JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs allege the government of Wayne County, Michigan has a policy or practice of seizing and holding vehicles while taking months to decide whether to initiate forfeiture proceedings. Plaintiffs claim they were not provided an opportunity to be heard about the detention of their vehicles and that this failure violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court held that plaintiffs are entitled to the requested hearing. We agree and hold that Wayne County violated that Constitution when it seized plaintiffs’ personal vehicles—which were vital to their transportation and livelihoods—with no timely process to contest the seizure. We further hold that Wayne County was required to provide an interim hearing within two weeks to test the probable validity of the deprivation. Accordingly, we AFFIRM and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jessie Lee Short, was convicted by a Hardin County Circuit Court jury of two counts of false imprisonment, a Class A misdemeanor, and three counts of assault, a Class A misdemeanor. See T.C.A. §§ 39-13-302(a) (2018) (subsequently amended) (false imprisonment); 39-13-101(a)(2) (2018) (assault). The trial court imposed concurrent sentences of eleven months, twenty-nine days in confinement at 75% service. On appeal, the Defendant contends that he was deprived of his right to equal protection under the law when the State exercised a peremptory challenge against a black prospective juror without articulating a valid race-neutral reason. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The March 9, 2023 order from which the appellant has appealed was not effectively entered. Therefore, there is no final appealable judgment, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

The plaintiff purchased a home at an auction. The home was sold “as is.” The plaintiff sued the defendant marketing firm which had advertised the property for auction, alleging that it had actual knowledge of mold issues but did not disclose them to bidders, and that it misrepresented the acreage of the real property. The plaintiff’s claims for breach of contract, fraudulent concealment, and reckless misrepresentation proceeded to a jury trial. The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff’s proof, which the court denied, but did not renew its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all the proof. After the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant did not file a post-trial motion seeking a new trial. On appeal, we conclude that the defendant waived its right to contest the trial court’s denial of its motion for a directed verdict by failing to file a motion asking for a new trial as required by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(e). We further conclude that the defendant waived appellate review of whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the fraudulent concealment, breach of contract, and reckless misrepresentation claims by failing to renew its motion for a directed verdict at the close of all proof in the jury trial. We grant the plaintiff’s request for reasonable attorney fees pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 27-1-122.

The Plaintiff brought suit alleging the Defendants failed to obtain informed consent prior to conducting a medical procedure. The Defendants responded with a consent form signed by the Plaintiff detailing the potential side effects of the procedure of which the Plaintiff asserted he had not been informed, and they moved for summary judgment. The Plaintiff argued the consent form in the present case was inadequate to establish informed consent. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants. The Plaintiff appealed, challenging the validity of the signed consent form based on an alleged misrepresentation and his inability to read because of an eye condition, and arguing, therefore, that there is a material question of fact as to whether informed consent was obtained. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Tennessee Supreme Court today rejected a Memphis nursing home’s argument that the trial court could not consider whether a resident with Down syndrome was competent to authorize his brother to act as his agent. The court held the trial court correctly considered evidence that David Welch, a resident with Down syndrome, did not have the mental capacity to understand the document he marked in lieu of a signature that gave his brother, James, power of attorney. Go here to read the court’s opinion.

A foster mother filed a petition to terminate parental rights and adopt a minor child. This appeal concerns the rights of a putative father who signed a Voluntary Acknowledgment of Paternity asserting that he was the biological father of the minor child. We have determined that the foster mother had standing to challenge the VAP, and we affirm the trial court’s decision disestablishing the putative father’s status as legal father.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights to his child. The juvenile court terminated parental rights on the grounds of failure to provide a suitable home, substantial noncompliance with the permanency plan, persistence of conditions, and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for his child. The court also determined that termination was in the child’s best interest. We agree and affirm.

Mother appeals the trial court’s order dismissing her petition for civil contempt and awarding Father a money judgment and his attorney’s fees. Because the trial court failed to conduct an evidentiary hearing, we conclude that there was no evidence before it from which to make a ruling. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the trial court and remand with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all issues in this case.

This interlocutory appeal involves a discovery dispute focusing on Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 36. In response to the employer’s second motion to deem matters admitted, the trial court concluded that the employee timely sent his responses to the requests but that the employer’s counsel did not timely receive them. The court denied the employer’s motion, and the employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we vacate the trial court’s order and remand the case.