Catch up on the latest news from the TBA!

Read about the lawyers who have recently been reinstated, disbarred, suspended, censured or transferred their licenses to disability inactive status.

Tennessee Bar Association members who have died recently are memorialized.

In this issue's Day on Torts column, John A. Day explores the principal tool used by the Tennessee General Assembly to enforce the prohibition of gender-affirming care — the tort system.

The custody of pets is not necessarily a new issue in family-related matters in Tennessee, and it is often a hot topic of discussion during settlement negotiations. Marlene Eskind Moses and Ansley Owens Tillett explore the possibilities of a bill that seeks to dictate the custody and ownership of our furry and not so furry friends when married pet parents go their separate ways.

Is it time to sever severance agreements from the employer’s toolbox? Not entirely. But Edward G. Phillips and Brandon L. Morrow point to a recent decision from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) and a follow-up memorandum from the NLRB General Counsel that have made clear that severance agreements — as we once knew them — no longer pass muster as far as the Board is concerned.

In this edition’s inspiration for your busy day, we remember two access to justice giants in Tennessee: Andy Branham, a founder of the Corporate Counsel Pro Bono Initiative, and Harris Gilbert, a champion of legal aid and former TBA president. 

Reporters from across the state gathered in Nashville to learn about open meeting law, investigative journalism and more during the annual Reporters Workshop program, produced jointly by the Tennessee Bar Association, the Tennessee Association of Broadcasters and the Tennessee Press Association Foundation. Participants were selected from a record number of applicants who were interested in developing a deeper understanding of media law issues that may affect their everyday work, including access to government information, defamation and privacy concerns in reporting and other timely topics. Panelists included veteran reporters Demetria Kalodimos, Meribah Knight and Ben Hall, as well as legal media experts Paul McAdoo, Deborah Fisher and Seth May. The program continues tomorrow.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, we must address how Article III’s “standing” requirements apply to class-action lawsuits. In individual litigation, a plaintiff lacks standing to sue a defendant if the plaintiff’s injuries are not “fairly traceable” to that defendant. DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006) (citation omitted). Yet some courts have relied on the “juridical link” doctrine to jettison this standing element in the class setting. See, e.g., Payton v. County of Kane, 308 F.3d 673, 678–79 (7th Cir. 2002). According to these courts, that doctrine allows a named plaintiff in a putative class action to sue defendants who have not injured the plaintiff if these defendants have injured absent class members.

This case shows how the doctrine is supposed to work. When a Michigan county forecloses on a property because its owner has failed to pay property taxes, Michigan law permits the county to obtain ownership of the property outright—even if its value exceeds the taxes owed. That fate befell Thomas Fox. After he racked up some $3,000 in unpaid taxes, Gratiot County took his land. He valued the property at over $50,000, and the county treasurer sold it for over $25,000. But Fox did not see any of the surplus. We have held that similar conduct amounted to an unconstitutional “taking.” Hall v. Meisner, 51 F.4th 185, 187–88 (6th Cir. 2022). Fox thus filed a class action against Gratiot County on behalf of himself and similar landowners. But Fox did not stop there. He also sued 26 other counties that did not injure him, arguing that they engaged in the same conduct against other delinquent taxpayers. The district court certified a class, holding that Fox had standing to sue these other counties under the juridical link doctrine.

We cannot agree. This oddly named doctrine conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent holding that a class-action request “adds nothing to the question of standing[.]” Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rts. Org., 426 U.S. 26, 40 n.20 (1976). And Fox lacks standing to sue the 26 other counties under normal rules. Nor has he justified the doctrine with historical evidence. Although the English Court of Chancery permitted parties to file class-like “bills of peace,” Fox cites no case in which a plaintiff pursued litigation on behalf of absent parties against a defendant who had not harmed the plaintiff. The juridical link doctrine instead originates from dicta in a 1973 case that expressed a desire for the “expeditious” resolution of disputes. La Mar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 489 F.2d 461, 466 (9th Cir. 1973). But expediency concerns cannot supplant Article III’s separation-of-powers protections. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693, 704–05 (2013). We thus vacate the certified class and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Defendant, Rickey Haymer, appeals his convictions of crimes involving the attempted unlawful purchase or possession of a firearm. He argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions because his actions in seeking to purchase a firearm did not constitute a “substantial step” toward the completed crimes. He also argues that the trial court committed plain error in admitting various text messages showing his contact with the putative seller. On our review, we respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court.