A new report from the Boyd Center for Business and Economic Research at the University of Tennessee and the Tennessee Second Look Commission finds that child abuse costs the state between $3 and $5 billion each year. That cost is mostly covered by Tennessee taxpayers in increased healthcare costs, special education services, child welfare, juvenile justice and other publicly funded programs for survivors. The Tennessee Lookout reports that Kylie Graves, director of the Tennessee Second Look Commission, says she “hopes the startling figures the report has produced will bolster arguments for increased investments in a broad range of public supports and interventions that include, but go beyond, the $1.35 billion budget for the Department of Children’s Services.”

Next week's TBA Annual Convention in Knoxville will feature a two-part panel discussion on how to improve your own wellbeing and the impact of mentoring on group wellbeing. This CLE is a joint presentation by the TBA Young Lawyer's Division, the TBA Attorney Well Being Committee and the TBA Mentoring Committee. The program will feature a panel of judges and attorneys who will candidly discuss the challenges of managing wellbeing in the legal field both on an individual level and a group level. If you can't make it to the full convention you can still sign up here for this program.

The ownership of the writings of Audrey Hale, who killed three adults and three children at Nashville’s Covenant School in April, will soon be transferred to the families at the school, the Tennessean reports. David Raybin, attorney for Hale's parents, made the announcement during court proceedings in a lawsuit seeking the release of the writings, which transferred to Hale’s parents after Hale’s death. The physical papers will remain in the custody of the Metro Nashville Police Department. Raybin said transferring ownership of the records to the parents solidifies their standing to intervene in several lawsuits seeking the release of the writings.

A trial court ordered a defendant to pay a set amount of criminal restitution but did not state payment terms or consider the defendant’s ability to pay. The Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the appeal, ruling the restitution order was not a final order because it did not include payment terms. We hold the restitution order was a final order even though it did not include payment terms. See State v. Cavin, No. E2020-01333-SC-R11-CD, ___ S.W.3d ____, 2023 WL _________ (Tenn. ______, 2023). The date for payment of the restitution was, by default, the expiration of the defendant’s sentence based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(g). The trial court erred by failing to consider the defendant’s financial resources and ability to pay when setting the amount of restitution as required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-304(d). We reverse the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeals, vacate the trial court’s restitution order, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Jasmin Lawan Towles, was convicted by a Fayette County Circuit Court jury of theft of property valued at $1000 or less and sentenced by the trial court to 11 months, twenty-nine days at 75% in the county jail, with the sentence suspended after service of 100 days and the Defendant placed on probation supervised by community corrections. The sole issue he raises in this appeal is whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Billy W. Locke, appeals from the trial court’s summary dismissal of his two motions to correct an illegal sentence filed pursuant to Rule 36.1 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure. Following our review of the briefs of the parties, the record, and the applicable authorities, we affirm the judgments of the trial court pursuant to Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 20.

Marcus Johnson, Petitioner, sought habeas corpus relief for the third time after his convictions for one count of felony murder, one count of especially aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault. See State v. Marcus Johnson, No. W2002-00987- CCA-R3-CD, 2003 WL 22080778, at *14 (Tenn. Crim. App. Sept. 4, 2003), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 26, 2004); Marcus Johnson v. State, No. W2007-02664-CCA-R3-PC, 2008 WL 4866817, at *2 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 10, 2008), no perm. app. filed. The petition was dismissed without a hearing after the habeas corpus court determined that Petitioner was merely raising issues that had previously been litigated. We determine that the habeas corpus court properly dismissed the petition and affirm the judgment of that court.

Appellants, purchasers of several unimproved lots, filed suit against Appellee title company. Appellants asserted five counts against Appellee based on Appellee’s alleged failure to disclose the existence of a lien lis pendens on the lots. The trial court dismissed all but one of the counts against Appellee and certified its orders of partial dismissal as final pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its orders as final and dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Shelby County lawyer Robert Harris Golder was suspended from the practice of law today for two years with three months being an active suspension pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Section 12.2, and the remainder served on probation conditioned upon engagement of a practice monitor, payment of Board costs, and payment of restitution. The disciplinary action involved three separate complaints. The hearing panel found the Golder's conduct violated Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (competence), 1.3 (diligence), 1.4 (communication), 1.15 (safekeeping funds and property), 3.2 (expediting litigation), 3.4 (c) (fairness to opposing party and counsel) and 8.4(a) (misconduct). Golder must comply with the requirements of Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, Sections 28 and 30.4, regarding the obligations and responsibilities of suspended attorneys and the procedure for reinstatement.