CLAY, Circuit Judge. For the second time, Defendant Calvin E. McReynolds Jr., appeals his sentence for his 2017 conviction for conspiring to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. In his first appeal, McReynolds argued that the district court erred in attributing to him a quantity of drugs substantially higher than the quantity of drugs that the jury attributed to him. This Court vacated McReynolds’ sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. On remand, the district court attributed the same quantity of drugs to McReynolds as it had at the first sentencing. McReynolds now appeals the district court’s resentencing. For the reasons that follow, we VACATE McReynolds’ sentence and REMAND for resentencing in accordance with this opinion.

JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. During the public comment period in a Zoom meeting of the Grand Traverse County Commission, Patricia MacIntosh expressed her concern about the Commission’s prior invitation to and endorsement of the Proud Boys, a group that has been designated an extremist group and a hate group. She requested that the Commissioners make a public statement condemning the group’s violent behavior. In response, Commissioner Ron Clous produced a high-powered rifle and displayed it to MacIntosh and the viewing audience. MacIntosh sued Clous and the County, alleging that Clous unconstitutionally retaliated against her for exercising her First Amendment rights and that the County had an unconstitutional policy or practice of allowing this kind of First Amendment retaliation. Defendant Clous appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Because MacIntosh plausibly alleged that Clous violated MacIntosh’s free speech rights and Sixth Circuit caselaw put him on clear notice that his actions were unconstitutional, we affirm the denial of Clous’s motion to dismiss.

Defendant, William Vess Binkley, stands convicted by a Dickson County jury of one count of rape of a child, a Class A felony, and was sentenced to forty years in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, he argues: (1) the trial court erred by not declaring a mistrial after the State introduced evidence during trial that had not been disclosed to Defendant during discovery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting the victim's forensic interview as substantive evidence; (3) the State committed prosecutorial misconduct during its closing arguments; and (4) the trial court imposed an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

A Shelby County jury convicted the defendant, Ovitta Vaughn, of driving with a blood alcohol concentration of .08 percent or more (DUI per se) and driving under the influence of an intoxicant (DUI) for which she received a sentence of 11 months and 29 days, suspended to supervised probation after serving 10 days in confinement. On appeal, the defendant contends the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support her convictions. The defendant also argues the trial court erred in failing to allow the introduction of Deputy Goodman’s prior adjudication for untruthfulness, in failing to issue a curative instruction following the prosecution’s inappropriate closing argument, in failing to allow the inclusion of a special jury instruction on the operability of the defendant’s vehicle, and in failing to require the State to make an election as to whether the defendant was driving her vehicle or merely had physical control. After reviewing the record and considering the applicable law, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. However, we remand the case for a corrected judgment form in count two.

The Defendant, Quincy D. Moutry, appeals the dismissal of his Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1 motion to correct an illegal sentence for his possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony conviction. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s entry of corrected judgment forms increasing the mandatory minimum service term on his sentence constituted an ex parte sentencing in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3). After review, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for entry of a corrected judgment form.

A Rutherford County jury found Defendant, Sebakire Crode, guilty of driving under the influence (DUI), third offense. The trial court sentenced him to eleven months, twenty-nine days, with Defendant to serve 150 days in jail and the balance on probation. On appeal, Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to convict him of driving under the influence and that he received an excessive sentence. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP has opened a new office in Atlanta with more than 20 attorneys, the Nashville Business Journal reports. It's a move that has been a strategic priority for the Birmingham-based firm for years, according to Jonathan Skeeters, managing partner and chairman of the board, who is based in the firm’s Nashville office. The move follows expansions to Florida and Texas. The new office is located in the Promenade Tower at 1230 Peachtree St. NE, Atlanta, GA 30309. See the list of lawyers joining the office.

Defendant, Hopie Conley, pled guilty to two counts of aggravated assault, one count of reckless aggravated assault, and one count of reckless endangerment, with an agreed sentence of six years, split confinement, with Defendant serving 180 days incarcerated and the remainder of her sentence on supervised probation. Following a restitution hearing, the trial court ordered Defendant pay $83,366.68 in total restitution through monthly payments of $500. On appeal, Defendant contends the trial court erred in determining the restitution amount because the total amount awarded could not be satisfied prior to the end of her sentence, Defendant lacked the financial ability to pay the ordered monthly restitution amount, and the State failed to prove the victim’s pecuniary loss. The State concedes that the trial court erred in ordering a monthly restitution payment schedule that would not satisfy the total restitution award prior to the end of Defendant’s sentence. However, it contends the trial court properly determined the monthly restitution amount and submits that the matter does not need to be remanded. After reviewing the record, the briefs and oral arguments of the parties, and considering the applicable law, we reverse the judgments of the trial court in part and remand for a new restitution hearing consistent with this opinion.

In a legal filing, the parents of some Covenant School students are urging the court not to release the shooter’s entire writings to the public. WKRN News 2, which obtained a copy of the filing, reports that the parents argue that withholding certain documents will protect their children from “a lifetime of abuse and harassment by the shooter from beyond the grave.” They also argue there is “no compelling state interest in giving voice to a horrendous criminal.” The group is objecting to any documents that threaten the safety of the school or their children. They do not, however, object to a police summary of the shooter’s motives. They say that document would “provide the public with the information needed to understand this horrific crime” and hopefully prevent “another incident of this nature.” The next court date in the case is June 8.

Petitioner, Jose Gonzalez Bonilla, appeals as of right from the Sumner County Criminal Court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he challenged his convictions for rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) did not inform Petitioner during plea negotiations that he would be subject to lifetime community supervision and registration on the sex offender registry if he was convicted at trial; (2) failed to object to the admission of the victim's forensic interview recording during a pretrial severance hearing; and (3) failed to object to the racial composition of the jury venire. Petitioner also argues that the cumulative effect of these errors requires relief. Following our review, we affirm.