The TBA will host three ethics webcasts on April 2, featuring the CLE Performer Stuart Teicher. The sessions will blend humor, pop culture and professional responsibility to provide insightful lessons on attorney ethics. Dealing with Deep Fakes: Danger and Direction will explain the hazards associated with deep fakes and how to deal with them. What Batman Teaches About Attorney Ethics will explore the ethical lessons attorneys can learn from the Caped Crusader. Lyrical Lessons from Taylor Swift will reveal ways that Swift's songs illustrate lessons from the Rules of Professional Conduct. Attorneys can register for these and other interactive webcasts on the TBA website.

Make plans now to join colleagues from across the state at the TBA’s 2026 Annual Convention, set for June 10-13, in downtown Knoxville. Annual favorites such as the Public Service Breakfast, Lawyers Luncheon, compelling CLE and swearing in of TBA’s new president will return, as will the Wednesday night welcome reception and a Thursday evening reception at Knoxville’s minor league ballpark, home of the Smokies. Again this year, the Tennessee Lawyers' Association for Women (TLAW) and Tennessee Alliance for Black Lawyers (TABL) will hold meetings and events in conjunction with the convention. This year’s convention also will include TBA’s first-ever Tech Showcase and several lunch and learn opportunities with tech vendors on Thursday. The four-day event will take place at the Crowne Plaza Knoxville. Don’t miss this annual gathering of Tennessee lawyers! Access registration, hotel reservation information and more on the event website. Day passes for the Tech Showcase on June 11 also are available for those who unable to attend the full convention. Learn more about that option.

Thank you for your continued support of the TBA Corporate Counsel Section! We know that you face a wide variety of issues in your practice, and we encourage you to stay connected with other in-house counsel in Tennessee. To that end, the section's executive council currently has open positions. The executive council meets monthly to develop and implement section initiatives, produce CLEs, and provide feedback to TBA leadership on in-house issues. If you are interested, please email section coordinator Jamie Rhode with your bio for consideration.

In the meantime, you do not have to wait to connect with colleagues. The section directory is a great resource for meeting other juvenile attorneys or for referrals. We hope to see you at TBA programming, and if you have thoughts or ideas about future section initiatives, please do not hesitate to reach out to Jamie Rhode.

JOHN T. GREGG, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. Days after receiving a discharge in chapter 7, Sharenne L. Tucker, the debtor-appellee (the “Debtor”), commenced a chapter 13 case. In her debt repayment plan, the Debtor proposed to keep her vehicle that was subject to the lien of Santander Consumer USA Inc., the secured creditor-appellant (“Santander”). Section 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) of the Bankruptcy Code1 provides that unless a secured creditor accepts the plan, the secured creditor is entitled to retain its lien “until the earlier of . . . the payment of the underlying debt determined under nonbankruptcy law; or . . . discharge under section 1328.” Because the Debtor was proposing to modify the contract rate of interest and section 1328(f) rendered her ineligible for a chapter 13 discharge, she could not technically satisfy section 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I). She therefore proposed a creative alternative: Santander would retain its lien until the completion of all plan payments, not the entry of the chapter 13 discharge. Santander objected. It contended that the Debtor’s plan contravened section 1325(a)(5)(B)(i)(I) by, in effect, rewriting the statute to include a provision found nowhere in its text. Without its acceptance, Santander argued, the Debtor’s plan could not be confirmed as a matter of law. The bankruptcy court overruled Santander’s objection and confirmed the plan. Santander appealed. Applying the plain meaning of the statute, we REVERSE and REMAND to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.

PER CURIAM. Renee Marie Johnson, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil-rights complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. She also moves to supplement the record and for us to take judicial notice of certain facts. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the following reasons, we vacate the district court’s judgment, remand for further proceedings, and deny as moot the motion to supplement and take judicial notice. Therefore, we VACATE the district court’s judgment dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order, and DENY as moot the motion to supplement and take judicial notice.

The Defendant, Amanda Jean Phillips, was convicted by a Scott County jury of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a Class C felony; two counts of especially aggravated kidnapping, a Class A felony; two counts of aggravated child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, a Class A felony; and carjacking, a Class B felony. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to four years for the aggravated assault conviction, twenty years for each of the especially aggravated kidnapping convictions, twenty years for each of the aggravated child neglect convictions, and ten years for the carjacking conviction. Finding the Defendant to be a dangerous offender, the trial court ordered partial consecutive sentences for an effective total sentence of thirty years at 100% service in the Tennessee Department of Correction. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of her aggravated child neglect convictions and argues that the trial court erred by not considering a mandatory mitigating factor in imposing her especially aggravated kidnapping sentences and by classifying her as a dangerous offender under the consecutive sentencing statute. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support the Defendant’s convictions for aggravated child neglect and that the trial court did not err in its application of enhancement and mitigating factors but failed to make adequate findings in support of consecutive sentencing under the dangerous offender criterion of the consecutive sentencing statute. However, upon de novo review, we conclude that the record supports the imposition of consecutive sentences based on the Defendant’s having committed the offenses while she was on probation. Accordingly, we affirm the Defendant’s convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court.

A majority of the members of the State Executive Committee of the Tennessee Democratic Party approved adding unelected “ex-officio members” as full members of the Executive Committee with voting rights. A group of dissenting Executive Committee members brought suit, claiming that the addition of voting members of the Executive Committee in this manner violated statutory provisions governing the composition of state party executive committees, codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 2-13-101 et seq. In response, the Executive Committee argued the statutory provisions permit adding ex- officio members as full voting members and invoked constitutional avoidance principles in support of the Executive Committee’s interpretation of the statutory scheme. The Executive Committee filed a counterclaim challenging the constitutionality of the statutory scheme based on freedom of association principles. Both parties sought judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the Executive Committee’s motion for judgment on pleadings, construing the statutory scheme as permitting the Executive Committee’s actions. Accordingly, the trial court pretermitted the constitutional issue, dismissing the Executive Committee’s counterclaim as moot. The dissenting members appealed. We conclude the trial court erred in its interpretation of the statutory scheme. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

A developer failed to use proper erosion control measures, resulting in recurring sediment runoff into a pond owned by neighboring landowners and increasing accumulation of sediment therein. The trial court concluded that developer’s actions constituted a temporary, not permanent, nuisance and awarded injunctive relief and damages. Damages for emotional distress were included among the damages the trial court awarded. The developer appeals, challenging the trial court’s finding as to proximate causation and asserting that its actions, if a nuisance, were a permanent and not temporary nuisance, and accordingly the landowners’ suit was barred by the statute of limitations. The developer also asserts that the trial court erred as to the remedies awarded, challenging both the injunctive relief and emotional distress damages. We affirm the trial court’s findings as to proximate causation and its conclusion that the nuisance is temporary. We also affirm the trial court’s imposition of an injunction. However, we reverse the award of damages for emotional distress based upon deficient pleading.

The defendant was involved in a motor vehicle collision with a tractor-trailer truck in another state. The insurance company that insured both the truck and the trailer filed a lawsuit in the Shelby County circuit court based on negligence. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(3). The trial court held that the terms of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-4- 101(a) did not provide for venue in Shelby County because the action did not arise there and the defendant did not reside there. The insurance company appeals. We affirm.

The employee questions the trial court’s denial of medical and temporary benefits in this interlocutory appeal. The employee reported pain in her shoulder from an incident at work. She received authorized medical treatment, and upon placing her at maximum medical improvement, the authorized treating physician opined the employee’s condition and need for future medical treatment were not primarily caused by the injury with the employer. Thereafter, the employee sought treatment with an unauthorized physician, who opined that the employee’s condition was caused by her work injury. After an expedited hearing, the court found the employee did not come forward with sufficient evidence that she would likely prevail at trial in establishing that the work injury was the primary cause of her condition and need for additional medical treatment and denied her request for benefits. The employee has appealed. Having carefully reviewed the record, we affirm the trial court’s interlocutory order denying benefits and remand the case.