The inaugural Joint Georgia/Tennessee Construction Law Conference hosted by TBA's Construction Law Section is now available as a 1-Click package. The CLE sessions are for both Georgia and Tennessee construction attorneys, covering topics such as regional differences in construction law, a view from the bench session featuring judges and arbitrators, a case study session and more. The program offers 6.5 total CLE hours, including one dual hour. Access the individual programs or the 1-Click package.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Quante Webb, of first-degree premeditated murder, attempted first-degree premeditated murder, employment of a firearm with intent to commit a dangerous felony, and aggravated child abuse. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to life plus thirty-two years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends: (1) that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of his gang membership; (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction for first-degree premeditated murder; and (3) the trial court improperly ordered partial consecutive sentencing. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

In 2024, a Madison County jury convicted the Defendant, William Dangelo Penny, of felony evading arrest, misdemeanor evading arrest, leaving the scene of an accident, and driving while his license was suspended. The trial court sentenced him to nine years of incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions. He also contends that his motion for a continuance of his trial should have been granted. The State notes that the appeal is untimely. After review, we dismiss the appeal.

The Petitioner, Marterious O’Neal, was originally convicted of two counts of felony murder, eight counts of attempted aggravated robbery, and one count of aggravated assault, for which he received an effective sentence of life imprisonment. He filed for post- conviction relief, alleging various grounds of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel including (1) trial counsel’s failure to file a motion under Rule 608 of the Tennessee Rules of Evidence to impeach a witness for the State, (2) appellate counsel’s failure to include the transcript of the motion to suppress on direct appeal; and (3) appellate counsel’s failure to withdraw from representation in compliance with Rule 14 of the Tennessee Supreme Court thereby depriving the Petitioner of a timely application to appeal pursuant to Rule 11 of the Tennessee Supreme Court. Following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the post-conviction court granted a delayed appeal upon finding that appellate counsel had failed to withdraw in compliance with Rule 14, thereby depriving the Petitioner of the ability to file a timely Rule 11 appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. In the same order, the post-conviction court determined that whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to file a Rule 608 motion had been previously determined by this court and that the Petitioner had failed to establish prejudice with respect to appellate counsel’s failure to include the motion to suppress transcript on direct appeal. In this appeal, the Petitioner contends, and we agree, that the post-conviction court erred in determining that the Rule 608 issue had been previously determined and in granting a delayed appeal to the Tennessee Supreme Court. With respect to the remaining issues, the Petitioner also contends that the post-conviction court erred in finding that he received the effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Although appellate counsel failed to withdraw in accordance with Rule 14, we conclude that appellate counsel filed a timely application for permission to appeal from the Petitioner’s convictions in this case. Accordingly, we reverse and vacate the order of the post-conviction court to the extent that it grants the Petitioner a delayed appeal. We also conclude that because the Petitioner’s Rule 608 claim challenges trial counsel’s failure to file the motion rather than the trial court’s denial of the same, this issue has not been previously determined by this court. Nevertheless, the Petitioner failed to establish that trial counsel’s decision in not filing a Rule 608 motion prior to trial was ineffective. Finally, we conclude that trial counsel’s failure to include the transcript of the motion to suppress on direct appeal was deficient; however, the Petitioner failed to establish prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. Schoening Investment insures its Kentucky properties with Cincinnati Casualty. When Schoening filed a claim with Cincinnati Casualty, the insurer offered to pay the cost of repairs less a deduction for depreciation. Schoening rejected the offer and filed this lawsuit, proposing to lead a putative class and arguing that Cincinnati Casualty improperly deducted depreciation from repair cost payouts. The district court dismissed Schoening’s claim after concluding that the policy authorized Cincinnati Casualty to do just what it did. We agree and affirm.

The defendant, Tommy Lynn Hollingsworth, appeals the order of the trial court revoking his probation and ordering him to serve the remainder of his six-year sentence in confinement. Upon our review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and oral arguments, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as to the denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss and the revocation of the defendant’s probation. As to the disposition of the defendant’s probation, while we affirm the judgment of the trial court to order confinement in case number 96-195, the trial court erred in imposing that disposition in case number 96-193, which had expired.

The Defendant, James Lee Dennis, pled guilty to vehicular homicide by intoxication. After a sentencing hearing, the trial court entered judgment ordering the Defendant to serve ten years’ incarceration at one hundred percent service. The trial court also ordered the Defendant to pay $113,700 in the form of child maintenance restitution pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-219. On appeal, the Defendant argues that the trial court erred by ordering excessive restitution and by imposing a sentence above the minimum required by law. Following our review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Petitioner, Thor Lucas Coleman, appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief. He argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition without a hearing or the appointment of counsel. Petitioner raises for the first time on appeal two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The notice of appeal in this case was not timely filed. Therefore, this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

This appeal arises from a premises liability action commenced by Tammala Thompson (“Plaintiff”) for injuries she sustained while camping for the weekend at Cedars of Lebanon State Park (“the Park”). Plaintiff alleges that the State of Tennessee (“the State”), which owns and operates the Park, is liable for her injuries because the State negligently maintained an unsafe sidewalk. Relying upon the affirmative defense provided by the Tennessee Recreational Use Statute (“the TRUS”), the State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. Plaintiff opposed the motion arguing that she was not engaged in recreational activity when the injury occurred because she was walking on a sidewalk; thus, the TRUS is not applicable. She also asserted that sidewalks are “improvements” which are not expressly exempted from liability under the TRUS. Finding the TRUS applicable and that no exceptions applied, the Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss. We affirm.