Pre-registration for TBA's 2026 Convention in Knoxville will close this coming Sunday, June 7, at 11:59 p.m. CDT. Only on-site registration will be accepted after that point. This year's convention will run from June 10-13. Visit the TBA Convention site for more information, including the the registration form, event schedule, CLE line up and awards to be presented.

The 2026 Convention CLE lineup will offer 8.5 hours of credit, including a presentation from attorney and productivity consultant Paul Unger with the Affinity Consulting Group. Unger will talk about “12 Time Management Things Attorneys Should Do, But Don’t.” Unger is a national speaker and author who coaches lawyers on how to be more efficient with time management. He began his career working for the governor of Ohio. After law school, he practiced law for six years, handling litigation and bankruptcy cases. In 2000, he started a legal technology consulting company. His favorite part of his job is helping people get organized and focused so they can find more enjoyment in their lives and jobs. Affinity Consulting is a TBA member benefit partner. Learn more about the services they offer. Learn more about the convention and register here.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. After the government sought to remove Odinaka Ethelberth Nwosu to Nigeria, he requested withholding of removal and cancellation of removal. To support his withholding-of-removal claim, Nwosu alleged that individuals in Nigeria had kidnapped his father back in 2004. To support his cancellation-of-removal claim, Nwosu alleged that his removal would significantly harm his children. But an immigration judge rejected his withholding claim because he did not corroborate his testimony about the kidnapping with other evidence. And the judge rejected his cancellation claim because he did not introduce evidence to establish that his partner lacked the means to support their children by herself. Nwosu challenges these conclusions, but his arguments rest on a misunderstanding of the law. We thus deny his petition for review.

HELENE N. WHITE, Circuit Judge. Defendant Radu Miclaus appeals the imposition of a $853,651.99 restitution obligation on resentencing after remand, arguing that the government affirmatively waived restitution, he was not provided with the underlying information on which the restitution amount was based, and the imposition of restitution for the first time on remand was vindictive and violated his due process rights. We AFFIRM the imposition of restitution but VACATE and REMAND for resentencing on the amount of restitution.

READLER, Circuit Judge. In 2008, Fifth Third Bank began offering a cash-advance program called “Early Access.” The program enabled customers to “advance” money into their checking accounts (otherwise known as a loan). When a deposit was next made into a customer’s account, Fifth Third would withdraw the loan amount plus 10%. Fifth Third disclosed this 10% “transaction fee” in its standard Early Access terms and conditions, which form the contract at the heart of this dispute. In accordance with the requirements of federal law, the bank also disclosed that these loans had a 120% annual percentage rate. But there was a disconnect between these statements: Because the loans were repaid whenever customers next received a deposit into their accounts, the lengths of the loans were variable, meaning that it was impossible to calculate a standard APR for all loans. As a result, the vast majority of customers paid an APR higher than 120%. Based on this allegedly misleading APR term, William Klopfenstein sued the bank for breach of contract on behalf of a class of Early Access users. At trial, a jury agreed with Klopfenstein that Fifth Third breached the contract but, in the end, found that the bank was not liable for the breach due to the voluntary-payment defense, an Ohio law equitable defense to a breach-of-contract claim. See State ex rel. Dickman v. Defenbacher, 86 N.E.2d 5, 7 (Ohio 1949) (per curiam). As the Ohio courts have explained the defense, if a plaintiff “with full knowledge of the relevant facts” pays the defendant, “such payment cannot be recovered merely because the person who made the payment mistook the law as to his liability to pay.” City of Cleveland v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 109 N.E.3d 84, 114–15 (Ohio Ct. App. 2018) (quoting Dickman, 86 N.E.2d at 7) (City of Cleveland I), rev’d on other grounds, 152 N.E.3d 172 (Ohio 2020) (City of Cleveland II). On appeal, the class contends that Fifth Third could not assert the voluntary-payment defense under Ohio law because the class members made a mistake of fact, not law. Ohio’s cases on the matter, however, point in all directions. As a result, we sua spontecertify to the Supreme Court of Ohio the questions set forth below in accordance with Supreme Court of Ohio Rule of Practice 9.02.

READLER, Circuit Judge. Julie Schulz Halbower, in her capacity as trustee of her family trust, sued her insurer for breach of contract based on a denial of insurance coverage. The district court dismissed the action due to the complaint’s lack of merit. On appeal, we take a different course. Because the parties did not adequately plead facts necessary to establish diversity jurisdiction, we remand the case to the district court to conduct further jurisdictional discovery.

SUTTON, Chief Judge. A Grand Rapids police officer frisked Fahirri Dannah during a traffic stop. Before the officer could complete the pat down, Dannah twisted away and started to run. Officers tackled him and wrestled with him until they could place handcuffs on him. Dannah filed this § 1983 action against several of the officers. The district court rejected the officers’ qualified-immunity defense, reasoning that a jury could find that they violated Dannah’s clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. Because the officers did not violate any clearly established law, we reverse.

The Defendant, Bernard Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrian Smith, a/k/a Adrianne Smith, was convicted of attempted first degree murder and aggravated domestic assault following a bench trial. The Defendant represented himself at these proceedings, although he was appointed an attorney as “counsel to assist,” also known as “standby counsel.” On appeal, the Defendant contends, inter alia, that he did not ask to represent himself, even with the aid of standby counsel, and that the trial court improperly required him to do so against his expressed wishes. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the Defendant that he was denied his right to counsel. Therefore, we reverse the judgments of the trial court and remand the case for a new trial.

The Defendant, Roy Gene Nicholson, III, appeals from his Williamson County Circuit Court convictions of reckless aggravated assault, evading arrest, possession of marijuana with the intent to sell or deliver, and unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, for which he received an effective sentence of five years’ incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant argues that his arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-8-204 and that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated by the trial court’s granting the State’s motion to continue his trial, during which time the State procured a superseding indictment. Discerning no error, we affirm.

Following a jury trial, Defendant, Bradley Michael Lesniewski, was convicted of possession of a handgun by a felon; possession of a firearm by a felon-prior felony drug conviction; false imprisonment; evading arrest; possession of a Schedule I controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Heroin); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (0.5 grams or more of Methamphetamine); possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with intent to sell or deliver (Fentanyl); possession of drug paraphernalia; and driving while license is suspended, cancelled, or revoked. For these offenses, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of twenty years’ incarceration. On appeal, Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. Following a thorough review, we affirm Defendant’s convictions but remand for the merger of two counts and the entry of corrected judgment forms.