BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Tiara Yachts, Inc., hired Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (“BCBSM”) to administer its self-funded healthcare benefits plan. It alleges that BCBSM knowingly squandered plan assets by systematically overpaying some categories of claims. BCBSM then allegedly profited from its mismanagement by implementing a program through which it caught overpayments, clawed them back, and kept a portion of those “savings” for itself. Tiara Yachts sued BCBSM under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., and BCBSM moved to dismiss. The district court granted that motion, holding that Tiara Yachts hadn’t plausibly alleged that BCBSM acted as an ERISA fiduciary. It also held that ERISA’s remedial provisions couldn’t provide the relief Tiara Yachts sought. Because the district court erred on both fronts, we reverse.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Officers discovered a large-scale drug distribution scheme operating in Toledo, Ohio. From those revelations, Christopher Simpson, Marquise Figures, and Antuan Wynn were charged with a host of federal crimes related to trafficking in cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl. The three defendants were tried in a joint proceeding. And except as to one charge against Wynn, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to all three. In this consolidated appeal, defendants challenge their convictions as well as their resulting sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

In June 2021, the Shelby County Grand Jury issued a three-count indictment charging Roy Frazier II (“Defendant Frazier”) with two counts of aggravated rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and Bionka McGaughy (“Defendant McGaughy”) with child abuse or neglect of a child eight years of age or less (Count 3). Following a joint trial, a jury convicted Defendant Frazier of aggravated rape of a child in Count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count 2, for which he received a sentence of life without parole plus twenty years. The jury convicted Defendant McGaughy of child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of two years to be served in the workhouse. On appeal, Defendant Frazier contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting multiple hearsay statements; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity; (4) the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors in sentencing; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencing. For her part, Defendant McGaughy argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for child neglect of a child eight years of age or less. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction in all respects.

This is the parties’ second appeal before this Court in the above-styled case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After this Court’s mandate issued, however, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. The defendants opposed the notice, but the trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The defendants again appealed to this Court. Because the plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary nonsuit was untimely, and because the trial court’s action exceeds the scope of our instructions on remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and again remand this case to the trial court for entry of a sufficient order.

Deer Hill Village Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) appeals from the order of the Chancery Court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs Janine M. Lamothe and Matthew T. Davenport (hereinafter “Appellees”). The underlying controversy is a request from Appellees, who own a condominium in Deer Hill Village, to inspect the HOA’s corporate records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-66-102 et seq. After subsequent filings from both parties, including multiple motions to enlarge time for discovery from the HOA, the Chancery Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The HOA timely appealed to this Court. Having determined that the Chancery Court failed to state the legal and factual grounds on which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the order at issue and remand for entry of an order that complies with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

A hospital system filed a declaratory judgment action in the Davidson County Chancery Court seeking invalidation of two TennCare State Plan Amendments on the basis that they violate Tennessee Code Annotated section 71-5-108. The two State Plan Amendments set forth reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court declared that the TennCare State Plan Amendments were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm.

A hospital system that was the aggrieved party in this contested case before The Division of TennCare, Department of Finance and Administration sought judicial review of the agency’s decision upholding the validity of two TennCare rules. The two rules regulate reimbursement rates for emergency services provided to Tennessee’s Medicaid beneficiaries when the provider of those emergency services does not have a contract with the managed care organizations that insure the beneficiaries. The Davidson County Chancery Court reversed the agency’s decision and held that the two rules were invalid and void ab initio. We affirm.

This year’s Bench Bar program “Lawyers Making History” offers a unique opportunity to hear from Tennessee judges, practicing lawyers and those who were there when history was made! The first of three sessions will look at famous Tennessee trials as Chattanooga lawyer Russell Fowler explores landmark cases that shaped our state’s legal landscape. The second session will feature trailblazing women as they reflect on their experiences breaking judicial barriers. Speakers include retired U.S. 6th Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Martha Craig "Cissy" Daughtrey, U.S. District Court Judge Aleta Trauger from the Middle District of Tennessee, and Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Camille McMullen. Nashville lawyer Margaret Behm will moderate the discussion. The final session will take a deep dive into one of Tennessee’s most controversial political and legal events: the Blanton pardon scandal. Don’t miss the opportunity to hear from Nashville lawyer Hal Hardin, author and columnist Keel Hunt, and former Tennessee Gov. and U.S. Sen. Lamar Alexander. Make plans to join your colleagues for this program — taking place June 12 from 9-11:45 a.m. CDT at the Franklin Marriott Cool Springs — as well as other educational programs being planned. Still need to register for convention? Get started here.

President Donald Trump on Monday signed the "Take It Down Act," bipartisan legislation that enacts stricter penalties for the distribution of nonconsensual intimate imagery, including deepfakes created by artificial intelligence, according to the Associated Press. The measure, which takes effect immediately, makes it illegal to “knowingly publish” or threaten to publish intimate images without a person’s consent, and requires websites and social media platforms to remove such material within 48 hours of receiving notice from a victim. Free speech advocates and digital rights groups argue the bill is too broad and could result in the censorship of legitimate content, including legal pornography.