of the Tennessee Bar Association CLE Ski group to get the discounted rate. You will be asked to provide your name, address and email address, any special requests and check in/check out dates. For the best service, contact the Stonebridge during the week from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. MST or on the weekend from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. MST.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Mustafa Reynolds of selling a fentanyl-heroin mixture that killed two young men. Investigators connected Reynolds to these fatal drugs in part through cellphone records, including records showing the general locations of several phones. Reynolds now raises four issues on appeal. First, he argues that the government introduced insufficient evidence to convict him. Second, he argues that a government expert identified the phones’ general locations using a software program that flunks the reliability standards from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Third, he argues that the district court violated the Constitution by excluding text messages that allegedly supported his innocence. And lastly, he argues that the prosecutor improperly “vouched” for a key government witness during closing arguments. Disagreeing on all fronts, we affirm.

CLAY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Mia Bennett appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Hurley Medical Center (“Hurley”). Plaintiff claims that Hurley violated her rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq.; Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794; and Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (“PWDCRA”), Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1101 et seq., when it stopped permitting her service dog, Pistol, to accompany her while working as a student nurse. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

PER CURIAM. Michael Davis and David Allen pleaded guilty to using a facility of interstate commerce (their cellphones) in a murder-for-hire scheme, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). But they reserved the right to raise two constitutional issues on appeal, one involving the Commerce Clause and the other involving the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Davis and Allen first argue that the government could not constitutionally apply the federal murder-for-hire statute to their conduct. Although the statute rests on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce, Davis and Allen never left Michigan or even made calls outside the State when committing the murder. At most, some of their intrastate calls required the telephone company to use out-of-state switches. This interstate connection, they say, does not suffice to give Congress the power to regulate their crime. Our binding precedent requires us to reject this claim. The Supreme Court has held that Congress may regulate the “instrumentalities of interstate commerce” even when used only within a State, and we have long treated an ordinary telephone as one such “instrumentality” within Congress’s control. See United States v. Windham, 53 F.4th 1006, 1013 (6th Cir. 2022); United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336, 341–42 (6th Cir. 1999).

So Davis and Allen turn to their speedy-trial claims. Before they pleaded guilty, the district court had postponed their trial for nearly four years. Davis and Allen allege that this lengthy delay violated the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and Allen also claims that it violated the Speedy Trial Act. But the delay arose in part from their own repeated requests for more time and in part from the COVID-19 pandemic. Because the district court found that both reasons justified the delay, it saw no speedy-trial problem. We agree and affirm.

The Appellant, Michael Anthony Tharpe, was convicted at a bench trial of burglary of a vehicle, retaliation for past action, theft of property, assault of an officer, evading arrest, and coercion of a witness. In this consolidated appeal, he challenges: (1) the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting four of his convictions; and (2) the trial court’s imposition of partial consecutive sentences. Upon our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Tony Manning, of rape, attempted rape, and aggravated assault. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to serve an effective sentence of eight years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that the trial court erred in finding that the State’s expert was qualified and by allowing the expert to testify outside of her area of expertise. In response, the State argues, in part, that the Defendant waived any issue concerning the expert by failing to object at trial and by filing an untimely motion for a new trial. On our review, we conclude that the Defendant’s notice of appeal was untimely filed. We also conclude that the “interest of justice” does not require us to waive the timely filing of the notice of appeal, and we respectfully dismiss the appeal.