The Defendant, Bobby Joe Waddle, was convicted in the Washington County Criminal Court of unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence and was sentenced as a Range III, career offender to thirty years in confinement. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by refusing to bifurcate his trial. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Defendant, Rusty L. Patterson, was convicted in the Knox County Criminal Court of theft of property valued $2,500 or more, a Class D felony. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced him as a Range III, career offender to twelve years in confinement with sixty percent release eligibility. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court committed plain error by refusing to instruct the jury on attempted theft, that the evidence is insufficient to show the value of the stolen property, and that the unavailability of the community corrections program in Knox County violated his constitutional rights at sentencing. Based upon the oral arguments, the record, and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Defendant, Terrance K. Martin, was charged in a three-count indictment with two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine and one count of sale of 0.5 grams or more of cocaine. A jury convicted Defendant as charged, and the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years’ incarceration. Defendant appeals his convictions, arguing that the State presented insufficient proof that he knowingly sold the drugs. We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Claiborne County jury convicted the Petitioner, Bobby Junior Lovin, of two counts of rape of a child. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of forty years to be served in the Tennessee Department of Correction. Thereafter, he filed for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial lawyers were ineffective by failing to (1) advise him on the range of punishment he could receive if convicted; (2) investigate the case and present witnesses at trial; (3) advise him so he could make an informed decision regarding a guilty plea; and (4) advise him of his right to testify, which deprived him of the ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision whether to testify. The post-conviction court denied the petition, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court.

The Defendant, Ryan Reese Leath, pleaded guilty to Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”), third offense with the trial court to sentence him. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the Defendant to eleven months and twenty-nine days, suspended to probation after the service of six months in confinement. The trial court ordered that the DUI sentence be served consecutively to a six-year sentence for theft of property valued over $10,000. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred when it ordered consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns the end of a business relationship between two brothers, Joe D. Grubb (“Joe”) and James W. Grubb (“Jim”).2 After many years of working together in the cash advance and rent-to-own businesses, Jim sued Joe in the Chancery Court for McMinn County (“the Trial Court”), asserting breach of contract, intentional interference with business relationships, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable relief under the LLC dissolution statute. Joe sued Jim in turn. One of the chief issues concerned Jim’s claim to equal compensation from the brothers’ businesses based on an alleged express oral agreement with Joe. After a trial, the Trial Court found in favor of Jim, awarding him damages based on multiple grounds. Centrally, the Trial Court found that an express oral agreement between Jim and Joe provided for equal compensation, even though Jim testified that the alleged agreement was “unspoken” and “just the way it’s been.” Joe appeals. We hold, inter alia, that notwithstanding the Trial Court’s factual findings and credibility determinations in favor of Jim, what Jim testified to did not constitute an express oral agreement or any other kind of contract as a matter of law. Jim’s alternative theories for relief are unavailing as well. We reverse.

The appellees filed suit against the appellants for defamation, defamation by implication, false light invasion of privacy, and loss of consortium. The appellants moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine barred the trial court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction. They also filed petitions seeking to have the case dismissed pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied in part the motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine does not apply to this case. It also denied the TPPA petitions, finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case. Alternatively, it found that the appellees satisfied their prima facie burden under the TPPA burden-shifting framework. We conclude that the trial court erred in finding that the TPPA does not apply to this case and reverse that portion of the judgment. Finding no other error, we otherwise affirm the judgment of the trial court.

This appeal arises from a slip-and-fall incident at an apartment complex in Franklin, Tennessee. On a rainy morning at the Venue at Cool Springs apartment complex, owned and operated by Mid-America Apartments, LP, Robert Trentham slipped and fell on a pedestrian bridge on the way back to his apartment. Mr. Trentham sustained serious injuries and filed a premises-liability lawsuit alleging that MAA had been negligent in maintaining the pedestrian bridge. Mr. Trentham asserted that his slip-and-fall was caused by a microbial growth on the bridge that MAA should have known about and should have addressed. The trial court found in favor of Mr. Trentham, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. MAA disputes the holding of the lower courts that it was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the pedestrian bridge. We hold that, because the microbial growth on the pedestrian bridge amounts to a “general or continuing condition indicating the dangerous condition’s existence,” Blair v. W. Town Mall, 130 S.W.3d 761, 762 (Tenn. 2004), MAA was on constructive notice of a dangerous condition on the bridge at the time of Mr. Trentham’s fall. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Christopher Oberton Curry, Jr. (“Defendant”) sought this Court’s review of his 2022 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a felony crime of violence. Pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17-1307, unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon is a Class E felony; however, if the prior conviction is for a felony crime of violence, the punishment is increased to a Class B felony. At Defendant’s trial in the present case, the State introduced a certified judgment of conviction for Defendant’s 2017 conviction for robbery, and the trial judge instructed the jury that robbery is a crime of violence. Robbery, however, is not included in the statutory definition of crimes of violence set forth in Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-17- 1301(3). Defendant was convicted and received an effective ten-year sentence. On appeal, Defendant argues, among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction because the State failed to establish that the predicate felony of robbery was a crime of violence. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed, concluding that robbery is a crime of violence despite its absence from the statutory definition of the term. We granted Defendant’s application for permission to appeal to consider whether robbery is encompassed within the statutory definition of “crime of violence” and to determine whether the evidence at trial was sufficient to support Defendant’s conviction. After review, we agree with the lower courts that robbery can be a “crime of violence” within the definition contained in section 39-17-1301(3). However, we conclude that whether robbery is a “crime of violence” in a particular unlawful possession of a firearm case is a question for a properly instructed jury, not the trial judge. Because the State did not present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendant’s prior robbery was a crime of violence, we reverse, in part, the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeals and vacate the judgment of the trial court on Count 1. The case is remanded to the trial court for entry of a new judgment reducing the conviction in Count 1 to a Class E felony and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that a prior conviction for robbery can increase the penalty for a criminal defendant’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm but only if a jury finds that the prior robbery was committed with the use of violence. In the case of Christopher Oberton Curry Jr., who was convicted in 2022 of unlawful firearm possession after a felony conviction for robbery, the trial court had instructed the jury that robbery was a "crime of violence." The appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge erred in making a determination that the prior robbery had been violent and reduced the conviction. The court said that a jury should have made that determination. Read more about the opinion from the Administrative Office of the Courts.