THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Ohio passed a law to stop foreign money from influencing its elections. The law bans foreign nationals from spending money to support or defeat ballot initiatives. It also bans foreign nationals from contributing to candidates in state elections. After plaintiffs brought a First Amendment challenge, the district court found that Ohio’s law violates the rights of lawful permanent residents. The district court preliminarily enjoined Ohio from enforcing its new campaign finance law with respect to all foreign nationals. Ohio appealed the district court’s decision. It also asked us for an emergency stay of the district court’s order so that Ohio can enforce its law while we consider the merits of the appeal. Because our initial review suggests that the district court’s First Amendment analysis was flawed, we now grant Ohio’s motion for a stay of the district court’s order.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Jaylan Gore was charged with possessing a stolen firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), and with receiving a firearm while under felony indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n). Gore moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that § 922(j) and (n) violate the Second Amendment. The district court denied the motion, and Gore’s case went to trial. During voir dire, Gore raised a Batson challenge to the prosecutor’s peremptory strike of the last black juror on the panel. The district court rejected that challenge after finding that the prosecutor’s motivations were race neutral. The jury convicted on both counts, and the district court sentenced Gore to 18 months’ imprisonment. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Christopher Goins challenges the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) following the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), as applied to himself. Section 922(g)(1) declares it unlawful for any person “who has been convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” to ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms or ammunition via interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C § 922(g)(1). The law thus prohibits firearm ownership by felons, unless such individuals receive expungement, a pardon, or other post-conviction relief. See id. § 921(a)(20). Goins raises an as- applied challenge, arguing under Bruen that this Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation does not support prohibiting felons like him from possessing firearms, and thus the Second Amendment renders § 922(g)(1) unconstitutional as applied to him. We consider this issue de novo and hold that § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied to Goins.

In 2016, Petitioner, Quincy D. Scott, was convicted by a McMinn County jury of aggravated robbery, for which he received a sentence of seventeen years’ incarceration as a Range II, multiple offender at eighty-five percent to be served consecutively to sentences for convictions in other counties. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal, and the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, alleging the ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Following a bifurcated hearing only on Petitioner’s appellate counsel claim, the post-conviction court granted a delayed appeal, finding that Petitioner had received the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. A panel of this Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the post-conviction court had failed to make sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. On remand, the post-conviction court again heard Petitioner’s claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel as well as his trial counsel claims. The post-conviction court denied relief, and this appeal followed. On appeal, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel ineffectively cross- examined the State’s witnesses, that trial counsel failed to file motions to suppress several pieces of evidence, that trial counsel failed to appeal the general sessions court’s bind over of his charges to the grand jury, that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that newly discovered evidence proves his actual innocence, and that appellate counsel failed to file a reply brief on appeal.1 After a thorough review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

In this consolidated appeal, the Defendants, Sanquez Keshawn Jones and Deion Jamaar Glover, appeal their convictions for aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, attempted carjacking, and employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony. For these convictions, both Defendants received an effective sentence of twenty-four years’ incarceration. Relative to Defendant Jones’s appeal, he contends the trial court violated Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b)’s general prohibition on propensity evidence by admitting a photograph depicting him possessing a firearm as a juvenile because such behavior is a criminal act. As to Defendant Glover, he first argues the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions because the State’s proof failed to establish his identity as one of the perpetrators of these offenses. He further alleges the trial court erred by admitting a photograph showing him possessing a firearm, arguing this photograph was irrelevant under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 402, unfairly prejudicial under Tennessee Rule of Evidence 403, and propensity evidence violative of Tennessee Rule of Evidence 404(b). Next, Defendant Glover contends he is entitled to plain error relief because his right to confrontation was violated when his cell phone data was extracted by a non- testifying Federal Bureau of Investigation agent and admitted against him at trial. Finally, he challenges the trial court’s imposition of consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender classification of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-115(b). After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court in all respects.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, Sidarius Jackson, of multiple drug, gang, and gun related felonies, including murder. Before trial, the Defendant filed a motion to sever his offenses into four separate trials, and the trial granted in part and denied in part the motion. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence found as the result of a warrantless search; (2) the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever the offenses, (3) the State’s gang- enhancement presentment was insufficient; (4) the criminal gang statute was not properly applied to his conspiracy and unlawful possession of a firearm conviction; (5) the trial court improperly considered acts he committed while a juvenile during sentencing; and (6) the evidence presented is insufficient to sustain his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to sell a controlled substance. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

This is an appeal concerning the application of the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act, specifically to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 29-20-203, 29-20-204, and 29-20- 205 of the Act. At issue is the trial court’s entry of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claims against a county government for damages sustained from an automobile accident allegedly caused by the washout of a road maintained by the county. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of the defendant’s claims for the return of funds held by the plaintiff hospital as untimely filed. We reverse the dismissal, holding that the plaintiff was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a defense and that the plaintiff revived the obligation throughout its repeated negotiations with the defendant.

Tennessee Gov. Bill Lee’s office has released new information, highlighting resources available for communities impacted by Hurricane Helene and ways Tennesseans can serve. Information provided on the webpage includes instructions for donating items to the Northeast Tennessee Disaster Relief Center, now located at the Bristol Motor Speedway, links to First Lady Maria Lee’s Tennessee Serves website for volunteer opportunities, and specific information about helping in Cocke and Greene counties. For those who cannot travel to East Tennessee, the site also offers a range of ways to help virtually from a distance. Finally, the page has resources for storm survivors, including information about shelters, disaster and crisis clean-up hotlines, and links to relief agencies including Tennessee Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters and the American Red Cross.

The Tennessee Supreme Court issued an order seeking comments on proposed changes to Rules 9 and 33, which would increase the annual registration fee from $170 to $270 and allocate the funds as follows: $225 to the Board of Professional Responsibility (up from $140), $15 to the Tennessee Lawyers’ Fund for Client Protection (up from $10), and $30 to the Tennessee Lawyer Assistance Program (up from $20). The court says the proposal is based on its own comprehensive review of the sufficiency of the annual registration fee and the allocation of funds it generates. Comments should be submitted by Nov. 8 and mailed to Clerk James Hivner, RE: Proposed Amendments to Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 9 & 33, 100 Supreme Court Building, 401 7th Ave. N., Nashville, TN 37219-1407 or by email to appellatecourtclerk@tncourts.gov. Comments should reference docket number ADM2024-01525.