The state’s AI Council met for the first time this year as members began setting a “roadmap” to transition from planning to implementation, the Tennessee Journal reports. At its last meeting in November, the council approved recommendations for the governor in areas including workforce development, education and government operations. “Since the report was issued in November, which was a great milestone for this council, we're moving from vision-setting to really operationalizing,” said Finance Commissioner Jim Bryson.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. In 2011, Officer Stephen Geelhood sought a search warrant to investigate narcotics sales from a home in Detroit. After a magistrate judge granted the warrant, Geelhood and a group of other officers searched the home of Janet Chancellor. There, they found over 500 grams of cocaine. Based on this and other findings, Janet’s son, Darell Chancellor, was arrested, prosecuted, and eventually sentenced to fourteen years and three months in prison for possession of illegal narcotics. Seven years later, the local prosecutor’s office vacated his conviction via a stipulated order. Chancellor then sued in federal court, alleging that Geelhood violated his state and federal rights. The district court granted summary judgment to Geelhood. Chancellor now appeals. We AFFIRM.

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. This appeal requires us to answer two questions. The first is one familiar to the federal courts: Does Randi Marie Bruce’s complaint contain sufficient factual material to state a claim—in this case, a workplace sexual-harassment claim—upon which relief can be granted? The second is an issue of first impression in this court: Does the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”) bar arbitration of each of Bruce’s claims against Adams and Reese, LLP (“A&R”), her former employer, or does it apply only to her sexual-harassment claim? Because Bruce has met Rule 8’s pleading standard as to her sexual-harassment claim, and the EFAA bars arbitration of Bruce’s entire case, we affirm the district court’s decision.

The Petitioner, Carlos Ortiz, acting pro se, appeals from the order of the Shelby County Criminal Court summarily dismissing his petition seeking habeas corpus relief. After review, we affirm.

Petitioner, Wendolyn Lee, appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief, arguing that the post-conviction court erred in finding that Petitioner received the effective assistance of trial counsel and that the remainder of his claims were either waived or previously determined. The State argues that the post-conviction court lacked the authority to consider Petitioner’s claims because a properly verified post-conviction petition was never filed and that Petitioner has otherwise waived consideration of his issues by failing to prepare an adequate brief. After review, we conclude that the post-conviction court had authority to consider Petitioner’s claims, but Petitioner has waived consideration of his claims in this court. Accordingly, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The Petitioner, Eric Bledsoe, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Specifically, he contends he is entitled to relief due to a defective indictment for his underlying charge of aggravated rape. However, as pointed out by the State, the Petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed late. Following our review, we conclude that the interest of justice does not require waiver of the timely filing requirement because the Petitioner’s explanation for the late filing is based upon a misunderstanding of the “prison mailbox rule,” see Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 20(g), and the nature of his defective indictment issue does not warrant such. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Defendant, Demonte Isom, of first degree premeditated murder, and the trial court imposed a life sentence. On appeal, the Defendant asserts that there is insufficient evidence to support his conviction. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This appeal concerns a health care liability lawsuit. Pamela Moses (“Moses”) sued the State of Tennessee (“the State”) in the Claims Commission after receiving dental treatment from the University of Tennessee Health Science Center (“UTHSC”). Moses alleged that her root canal was botched, leaving her injured. The State filed a motion to dismiss. The Claims Commission granted the State’s motion to dismiss on multiple independent grounds including that Moses failed to file a certificate of good faith with her complaint in accordance with Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-26-122. Moses appeals. We affirm.

This case stems from an alleged oral promise by the owner of two companies to pay the chief financial officer of one company a bonus of ten percent of the “profits” of both companies for work performed for the companies, including related to the sale of certain real property by one company. The plaintiff sued, alleging breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, and unjust enrichment. The defendants, the companies and their owner, filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the claims were barred by the parties’ written contract and the Tennessee Real Estate Broker License Act. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss but later granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff’s claims and ruled in favor of the defendant as to their defense under the real estate broker statute. Both parties appeal. We affirm the grant of summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims for fraud and unjust enrichment but reverse as to the claims for breach of oral contract and promissory estoppel. We also reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to the defendants on their defense under the real estate broker statute.

This appeal focuses on whether a Grundy County Resolution that regulates the location of quarries is, in effect, a zoning ordinance enacted in violation of Tennessee’s County Zoning Act (“the CZA”). The Plaintiffs claim the Resolution is invalid because Grundy County did not comply with the procedural requirements for passing a zoning ordinance as mandated by the CZA. The Plaintiffs further contend that the County could not utilize its police powers to regulate the location of quarries because the Resolution was preempted by state law. Grundy County argues that the Resolution was not a zoning ordinance, but rather a valid exercise of the County’s police powers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Grundy County, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Tinsley Props., LLC v. Grundy Cnty., No. M2022-01562-COA-R3-CV, 2024 WL 495700 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2024), perm. app. granted, (Tenn. June 27, 2024). We granted permission to appeal. Based on our review of applicable law, we conclude that Grundy County enacted what amounts to a zoning ordinance without complying with the statutory requirements contained in the CZA. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Grundy County. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacate the trial court’s judgment, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.