Don't forget, nominations are due Monday for the 21st annual TBA Leadership Law (TBALL) program for 2024. Nominees should have from five to 15 years of experience in practice. Last year, 33 lawyers from across the state were accepted into the program. TBALL programming will kick off in January 2024 with an opening retreat at Henry Horton State Park and end in June with class commencement during the TBA Annual Convention in Memphis. Read more about the program or contact program coordinator Paul Burch for more information.

Gov. Bill Lee announced three judicial appointments for newly created state courts, appointing Shawn Fry to the 13th Judicial District Criminal Court, Ashleigh Travis to the 19th Judicial District Circuit Court and Julie Heffington to the 22nd Judicial District Circuit Court. Fry currently serves as an attorney at Fry, Fry, Knight & Looper. The 13th Judicial District includes Clay, Cumberland, Dekalb, Overton, Pickett, Putnam and White counties. Travis currently serves as a magistrate judge in the 19th Judicial District, which covers Montgomery and Robertson counties. Heffington currently serves as an attorney at Middle Tennessee Law Group. The 22nd Judicial District includes Giles, Lawrence, Maury and Wayne counties. Read the full announcement from the Administrative Office of the Courts.

Petitioner, Fred Auston Wortman, III, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition seeking post-conviction relief from his 2015 guilty-pleaded conviction for attempted first degree murder, arguing that the post-conviction court incorrectly concluded that the Petition was time-barred. After our review of the record, we reverse and remand the case to the post-conviction court. On remand, the post-conviction court should appoint counsel, if necessary; provide an opportunity for counsel to amend the Petition; and conduct a hearing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to due process tolling of the statute of limitations.

Defendant was convicted of a single count of aggravated sexual battery, and the trial court imposed a sentence of eight years as a Range I offender to be served in confinement. On appeal, Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting the video recording of the minor victim’s forensic interview. Following our review of the entire record and the parties’ briefs, we reverse Defendant’s conviction and remand this case for a new trial.

FEMA announced the availability of federal disaster assistance to Tennessee to supplement recovery efforts in the areas affected by severe storms, straight-line winds and tornadoes on Aug. 7. The action makes public assistance federal funding available to affected state and eligible local governments and certain private nonprofit organizations on a cost-sharing basis for emergency work and the repair or replacement of disaster-damaged facilities in Bledsoe, Coffee, Cumberland, Jefferson, Knox, Loudon, Meigs, Rhea, Roane and Van Buren counties. Federal funding is also available on a cost-sharing basis for hazard mitigation measures statewide. Yolanda J. Jackson has been named the federal coordinating officer for federal recovery operations in the affected areas. Additional designations may be made at a later date if warranted by the results of further damage assessments.

The Defendant, Eric Martell Small, was convicted by a Tipton County jury of evading arrest in a motor vehicle endangering others, a Class D felony; driving while license revoked, a Class A misdemeanor; violation of the financial responsibility law, a Class C misdemeanor; and violation of the open container law, a Class C misdemeanor. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting hearsay testimony and that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Based on our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In this appeal, a defendant asserts that the trial court erred when it granted the plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss its complaint while the defendant’s motion to dismiss and for attorneys’ fees was pending. We hold that a pending motion to dismiss does not preclude the plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing its case pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. 41.01. Likewise, the defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees did not create a “vested right” preventing the plaintiff from voluntarily dismissing its case. The ruling of the trial court is affirmed.

The appeal arises from a conservatorship proceeding. At issue is whether the trial court erred by quashing the appellant’s subpoena of the conservator’s records on the basis of res judicata, rendering the document subpoena moot as a matter of law. We have determined that a final judgment had not been rendered on the merits concerning the services rendered by the conservator; thus, res judicata was not applicable. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

The Tennessee Department of Revenue issued a tax assessment against a horse-drawn carriage company pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-6-212(a)(2). The carriage company filed a complaint in the chancery court challenging the tax assessment on two grounds: (1) that its carriage rides did not constitute a place of amusement under the statute and (2) that its equal protection rights had been violated because no other carriage companies had been assessed the tax. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The court granted the Tennessee Department of Revenue’s motion for summary judgment and denied the carriage company’s motion for summary judgment. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the chancery court’s decision.

This is a breach of contract action involving an agreement for purchase and sale of improved real property. Upon the sellers’ motion for summary judgment and following a hearing, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the sellers. Following an evidentiary hearing to determine damages, the trial court entered a judgment directing the buyers to pay $45,000 in compensatory damages and $15,000 in attorney’s fees. The buyers have appealed. Determining that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment, we reverse.