Judge Zachary Walden, TBA Young Lawyers Division (YLD) East Tennessee governor and mock trial long range planning coordinator, spoke at the East Tennessee Director of Schools Study Council last month about civics education. Walden also spoke about the TBA YLD Mock Trial competition and its new component, the artist in the courtroom competition. He noted that mock trial is an excellent way to get students actively involved in civics education as it increases their knowledge of the law and the legal system. Visit the TBA website for more information about the the 2025 mock trial competition.

The TBA Young Lawyers Division (YLD) continued its visits to Tennessee law schools last month with a discussion at the University of Tennessee College of Law. Daniel Mendoza, a 3L at the school and a graduate of the 2024 YLD Diversity Leadership Institute shared his experiences with the program and encouraged others to apply for this valuable opportunity. Mendoza was joined by Samantha Ellis, YLD CLE chair for East Tennessee, who has been an integral part of planning educational programs for young lawyers. See photos from the event.

The defendant, Jerry Donald Brown, III, appeals the order of the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm the trial court’s decision.

Question: In light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010), and New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), are rifles and other long guns, such as shot guns, muzzleloaders, carbines, etc., regardless of their type of actions (single shot, pump, lever, bolt, or semi-automatic) covered under the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 26 of the Tennessee Constitution?

Opinion: The Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article I, § 26 of the Tennessee Constitution protects some (but not all) rifles and long guns in some (but not all) circumstances.

A Knox County jury convicted the Defendant, John M. Fletcher, of initiating a false report to a law enforcement officer and presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of four years. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Upon our review, we hold that the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the Defendant’s conviction for presenting a false or fraudulent insurance claim. However, we also conclude that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for initiating a false report, and we vacate that judgment and remand for dismissal of that charge. We respectfully affirm the judgments of the trial court in all other respects.

A Stewart County jury found Defendant, Lloyd Allard, guilty of two counts of aggravated rape of a child, two counts of aggravated sexual battery, and twenty-eight counts of especially aggravated sexual exploitation of a minor. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of 144 years in the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”). On appeal, Defendant contends: (1) the trial court erred in failing to suppress the entirety of his custodial statement after he invoked his right to counsel; (2) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence on chain of custody grounds; (3) his sentence is excessive; and (4) the evidence produced at trial supported his insanity defense. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Father appeals the termination of his parental rights based on abandonment and failure to manifest a willingness and ability to parent. After our review, we affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights.

At issue in this appeal is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees after the plaintiff filed a notice of voluntary dismissal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 41.02. This action arose when Gregory F. Heerdink (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Heerdink”) filed a complaint for a declaration of an easement by implication on adjoining property owned by defendant Dawn A. Osborne (“Osborne”) and previously owned by defendant Robert K. Garrett (“Garrett”) (collectively “Defendants”). Defendants each filed an answer but neither filed a counterclaim. More than a year later, Defendants each filed a motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute pursuant to Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure 41.02(1). In an order entered October 9, 2020, the trial court denied Defendants’ motions to dismiss but ruled that Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 37 sanctions were appropriate and ordered Plaintiff to, inter alia, pay “all of each Defendant’s attorney’s fees associated with Plaintiff’s delays, including attendance at prior hearings on Motions to Withdraw, today’s hearing and all preparations for any such hearings.” The order further directed defense counsel to “Submit an Affidavit of itemized time for approval by the Court.” Five days after the entry of this order, but before either defendant filed a fee application, Plaintiff filed notice of voluntary dismissal. The court entered an order granting Plaintiff’s voluntary dismissal on November 2, 2020. Shortly thereafter, Garrett filed an application for fees, however, Osborne did not file a fee application until approximately two years later, when she filed a motion to enforce sanctions along with an attorney’s fee affidavit. Plaintiff opposed Osborne’s motion, arguing that the case had been dismissed and that, as a consequence, the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to award the fees. Alternatively, Plaintiff argued that Osborne waived the right to fees due to the over two-year delay. Defendants contended that they had a “vested right” to recover their attorney’s fees, which vested right prevented Plaintiff from dismissing the case pursuant to Rule 41.01. They also relied on the precedence of Menche v. White Eagle Prop. Grp., LLC, No. W2018-01336- COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 4016127 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2019) to contend that the order of dismissal was not a final order because the attorney’s fees claim was pending, and that the trial court therefore retained jurisdiction to rule on the unresolved issue of attorney’s fees. The trial court agreed and awarded attorney’s fees. This appeal followed. We have determined that Defendants did not have a vested right to recover their attorney’s fees and that Menche is inapposite. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award any fees following the voluntary dismissal of the action. Accordingly, we vacate the award of fees.

Michael Halliburton (“Halliburton”) filed a lawsuit against his former attorney, Blake Ballin (“Ballin”) and Ballin’s law firm, Ballin, Ballin & Fishman, P.C. (“Ballin Firm”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”). Ballin and Ballin Firm filed a motion to dismiss Halliburton’s amended complaint. The Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss, and Halliburton has appealed. Having reviewed the record and briefs in this case, we conclude that Halliburton presents an issue unreviewable by this Court and that Halliburton’s appellate brief, accordingly, does not comply with Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27. We affirm the Trial Court.

The parental rights of Cedric G., Sr. (“Father”) were terminated by the Davidson County Juvenile Court (“the trial court”) on November 20, 2023. Father appeals. We affirm the termination of Father’s parental rights as to Cedric G., Jr. (“the Child”) for abandonment by an incarcerated parent for failure to visit, failure to support, and exhibiting a wanton disregard for the Child’s welfare; substantial noncompliance with the permanency plans; persistence of conditions; and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume custody or financial responsibility of the Child. We also affirm the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Child’s best interests.