The Arts & Business Council of Greater Nashville and its Volunteer Lawyers & Professionals for the Arts (VLPA) program will hold a clinic on May 7 for those needing legal advice on issues surrounding their creative practice. The free 30-minute in-person appointments are available to income-qualified artists, musicians, creatives and arts organizations in the state. The clinic will run from 6-8 p.m. CDT at the Belmont College of Law, Randall and Sadie Baskin Center, 1901 15th Ave. S., Nashville 37212. Those needing help should register by May 2. To volunteer at the clinic email vlpa@abcnashville.org.

The death of record company magnate J.W. Hanks has upended our community, leaving the town reeling with a murderer in our midst. Hanks’ untimely demise has sparked gossip and intrigue, revealing a double life only discovered through death. Join the TBA and colleagues from across the state as we travel to the roaring 1920s and unravel this mystery. Gumshoes will use Tennessee’s latest criminal laws to uncover crucial clues to unmask the killer and put this brazen crook in the birdhouse. Was Hanks’ killer his business partner, his doctor, his wife, his mistress, his best friend or someone else he trusted? It’s up to you to solve.

The Tennessee General Assembly passed the budget for FY2025-2026 which includes an additional $17 million to fund the new Plan for Indigent Representation in Tennessee. TBA President Ed Lanquist Jr. reacted to the development saying, “The TBA thanks the General Assembly and Gov. Lee for making indigent representation funding a priority, and is especially grateful to Chief Justice Holly Kirby, the Tennessee Supreme Court and the Administrative Office of the Courts for their leadership and development of the Indigent Representation plan, which will result in better solutions to improve the system of indigent representation in Tennessee.” The budget is the one piece of legislation that lawmakers constitutionally are required to pass before adjournment. Once the budget is approved, lawmakers will consider matters “behind the budget” that received funding, as well as other priority items. The legislature is expected to adjourn early next week.

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. During a late-night traffic stop, officers found two firearms in Andre Whitlow’s car. Since Whitlow was a felon, it was illegal for him to have the guns. At trial, a jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession. He appeals, challenging various aspects of the traffic stop and conviction. We affirm.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. Cheyenne Witt died of a morphine overdose after her dentist, Jay Sadrinia, prescribed her that medication twice in three days. A jury convicted Sadrinia of knowingly prescribing Witt a controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose resulting in her death, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C). We hold that sufficient evidence supported Sadrinia’s conviction. But we agree with him that the district court improperly admitted—as “intrinsic evidence” of the conduct charged in the indictment— testimony about bad acts unrelated to that conduct. The government, on that point, does not even argue the contrary. We vacate Sadrinia’s convictions and remand his case for a new trial.

GRIFFIN, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Joseph Ebu, a lawful permanent resident, was subject to concurrent naturalization and removal proceedings. Believing that the pending removal proceedings took priority over his naturalization application, defendant United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) delayed considering Ebu’s naturalization application until his removal proceedings concluded. But when that delay exceeded 120 days following his naturalization examination, Ebu asked the district court to “determine” his naturalization application and declare him prima facie eligible for naturalization pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b). Relying on our unpublished opinion in Rahman v. Napolitano, 385 F. App’x 540, 544 (6th Cir. 2010), the district court dismissed Ebu’s complaint under a separate provision that prohibits the determination of a naturalization application while removal proceedings are pending, see 8 U.S.C. § 1429. Because Rahman is sound, we affirm the district court’s dismissal and hold that § 1429 precludes district courts from considering naturalization applications under § 1447(b) while removal proceedings are simultaneously pending against the applicant.

The Defendant, William Joel Lauper, was convicted by a Rutherford County Jury of especially aggravated kidnapping, four counts of aggravated assault, domestic assault resulting in a bodily injury, and preventing another from making an emergency call, for which he received an effective sentence of fifty years, eleven months, and twenty-nine days of confinement. In this direct appeal, the sole issue presented for our review is whether the State established the essential element of serious bodily injury to sustain the especially aggravated kidnapping conviction. After review, we affirm.

The plaintiffs filed this lawsuit against seven defendants. Their complaint asserted various counts arising out of the defendants’ involvement with a water loss claim the plaintiffs had reported to their insurer. Four of the defendants moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted their motions and simply stated at the end of its order of dismissal, “This is a final and appealable order and there is no just cause for delay.” The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. This Court entered two show cause orders, directing the appellants to either obtain a final judgment or show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed. We then entered an order deferring the matter to the panel of the Court deciding this appeal. We conclude that the trial court improvidently certified its order as final and dismiss this appeal.

This appeal arises from a will contest. Appellant David Riss (“Respondent”) and Appellee Adam Riss (“Petitioner”) dispute the validity of a typewritten codicil and holographic document that purportedly amended the last will and testament their mother, Nancy G. Riss (“Decedent”), executed on September 25, 2018 (“the Will”). After petitioning to admit the Will to probate and set aside the purported codicils, Petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings. He argued that the typewritten codicil and holographic document do not meet applicable statutory requirements and thus should be given no testamentary effect. The trial court agreed with Petitioner and granted his motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that the typewritten codicil failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-104 because the witness signatures were affixed to an attesting affidavit but not to the codicil. The court further held that the holographic document failed to meet the statutory requirements of a valid holographic testamentary instrument under Tennessee Code Annotated § 32-1-105 because it did not contain any material provisions directing the distribution of Decedent’s estate. This appeal followed. We affirm.

Vanessa Faddoul sought an order of protection as a stalking victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 against her neighbor, Edward James Beyer, in Williamson County General Sessions Court. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the general sessions court issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Mr. Beyer from contacting or coming about the victim, Mrs. Faddoul, or her family, and restricting Mr. Beyer’s second amendment rights. Mr. Beyer appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon a pre-trial motion of Mr. Beyer, the circuit court modified the general sessions order by restoring Mr. Beyer’s second amendment right to possess firearms. Following three days of hearings on the petition, but before the circuit court could rule on the merits of the de novo appeal, Mr. Beyer filed a “Notice of Voluntary Nonsuit and Dismissal of Appeal” to dismiss his appeal of the general sessions court ruling against him in Case No. 2022OP- 176, purportedly pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41.01(1). Because Mr. Beyer dismissed his appeal, the circuit court entered an order “affirming” the judgment of the general sessions court, save the second amendment issue, dismissing the appeal, and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to apply for an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mrs. Faddoul requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $168,112.50 under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), discretionary costs in the amount of $5,248.62 under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), and $2,579.37 in “non-discretionary cost expenses.” The circuit court denied her request for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs in toto based on several findings. It found that she was not entitled to an award of mandatory attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 because, inter alia, stalking victims are not entitled to the same “enhanced protections” as domestic abuse victims, that it did not complete the hearing on the petition, which it found to be a prerequisite for fees, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was unreasonable. The circuit court also declined to award Mrs. Faddoul any discretionary costs. Both parties appeal. Contrary to Mr. Beyer’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take any action after he purportedly “nonsuited” his appeal, we find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction and that it did not err in affirming the judgment of the general sessions court and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to request attorney’s fees. Because Mrs. Faddoul,as a stalking victim, is entitled to the same rights afforded to domestic abuse victims, and as mandated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), we hold that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees and remand for the circuit court to award Mrs. Faddoul her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3- 617(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Mrs. Faddoul’s request for discretionary costs, finding that some of the court reporters’ invoices clearly delineate the discretionary costs that she is entitled to recover pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). We also conclude that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3- 617(a)(1).