A Shelby County Chancery Court judge ruled yesterday that the Memphis City Council can join an ongoing lawsuit filed by two Memphis mayoral candidates who oppose a five-year residency requirement. Memphis mayoral candidates Van Turner, who currently heads the Memphis NAACP branch, and Shelby County Sheriff Floyd Bonner sued the Shelby County Election Commission over the requirement that candidates must have lived in Memphis for at least five years to be eligible. The candidates and the city council argue that a 1996 ballot referendum ended the residency requirement. City attorneys argue the five-year requirement is still in effect. Read more from the Commercial Appeal.

This year's Real Estate Essentials course will be held virtually on June 22. The program will run from 1 to 4:15 p.m. CDT. Thanks to attorney and senior underwriting counsel Joseph Kirkland Jr. at Executive Title and Closing Inc. in Memphis for producing this program. Watch for more details coming soon.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. The Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (“Nashville”) passed a “sidewalk ordinance” that imposes sidewalk-related conditions on landowners who seek building permits. To obtain a permit, owners must grant an easement across their land and agree to build a sidewalk on the easement or pay an “in-lieu” fee that Nashville will use to build sidewalks elsewhere. This ordinance implicates a question about the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause that has divided state courts. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 136 S. Ct. 928, 928 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring in the denial of certiorari).

In particular, the parties here disagree over the “test” that we should use to judge whether the sidewalk ordinance commits a taking. The landowner plaintiffs ask us to apply the “unconstitutional-conditions” test that the Supreme Court adopted to assess conditions on building permits in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). Nashville responds that the Court has applied Nollan’s test only to ad hoc administrative conditions that zoning officials impose on specific permit applicants—not generally applicable legislative conditions that city councils impose on all permit applicants. For legislative conditions, Nashville says, we should turn to the deferential “balancing” test that the Court adopted to assess zoning restrictions in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

We side with the landowner plaintiffs. Nothing in the relevant constitutional text, history, or precedent supports Nashville’s distinction between administrative and legislative conditions. Nollan’s test thus should apply to both types, including those imposed by the sidewalk ordinance. Because the district court reached a contrary conclusion, we reverse its grant of summary judgment to Nashville and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Petitioner Mario Banuelos-Jimenez petitions for review of the Immigration Judge’s and Board of Immigration Appeal’s (BIA’s) decisions denying cancellation of removal. The immigration judge concluded, and the BIA affirmed, that his state conviction for third-degree assault on a family member was a crime of violence and, therefore, he was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. We agree and deny the petition for review.

The Defendant, Michael Wojnarek, appeals the revocation of his probation and reinstatement of his original sentence in confinement, arguing that the trial court erred by considering evidence found in violation of the Fourth Amendment and by failing to make adequate findings in support of its decision. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Miron D. Johnson, was convicted by a Dyer County jury of evading arrest, a Class D felony; misdemeanor evading arrest; felony reckless endangerment; and driving on a revoked license, fourth offense. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for felony evading arrest and felony reckless endangerment. Relative to his felony evading arrest conviction, the Defendant specifically argues that his conduct did not create a risk of death or injury to others. For his felony reckless endangerment conviction, the Defendant argues that his vehicle was not used as a deadly weapon and that the threat of death or serious bodily injury was not imminent. The Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing fines without making findings regarding the Defendant’s ability to pay. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner, Kristina Cole, appeals the denial of post-conviction relief from her Shelby County convictions for two counts of conspiracy to possess 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with the intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone and two counts of possession of 300 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell or deliver in a drug-free zone. Petitioner contends that she was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon counsel’s failure to: (1) object to irrelevant and prejudicial text messages introduced at trial; (2) file a Bruton motion; (3) contest that Petitioner tracked the package containing the methamphetamine; (4) adequately prepare for trial; (5) object when the State argued that Petitioner’s silence implied guilt; (6) object when the prosecutor “testified during closing argument in order to bolster his own credibility”; and (7) object when the prosecutor intentionally misrepresented evidence during closing argument. Petitioner further asserts that she is entitled to relief based on cumulative error. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court. 

Because the order appealed from does not constitute a final appealable judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal concerns whether a municipality must have a general plan for development before it can exercise its zoning power. William Foehring, Janice Foehring, William Best, Mary Beth Best, Ron Terrill, and Sandra Terrill (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) sued the Town of Monteagle, Tennessee (“the Town”) and RBT Enterprises, LLC (“RBT”)1 (collectively, “Defendants”) for declaratory judgment in the Chancery Court for Marion County (“the Trial Court”). Plaintiffs challenged the rezoning of a certain parcel which allowed for the development of a truck stop near their homes. Plaintiffs argued that the zoning ordinances at issue, 05-21 and 12-21, were invalid because the Town had no comprehensive or general plan in effect. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Defendants. Plaintiffs appeal. We hold, inter alia, that no comprehensive or general plan was required before the Town could exercise its zoning powers. It was sufficient that the Monteagle Regional Planning Commission (“the Commission”) transmitted to the Town Board of Mayor and Aldermen (“the Board”), the Town’s chief legislative body, the text of a zoning ordinance and zoning maps, which comprised the zoning plan. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

This is an appeal involving the termination of parental rights. The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother and the fathers of the children on the following grounds: (1) abandonment by failure to support; (2) substantial noncompliance with a permanency plan; (3) persistent conditions; and (4) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody. The trial court also found that termination was in the best interest of the children. Only the mother appeals. We affirm.