SUTTON, Chief Judge. At issue in these two cases is whether the United States Constitution prohibits Kentucky and Tennessee from limiting certain sex-transition treatments for minors experiencing gender dysphoria.

No one in these consolidated cases debates the existence of gender dysphoria or the distress caused by it. And no one doubts the value of providing psychological and related care to children facing it. The question is whether certain additional treatments—puberty blockers, hormone treatments, and surgeries—should be added to the mix of treatments available to those age 17 and under. As to that, we return to where we started. This is a relatively new diagnosis with ever-shifting approaches to care over the last decade or two. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for anyone to be sure about predicting the long-term consequences of abandoning age limits of any sort for these treatments. That is precisely the kind of situation in which life-tenured judges construing a difficult-to-amend Constitution should be humble and careful about announcing new substantive due process or equal protection rights that limit accountable elected officials from sorting out these medical, social, and policy challenges.

For these reasons, we reverse the preliminary injunctions issued in these cases and remand them for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. While L. C. was incarcerated at Federal Medical Center, Lexington (“FMC”) in Lexington, Kentucky, she was repeatedly sexually assaulted by Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) employee Hosea Lee. L. C. alleges that the BOP knew or should have known of Lee’s assaults on her and other incarcerated women. She claims that the BOP failed to enforce its zero-tolerance policy for sexual assault in BOP facilities because BOP officials failed timely to report and investigate Lee’s assaults. Accordingly, L. C. filed a negligence claim against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”). Because a BOP policy imposes specific and mandatory directives on all BOP officials timely to report and investigate information pertaining to sexual assault by a BOP official, and because deciding whether to do so is not susceptible to policy considerations, this type of negligence claim falls outside the scope of the discretionary-function exception to the FTCA. But because L. C.’s specific allegations fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

SILER, Circuit Judge. In 2018, First Floor Living, LLC (“First Floor”) and Lush Designs, LLC (“Lush Designs”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”) each purchased real estate parcels in Cleveland for the purpose of rehabilitating and redeveloping the properties. First Floor’s property was located at 4400 Warner Road, and Lush Designs’ property was located at 7410 Linwood Avenue. Prior to Plaintiffs’ purchases, the City of Cleveland (“Cleveland”) declared the buildings on the properties public nuisances, condemned them, and ordered that they be demolished. Following the purchases, and after Plaintiffs had invested time and resources into renovating the buildings, Cleveland authorized private contractors to demolish them.

In 2021, following demolition of the buildings, Plaintiffs filed suit against Cleveland; Cuyahoga County Land Reutilization Corporation (“Land Bank”); Laster, LLC (Laster); and Baumann Enterprises, Inc. (“Baumann”) (collectively “Defendants”), arguing that the demolitions violated numerous state laws and federal constitutional provisions.1 The district court denied Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(d) motion for discovery, granted summary judgment to Defendants on the constitutional claims, and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Plaintiffs argue that the district court erred by denying their Rule 56(d) motion for discovery and by granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We affirm.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. When this interlocutory appeal was initially briefed, the issue presented was whether the district court abused its discretion in granting a preliminary injunction under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), 18 U.S.C. § 248. By the time we heard oral argument, however, that merits issue had been overtaken by a dispute over whether intervening events that occurred after the parties filed their merits briefs warranted modifying or dissolving the district court’s preliminary injunction. Because that dispute raises new factual and legal issues that the district court is best positioned to resolve in the first instance, we DISMISS the appeal and REMAND for further proceedings. We separately DENY appellants’ motion for attorney fees, expenses, and costs.

In 2021, the Defendant, Timothy Eugene Wells, pleaded guilty to sexual assault by an authority figure, as a Range II offender, in exchange for a sentence of six to ten years with the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed an effective sentence of eight years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered him to serve his sentence in confinement. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Defendant, Tyrone T. Roach, entered a nolo contendere plea to one count of sexual battery. The trial court imposed a diverted one-year sentence. As part of the plea, Defendant attempted to reserve a certified question of law under Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 37(b)(2) as to whether the four-year delay between the grand jury presentment on the sexual battery charge and his arrest on the presentment violated his rights to a speedy trial and due process. The State contends that this court lacks jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a diverted sentence. In the alternative, the State argues that Defendant did not reserve the certified question properly, and even if the certified question were reserved, the trial court did not violate his right to a speedy trial. Defendant has not responded to the State’s contention regarding jurisdiction. We conclude we lack jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

Defendant, Christopher Alan Peters, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of aggravated burglary, and the trial court sentenced him as a Range II offender to ten years to serve in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction because the State presented no evidence that he entered the residence with the intent to commit a theft. Following our review of the entire record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

We granted this interlocutory appeal to review the trial court’s order denying the State’s motion to admit the preliminary hearing testimony of one of the victims who had subsequently, and unrelatedly, been killed, and granting the Defendant’s motion to exclude said testimony. The Defendant argued that the trial court should exclude the victim’s former testimony because the State withheld exculpatory information prior to the preliminary hearing in violation of the Defendant’s rights to confrontation, due process, and a fair trial. The trial court agreed with the Defendant, and the State appeals. Following our review, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings.

Defendant, Eugene W. Jones, appeals the trial court’s order revoking his probationary sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon with a previous conviction for a violent felony and simple possession of marijuana. Following our review of the entire record and the briefs of the parties, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This case involves an appeal from the trial court’s appointment of a permanent conservator to oversee the person and property of the appellant, Tara Young. Ms. Young’s brother, Daniel Wood, petitioned for a conservatorship after he discovered that Ms. Young had been admitted to the Vanderbilt Adult Psychiatric Hospital following a car accident. After several months of proceedings and a two-day trial, the trial court concluded that a conservatorship was warranted and appointed a conservator for the person and property of Ms. Young. The trial court further determined that medical decisions should remain vested with Ms. Young. Ms. Young timely appealed. On appeal, Mr. Wood did not file a brief in response to Ms. Young’s appellate brief. Upon review, we conclude that Ms. Young’s brief lacks a statement of the issues presented for review and therefore does not comport with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(a)(4). Inasmuch as Ms. Young has not presented any issues on appeal as required by Rule 27, we dismiss this appeal.