Sullivan County lawyer Steven Carl Frazier received a public censure from the Tennessee Supreme Court on April 17. The court found that Frazier violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.4(a), 1.5(a) & (b) and 1.15(a) & (b). It conditioned the censure on refunding his client $2,500 within 30 days. Frazier was retained by the client for representation in a property boundary dispute. The court found that Frazier did not deposit the retainer fee into his trust account and wrongfully commingled the client funds with his own. The court also found that he did not track his time, issue an invoice for legal services, or communicate the rate of his fee or expenses the client would pay. He also did not obtain a signed explanation of the parties’ intent and amount of non-refundable funds. He later stopped responding to the client’s requests for updates and took no further action on the case. Finally, the court found that while Frazier offered to refund one-half of the client’s fees three years after the client filed a disciplinary complaint, the fees were never refunded.

Wilson County lawyer Mitchell Jeffery Ferguson received a public censure from the Tennessee Supreme Court on April 17. Ferguson was appointed to represent a client who was charged with several felonies, including first degree murder. During the representation, Ferguson failed to appear for multiple court hearings and failed to communicate with the court and his client about hearing dates and absences. The Supreme Court also found that he failed to provide communication or copies of legal documents to the client and failed to meet with the client for trial preparation. His inaction resulted in multiple continuances, removal from the case and postponement of the client’s murder trial, thereby prejudicing the administration of justice. His actions violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.3, 1.4, 3.2 and 8.4(d).

Shelby County lawyer Robert Andrew Pope received a public censure from the Tennessee Supreme Court on April 16. The court found that Pope violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(b) when he failed to disclose a material fact regarding his termination from the Tennessee Department of Corrections while his bar admission application was pending.

JIMMY L. CROOM, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. At issue in this appeal is whether the bankruptcy court erred in dismissing the appellant’s adversary complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim against the debtor. The bankruptcy court was tasked with sua sponte reviewing the sufficiency of the appellant’s complaint by virtue of her application to proceed in forma pauperis. After analyzing the appellant’s adversary complaint, the bankruptcy court concluded that it did not adequately state a claim for relief against the debtor because her claims were time-barred under the relevant statutes of limitations. As such, the court dismissed her complaint under the mandate of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For reasons that will be set forth herein, the appellant is not entitled to relief in this appeal. The bankruptcy court did not err in sua sponte dismissing her adversary complaint. Her claims were time-barred by various statutes of limitations and, as such, dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 was mandated. The errors appellant alleges the bankruptcy court made in this matter stem from a misunderstanding of the law and of legal procedure—not an error by the bankruptcy court.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. The federal courts do their business in public—which means the public is presumptively entitled to review every document that a party files with the court for purposes of influencing a judicial decision. Thus, under rules long settled in this circuit, “[o]nly the most compelling reasons can justify non-disclosure of judicial records.” Shane Group, Inc. v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Mich., 825 F.3d 299, 305 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting In re Knoxville News-Sentinel Co., Inc., 723 F.2d 470, 476 (6th Cir. 1983)). And when a court does seal off judicial records from public view, it must explain “why the interests in support of nondisclosure are compelling, why the interests supporting access are less so, and why the seal itself is no broader than necessary[.]” Id. at 306. None of these rules were honored here. CoreCivic, for its part, largely elided them in its filings with the district court. And the district court repeatedly sealed off documents that the parties themselves (or just one of them) had deemed “confidential”—thereby shielding from public view all kinds of information about how the defendant corporation ran its prisons. For the most part the court did so merely by electronically stamping the first page of each motion to seal. Eventually a local newspaper, the Nashville Banner, intervened and sought to unseal broad swaths of the court record; but the court kept under seal every document that the parties asked it to. The Banner now appeals the district court’s refusal to unseal 24 deposition transcripts in particular. We vacate the court’s order to that extent and remand for a prompt decision in accordance with our precedents.

The Petitioner, Bryant Ward, pleaded guilty to second degree murder, in exchange for a twenty-year sentence. The Petitioner filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel was ineffective and that he was on a medication that inhibited his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. After review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s judgment.

The law license of Hardeman County lawyer William Boyette Denton was transferred to disability inactive status on April 11. Denton cannot practice law while on inactive status but may return to the practice of law after showing that his disability has been removed and being reinstated.

A Shelby County jury convicted the Petitioner, Victor Valle, of rape of a child, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of twenty-two years imprisonment. Thereafter, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, asserting that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. In relevant part, the Petitioner alleged that his attorneys were ineffective by (1) calling the victim’s mother and his former spouse as witnesses at trial; (2) failing to explain his right to testify and advising him not to testify; and (3) failing to advise him of his right to have the jury instructed regarding lesser-included offenses. The Petitioner also asserted that he was entitled to relief due to cumulative error. After a hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief, and the Petitioner appealed. Upon our review, we respectfully affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Defendant, Derek Morse, was convicted by a Hamilton County jury of three counts of premeditated first degree murder and one count of attempted premeditated first degree murder. Defendant was sentenced to three terms of life imprisonment without parole for the first-degree murder convictions, and he was ordered to serve a concurrent sentence of fifteen years for the attempted first degree murder conviction. In this direct appeal, Defendant contends that: 1) the evidence at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions because the State failed to establish his identity as a shooter; 2) the trial court erred by allowing evidence of a prior bad act; 3) the State failed to establish a proper chain of custody for evidence of gunshot residue on Defendant's clothing; 4) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on newly discovered evidence; 5) the trial court should have granted a new trial based on proof that a State's witness gave false testimony that he did not receive favorable treatment from the State for his testimony against Defendant; 6) the State made improper comments during its opening statement and closing argument; and 7) the cumulative effect of these errors entitles Defendant to a new trial. Having reviewed the entire record and the briefs and arguments of the parties, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Plaintiff sued Defendant for divorce. Defendant appeals challenging the trial court’s failure to award alimony. Without a transcript or statement of the evidence, appellate courts presume the record supports the trial court’s findings. We affirm.