The Office of the Tennessee Attorney General is urging consumers to be aware of scam websites posing as classic car and heavy equipment dealerships. Even though scammers answer the phones, send videos and present fake business licenses, consumers will be swindled out of their money if they fall for these scams, the office said in a release this week. Among the scams are a fake classic car seller named Leo’s Luxury Motors and a fake website for heavy machinery, which was made using the name of Equipment Express, an authentic forklift dealer in Lebanon, Tennessee. The office recommends viewing any vehicles or machinery in person before purchasing and following five tips to ensure dealings are with reputable sellers. Learn more and get the tips on the office’s website.

The Petitioner, Cedric Jones, appeals the Criminal Court for Johnson County’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus relief. On appeal, he argues that the sentence and fines imposed against him were excessive, the trial judge and jurors should have been disqualified, his prosecution was a violation of double jeopardy, the indictment against him was defective, and the judgments were facially void. The State contends that the grounds raised are not cognizable under habeas corpus and that the indictment vested the trial court with jurisdiction to render its judgment. Based on our review, we affirm the habeas corpus court’s dismissal of the petition.

Petitioner, Jashun Antravious Garrett, pleaded guilty to one count of aggravated robbery and one count of theft under $1,000 and was sentenced to an effective eight years of incarceration. More than one year after the trial court entered judgments on Petitioner’s convictions, Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. Petitioner then filed an untimely notice of appeal with this court. Based on Petitioner’s untimely notice of appeal, his appeal is dismissed.

The Defendant pleaded guilty to theft of property and was placed on judicial diversion for five years and ordered to pay $167,000 in restitution to the victim. The Defendant failed to pay the entire amount of restitution, and the trial court revoked the Defendant’s sentence and ordered him to serve a five-year prison sentence. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s finding that his failure to pay the entirety of the restitution prior to the expiration of his sentence was willful. After review of the record, we reverse the trial court’s revocation order.

In 2018, a Davidson County jury convicted the Petitioner, Jermaine Nelson Buford, of possession of .5 grams or more of cocaine with intent to sell, aggravated assault, felony evading arrest, evading arrest, vandalism of property less than $1,000, and simple possession of marijuana. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to an effective sentence of thirty years of incarceration. The Petitioner filed a direct appeal, and this court affirmed the judgments of the trial court. State v. Buford, No. M2019-00402-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 414558, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2020), perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 3, 2020). The Petitioner then filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Petitioner maintains that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel by trial counsel’s failure to seek the suppression of evidence from the Petitioner’s cell phone. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of post-conviction relief.

The legal father of two children and the putative father of one of the children both appeal a juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights. We affirm the juvenile court’s decision to terminate their parental rights, but we reverse the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the putative father’s rights on the ground of failure to manifest willingness and ability.

This appeal concerns the termination of a mother’s parental rights to her child. The trial court determined that the mother had abandoned the child by failure to engage in more than token visitation and further ruled that it was in the child’s best interests for the mother’s rights to be terminated. Because we conclude that clear and convincing evidence supports both the ground of abandonment by failure to visit and that termination of the mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of the child, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Chancery Court for Knox County (“the Trial Court”) terminated the parental rights of Kelsie M. (“Mother”) to Nash M. (“the Child”), finding by clear and convincing evidence the statutory ground of severe child abuse and that termination was in the Child’s best interest. Mother appealed, and this Court vacated the judgment due to an insufficient record and remanded for preparation of the transcripts of the proceedings. On remand, the Trial Court entered orders providing for the payment of the transcripts and reinstated its judgment terminating Mother’s parental rights. Mother appealed again, and transcripts of the proceedings have been presented in the record. Based upon our thorough review, we discern no reversible error and affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

The Tennessee Department of Revenue will host a free webinar on Nov. 26 on tax implications for both marketplace facilitators and sellers. Marketplace facilitators are businesses that own or operate a website or other platform where sales are made on behalf of marketplace sellers (i.e. third parties). A marketplace seller is a person who sells goods or services through a marketplace operated, owned or controlled by a marketplace facilitator. Learn more or register here. The webinar is one in a series of educational sessions held by the department each month.

This is a premises liability/wrongful death case. Decedent, an employee of appellee’s independent contractor, died when the suspension system that was used to lift and turn tire molds failed, and the mold fell onto decedent. The trial court denied appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of workers’ compensation exclusivity, but it granted appellee’s motion for summary judgment on the question of duty. Because disputed material facts concerning appellee’s duty to decedent preclude summary judgment, we reverse the trial court’s grant of the motion on that question. We affirm the trial court’s denial of summary judgment on the workers’ compensation exclusivity question.