Question 1: Must an individual satisfy all the following statutory requirements in Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-3-802(b) to qualify for appointment to serve as the chief executive officer of the Tennessee Department of Education: a. be a person of literary and scientific attainments; b. be of skill and experience in school administration; and c. be qualified to teach in the school of the highest standing of which the commissioner has authority?

Opinion 1: Yes.

Question 2: What is contemplated and/or meant by the statutory requirement to “be a person of literary and scientific attainments”?

Opinion 2: This phrase likely refers to a person’s literary and scientific knowledge relating to Tennessee’s school curriculum. It imposes a general standard to be administered principally by the Governor through the appointment and removal process.

Question 3: What is contemplated and/or meant by the statutory requirement to “be a person . . . of skill and experience in school administration”?

Opinion 3: This phrase likely refers to a person’s abilities and prior involvement in school administration. It imposes a general standard to be administered principally by the Governor through the appointment and removal process.

Question 4: What is contemplated and/or meant by the statutory requirement to “be qualified to teach in the school of the highest standing over which the commissioner has authority”?

Opinion 4: This phrase likely refers to the education, experience, and strength of character necessary to teach. It imposes a general standard to be administered principally by the Governor through the appointment and removal process. The phrase likely does not require a certification to teach.

Question 5: Is an individual who fails to meet all three statutory requirements legally qualified to be appointed to serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Education?

Opinion 5: See Response to Question 1.

Question 6: Is an individual who fails to meet all three statutory requirements legally qualified to serve as the Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Education?

Opinion 6: See Response to Question 1.

Question 7: Does the legislature have any legal authority to remove an unqualified Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Education?

Opinion 7: The General Assembly has no authority to remove the Commissioner of Education.

Question 8: Are any legal remedies available to the state legislature or general public to remove an unqualified Chief Executive Officer of the Department of Education?

Opinion 8: The General Assembly likely lacks any viable route to removing the Commissioner of Education from office through litigation. The State—acting through its District and State Attorneys General—may have a right to seek court-ordered removal of an unqualified state officer through Tennessee’s “quo warranto” statute. Individual members of the public likely have no direct avenue to prosecute a “quo warranto” action or other removal litigation.

Question 9: Who would have a right of legal action to pursue or request said remedy or remedies?

Opinion 9: See Response to Question 8.

In 2020, the Defendant, Justin McDowell, pleaded guilty to possession with intent to sell or deliver less than .5 grams of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a Drug Free Zone, a park. The trial court imposed an effective sentence of five years of incarceration. The Defendant filed a motion for resentencing pursuant to an amendment to the Drug Free Zone Act. See T.C.A. § 39-17-432. The trial court held a hearing and denied relief. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that his motion for resentencing should have been granted. After review, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Shaun Alexander Hodge, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of error coram nobis based on alleged newly discovered evidence of a trial witness’s criminal history. Based on our review, we affirm the summary dismissal of the petition.

A Morgan County jury convicted the Petitioner, Fred Birchfield, of second degree murder and reckless homicide. The trial court sentenced the Petitioner to serve consecutive sentences of eighteen years for his second degree murder conviction and three years for his reckless homicide conviction. The Petitioner appealed, and this court affirmed the Petitioner’s convictions. State v. Birchfield, No. E2016-00493-CCA-R3-CD, 2017 WL 758515, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 27, 2017), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jun. 7, 2017). The Petitioner timely filed a post-conviction petition, alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

This is the second appeal in this healthcare liability case. In the first appeal, which was taken under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 9, this Court reversed the trial court’s denial of Appellees’/healthcare providers’ Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6) motion. The trial court held that, although Appellant/patient failed to substantially comply with the pre-suit notice requirement of Tennessee Code Annotated section 29-26- 121(a)(2)(E), Appellant showed extraordinary cause to excuse the noncompliance. The only question certified in the Rule 9 appeal was whether the trial court erred in finding extraordinary cause. We determined that it did and reversed the extraordinary cause finding but left undisturbed the trial court’s finding on substantial compliance. On remand, the trial court granted Appellees’ motion to dismiss without hearing. Now, in this Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3 appeal, we review the trial court’s initial finding that Appellant did not substantially comply with the statutory requirements. Because the trial court applied an incorrect legal standard in so finding, we vacate the order granting Appellees’ motion to dismiss and remand for reconsideration of the question of substantial compliance under the correct legal standard.

Foster parents appeal the dismissal of their petition to terminate a father’s parental rights and to adopt. The petitioners sought to terminate the father’s rights on two grounds: failure to file a timely petition to establish paternity and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody and financial responsibility for the child. The trial court found insufficient evidence to support either ground for termination. Upon review, we find clear and convincing evidence to support one of the alleged grounds. So we vacate the judgment of dismissal and remand for further proceedings.

This is a modification of child support case. Mother appeals the trial court’s: (1) discovery rulings regarding Father’s inheritance, banking, and trading accounts; (2) findings with respect to Father’s income; (3) denial of an upward deviation from the Child Support Guidelines; and (4) assignment of the Guardian ad Litem costs to Mother. We reverse the trial court’s order denying Mother’s discovery requests and the assignment of the Guardian ad Litem costs to Mother. We vacate the order establishing Father’s child support obligation and denying Mother’s request for an upward deviation. All other issues are pretermitted, and we remand the case for further proceedings.

The state House on Monday passed HB1663/SB1834, sponsored by Rep. William Lamberth, R-Portland, and Sen. Jack Johnson. R-Franklin, which would authorize the death penalty to be considered in the sentencing of a person convicted of rape, aggravated rape and especially aggravated rape of a child. The legislation prohibits a person with an intellectual disability from being given the death penalty for any offense. Having already passed in the state Senate, the legislation now goes to Gov. Bill Lee, WATE reports. The bill may contradict a 2008 ruling from the U.S. Supreme Court, but supporters say the current court may rule differently. On Wednesday, the House gave final approval to legislation requiring websites with “substantial” amounts of sexual content to verify the age of users. Those who do not create systems to block minors’ access could face felony charges. The Tennessee Journal reports on this legislation.

Laura Adams (“Wife”) filed a complaint for divorce in the Circuit Court for Robertson County (“the Trial Court”) against Timothy Adams, Sr. (“Husband”). In its final judgment of divorce, the Trial Court determined that real estate in Lawrence County (“Lawrence County property”), purchased by Husband prior to the marriage, was marital property because it had become “inextricably commingled.” The Trial Court awarded Wife “40% of the total proceeds” from the Lawrence County property. The Trial Court further awarded Wife the marital residence and any and all equitable interests in the marital residence. Husband has appealed. We affirm the Trial Court’s judgment.

Republican Gov. Bill Lee has “unchecked authority” under Tennessee law to pick whoever he wants to run the state Education Department, according to a new legal opinion issued by Attorney General Jonathan Skrmetti. In the opinion, Skermetti writes: “… the General Assembly chose to grant the Governor unchecked authority to appoint the Commissioner of Education. It could have, but did not, subject the Governor’s choice to legislative confirm[ation]. Nor did it require a ‘certificate of qualification’ from some expert third-party board, as past laws had. In lieu of such checks, the General Assembly determined that the Governor should unilaterally judge who had the attainments necessary to lead the State’s Department of Education." The opinion came in response to an inquiry as to whether the legislature or any other party has the authority to challenge the governor’s choice for the position. Read press coverage from the Tennessee Journal.