This is an appeal from a final order entered on November 3, 2025. The notice of appeal was not provided to the appropriate individual at the correctional facility to mail to the Appellate Court Clerk until December 26, 2025, more than thirty days from the date of entry of the order from which the appellant is seeking to appeal. Because the notice of appeal was not timely filed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal.

MATHIS, Circuit Judge. Tayseer Yousef was a professional “fence” in a scheme to resell stolen cell phones obtained from armed robberies of retail stores. A jury convicted Yousef of two counts of interstate transportation of stolen goods and one count of conspiracy to transport stolen goods interstate. The district court sentenced him to 109 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Yousef challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. We affirm.

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Abida and Gulam Mukhdomi each pled guilty to one count of making false statements relating to health care matters with identical plea agreements containing appellate waivers. As part of each of their sentences, the district court imposed a fine of $125,000. On appeal, the Mukhdomis argue that the fines were procedurally and substantively unreasonable and unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause. Because the Mukhdomis’ appellate waivers bar their procedural and substantive reasonableness challenges and because their Eighth Amendment challenge, even if not barred, fails on the merits, we affirm the district court’s imposition of the fines.

The pro se petitioner, Dewaine Love, appeals the summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that he is entitled to relief because his multiple convictions violate due process and double jeopardy protections and that his sentence is unlawful because it was imposed without the preparation of a presentence report. Upon our review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we conclude that the petitioner’s notice of appeal was untimely and that the interest of justice does not mandate waiver of the requirement. The appeal is dismissed.

Defendant, Kevin Smith, appeals his conviction for vandalism of property valued at $60,000 or more but less than $250,000, for which he received a thirty-year sentence as a career offender. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In March 2019, the Petitioner, Sean William Lee, pleaded guilty to attempting to violate the Sex Offender Registry Act (“SORA”), and the trial court ordered him to serve 270 days in jail. In July 2025, the Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief in which he alleged that a federal preliminary injunction issued in his favor applied retroactively and rendered void his conviction for attempting to violate the registry. He also alleged that the State and his trial counsel failed to give him proper notice that he was required to register as a sex offender. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed the petition as untimely. The Petitioner appeals, maintaining on appeal that his conviction for attempting to violate SORA is void, and that he was not properly informed by the State or his trial counsel that he would be required to register as a sex offender. After review, we affirm the post- conviction court’s judgment.

The Defendant was indicted for one count of first degree premeditated murder for the shooting death of the victim, Michael Hawkins, Jr. Prior to trial, the Defendant filed two motions to suppress his statement to the police, both of which the trial court denied. The trial court granted the Defendant’s motion to suppress a photographic line-up identification. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury convicted the Defendant of second degree murder. The trial court subsequently sentenced the Defendant to twenty years of imprisonment. In this appeal, the Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing to suppress his statement. The Defendant also contends that the trial court erred by allowing one of the trial witnesses to identify him in court. Upon our review, we affirm the Defendant’s conviction and sentence. We remand this matter for the entry of a corrected judgment order.

Petitioner, Vernon Lee Ivey, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise Petitioner of his full sentencing exposure and statutory ineligibility for probation before Petitioner entered an open guilty plea. Petitioner also presents a stand-alone claim arguing that the post-conviction court erred when it determined that he intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily entered his guilty plea. Upon review of the entire record, the briefs and arguments of the parties, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The State appeals from the judgment of the trial court sentencing Defendant, Carmen Noe Garcia Guox, to eleven months and twenty-nine days’ incarceration for patronizing prostitution from a law enforcement officer posing as a minor. On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred by imposing a Class A misdemeanor sentence because Defendant’s conviction is a Class B felony offense. Defendant responds that he entered a best interest plea to a Class A misdemeanor and that the relevant statute does not authorize a Class B felony conviction or sentence. Upon a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, vacate Defendant’s plea, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Defendant, Donavous Drennon, was indicted with one count of second degree murder in Count 1, one count of aggravated assault resulting in death in Count 2, one count of tampering with evidence in Count 3, two counts of possessing a handgun after being convicted of a felony drug offense in Counts 4 and 5, and two counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony after being convicted of a dangerous felony in Counts 6 and 7. Prior to trial, the trial court merged Count 5 into Count 4 and bifurcated Counts 6 and 7. After trial, a jury acquitted Defendant on Counts 1 and 2 but convicted him on Counts 3 and 4, and the trial court dismissed Counts 6 and 7. On appeal, Defendant argues that (1) the trial court committed plain error by improperly implying to the jury that the defense of self-defense did not apply to Defendant’s charge of possessing a handgun after being convicted of a felony drug offense; (2) the Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution prevents retrial upon reversal of his conviction for the same; and (3) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for tampering with evidence. After review, we dismiss Defendant’s appeal.