Davidson County Lawyer Anne-Marie Moyes was reinstated to the practice of law on Sept. 5. The Tennessee Supreme Court reports that Moyes has been on inactive status since May 27, 2019. The Board of Professional Responsibility found that Moyes petition for reinstatement was satisfactory, and she had met all requirements for reinstatement.

The TBA will host its Local Government Forum on Oct. 14 as a live virtual event from 9 a.m. to 1:15 p.m. CDT. The program will cover key issues in government law, including budgetary matters and ongoing PFAS litigation, with additional details to be announced. A discount is available for Local Government Practice Section members. For more information and to register visit the TBA website.

Judge Emily Abbott was appointed by Gov. Bill Lee to serve on the 6th Judicial District Criminal Court on Aug. 15 and was sworn in just three days later. “I wanted to go ahead and get sworn in immediately to be able to start hearing cases because Knox County had been without a judge since March,” Abbott said. She fills a vacancy created by Judge Steven Sword’s appointment to the appellate bench. Reflecting on her first days, Abbott said, “It was overwhelming, the welcome I received. Judge Sword swore me in. Judge Sanchez robed me. Justice Sharon Lee brought me her robe to wear on the bench until I can get mine ordered. She was at my swearing in, and it was amazing.” Abbott is just the second woman to serve in the Knox County Criminal Court. She previously was district attorney for the 7th Judicial District. Read more in a profile by the Administrative Office of the Courts.

LARSEN, Circuit Judge. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Southern Ohio Medical Center (SOMC) required its employees either to be vaccinated against the disease or to test weekly for it. Christina Henry refused both options, citing religious objections. SOMC then placed her on unpaid leave. Henry sued under Title VII for failure to accommodate her religious beliefs and for retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of SOMC, holding that Henry’s requested accommodation would place an undue hardship on SOMC and that Henry had failed to show that SOMC’s stated reasons for placing her on unpaid leave were pretextual. For the reasons below, we AFFIRM.

READLER, Circuit Judge. Advancing technology reaches every corner of society. The law is no exception. Consider, on this front, the advent of portable recording devices, from those attached to the body (body cams) to those placed on a vehicle’s dashboard (dash cams). These innovations have dramatically changed our collective understanding of law enforcement encounters. Today, most officer interactions are captured on video. See Logan Seacrest & Jillian Snider, R St. Inst., The Past, Present, and Future of Police Body Cameras 3 (2025), https://perma.cc/2KKH-8LY3 (recognizing that over the past decade and a half police cameras have become “standard operating procedure” in the United States); see also Sean E. Goodison & Connor Brooks, Bureau Just. Stats., Local Police Departments, Procedures, Policies, and Technology, 2020–Statistical Tables 6 (2023), https://perma.cc/B8EC-TLQ4 (noting that as of 2020, 79% of local police officers worked in departments using body cams, with use ubiquitous in major urban areas). With those recordings typically available for broader viewing through public records laws and the like, body and dash cam video makes the work of law enforcement more open to public evaluation (and, invariably, debate). See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code § 149.43(A)(1)(jj) (generally subjecting body cam and dash cam videos to public release). The court system has especially benefitted from these advancements. Whereas encounters with law enforcement historically had to be understood through witness recollections alone, video now captures key aspects of the engagement, if not the entire event itself. According to one recent study, video evidence has resulted in cases being “decided more quickly, with fewer disputed facts.” See Seacrest & Snider, supra at 3 (discussing how “body camera footage began to make its way from police stations to courtrooms”). For judges in particular, video evidence makes us far better equipped to evaluate claims tied to an officer’s conduct. Especially so in the interlocutory posture in which we review qualified immunity appeals, where we must measure that conduct against constitutional norms. In the past, it could be tempting to leave untouched a district court’s assessment of the evidence, as our review was limited to a paper record. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 307–09 (1995) (refusing to resolve factual dispute centered on dueling affidavits at summary judgment). But today, where video allows us in effect to witness the critical events at issue, we are equipped to assess for ourselves both the factual and legal questions underlying an officer encounter without reflexively deferring to the district court. After all, while we well appreciate the vital role district courts play in assessing live testimony or a complex record, we are on more equal footing in reviewing video evidence. See Johnson v. Rogers, 944 F.3d 966, 969 (7th Cir. 2019) (observing that a “conclusive video allows [an appellate] court to know what happened and decide the legal consequences”). Our jurisprudence over interlocutory qualified immunity appeals bears out these developments. In the increasingly rare excessive force case where the underlying record contains no video or audio record, and instead consists entirely of conflicting witness testimony, we have understood our role to be limited. Namely, it is for the jury, not us, to settle any underlying material factual disputes. Gambrel v. Knox County, 25 F.4th 391, 404–05 (6th Cir. 2022). But when presented with video footage that “accurately depicts most of the relevant events,” we may utilize that footage to “ensure [that] the district court properly constructed the factual record” and assessed the legal questions in line with that record. Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900, 910 (6th Cir. 2024); Rudlaff v. Gillispie, 791 F.3d 638, 639 (6th Cir. 2015) (using video evidence when it captures the material facts); Hayden v. Green, 640 F.3d 150, 152 (6th Cir. 2011) (similar). Put another way, rather than “clos[ing] our eyes to the evidence presented” through dash or body cam, we instead “assess [that evidence] in the light depicted by the videotapes.” Moore v. Oakland County, 126 F.4th 1163, 1167 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation modified). This approach is now the rule more than the exception, with fewer and fewer police interactions occurring outside the scope of a camera’s lens. Today’s case is emblematic, with dash cam video vividly telling the tale of Ulysses Feagin’s most recent encounter with law enforcement officers. Now a prisoner, Feagin sued the officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, raising both excessive force and deliberate indifference claims tied to the officers’ deployment of a taser and pepper spray to effectuate Feagin’s arrest. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all but two claims: an excessive force claim related to the use of a taser, and a deliberate indifference claim stemming from the officers not tending to Feagin’s medical needs after he was pepper sprayed. Those remaining issues are now before us as part of the officers’ interlocutory appeal. As explained next, we reverse the district court’s denial of qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim, dismiss the appeal of the deliberate indifference claim for lack of jurisdiction, and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

Following a bench trial, the Defendant, David James Paul, was convicted of two counts of driving under the influence. The trial court merged the convictions and imposed a sentence of eleven months and twenty-nine days. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the trial court’s denial of his pretrial motion to suppress. He contends that the State failed to establish reasonable suspicion for the initial seizure because the officers who detained him did not testify, leaving the record without proof of the circumstances justifying the stop. The State responds that reasonable suspicion was established through a “be on the lookout” dispatch report, or BOLO, and the testimony of the arresting officer, who arrived after the Defendant had been detained. Upon our review, we hold that because the State offered no admissible evidence concerning the circumstances of the initial seizure, it fell short of establishing that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Accordingly, we respectfully reverse and vacate the judgments of the trial court and remand for dismissal.

The defendant, Gerald Lovelace, was convicted by a Stewart County Circuit Court jury of three counts of first-degree felony murder, which were merged into one conviction and for which the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to law enforcement; (2) his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures was violated; (3) the trial court erred in allowing witness testimony concerning his prior purchase of drugs from the victim, his “habit” of keeping a gun under the hood of his car, and his being “suited and booted” when he left the house the night of the murder; and (4) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Following a thorough review of the record, the briefs, and oral arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Serena N. Hammond, Defendant, was indicted by a Knox County Grand Jury for one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Count 1, one count of aggravated burglary acting in concert with two or more other persons in Count 2, and one count of attempted second degree murder in Count 3. Defendant was convicted as charged in Counts 1 and 2 and convicted of attempted voluntary manslaughter in Count 3. Defendant was sentenced to an effective sentence of ten years in incarceration as a standard offender. Defendant appealed, arguing that (1) the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for aggravated burglary acting in concert; (2) the trial court committed reversible error by admitting photographs of a gun and magazine recovered from a car in which she was pulled over fifteen days after the incident; (3) the trial court committed reversible error by admitting recordings of Defendant’s phone call made from jail to a co-defendant; (4) the trial court improperly considered Defendant’s false testimony at trial and the location of the offense in enhancing her sentence for aggravated burglary acting in concert; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors deprived her of the right to a fair trial. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

The plaintiff in this landlord-tenant dispute sought a temporary injunction in the general sessions court, asking the court to force the defendant landlords to repair an air conditioning unit. The general sessions court granted a temporary injunction and later held a final hearing, after which it awarded the plaintiff $24,793.63 in damages. The defendants appealed to the circuit court which, following a bench trial, dismissed the plaintiff’s case. The circuit court, inter alia, concluded that the plaintiff offered no proof of his damages. The plaintiff timely appealed the circuit court’s judgment to this Court. Discerning no error, we affirm.

In this action, the plaintiff, through her conservators, asserted health care liability and breach of contract claims against the senior living facility where she resides and its parent corporation. Following some amount of discovery, the parties filed competing motions for partial summary judgment concerning the breach of contract and financial claims. The trial court conducted a hearing regarding the motions and granted partial summary judgment in favor of the senior living facility based on the terms of the contract signed by the plaintiff. The trial court further certified the judgment as final. The plaintiff has appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.