Petitioner, Michael Dewayne Wright, Jr., was convicted by a Davidson County Criminal Court jury of first degree felony murder, voluntary manslaughter, and first degree premeditated murder, for which he is serving two consecutive life sentences. Petitioner subsequently filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which the post-conviction court denied after a hearing. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel based upon (1) trial counsel’s conflict of interest stemming from representing two other suspects at the same time he represented Petitioner; (2) trial counsel’s failure to compel the same two suspects to testify at trial; (3) trial counsel’s failure to consult or call as a witness a firearms expert; (4) trial counsel’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation and prepare for trial; and (5) the cumulative effect of these errors. Petitioner also asserts that the trial court failed in its duty to inquire about trial counsel’s conflict of interest. Finally, Petitioner asserts that the trial court failed to adjudicate Petitioner’s request for DNA testing pursuant to the Post-Conviction DNA Analysis Act (“the DNA Act”). Following a thorough review, we affirm the post-conviction court’s denial of relief.

The pro se Petitioner, Antonio Kendrick, appeals the Weakley County Circuit Court’s summary dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Based on our review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

Petitioner, Andrew Levi Jefferson, appeals the denial of his petition seeking post- conviction relief from his guilty-pleaded convictions in Coffee County Circuit Court case numbers 40579, 42946, 43169, and 43688. Petitioner pleaded guilty to two counts of sale of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance; possession of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver; possession of 0.5 grams or more of a Schedule II controlled substance with the intent to sell or deliver; and possession of a weapon by a convicted felon, for which he is serving an effective twenty-five-year sentence. On appeal, Petitioner contends that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because counsel failed to (1) investigate evidence tampering by a police officer; (2) file several motions to suppress; and (3) adequately explain the plea agreement. After a thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the judgment of the post- conviction court.

The U.S. Senate approved the nomination of Braden Boucek as the new U.S. attorney for the Middle District of Tennessee late last week by a vote of 53-43. The nomination was included as part of a package of 97 executive nominees, according to a press release from the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee. Boucek previously worked with the Southeastern Legal Foundation (SLF). In a statement released by that group, Boucek said, “I am thrilled to be starting this new chapter as U.S. Attorney and I cannot thank President Trump enough for the nomination.” He also thanked the SLF team, saying, “I truly believe that I wouldn’t be in this position if not for my time there.” Boucek joined SLF in 2021 as senior vice president of litigation, where he handled constitutional cases and helped shape policy initiatives designed to advance individual liberty and limited government. He was nominated to the federal post in July. 

This is an appeal from a final decree of divorce. The trial court found that the wife was economically disadvantaged, that it was not feasible for her to be rehabilitated, and that she had no meaningful earning capacity. Therefore, the court awarded the wife alimony in futuro. The court also conducted an equitable division of the couple’s marital property. The husband appealed. We have determined that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the wife could not be rehabilitated. However, the court failed to consider all of the wife’s sources of income and to make sufficient findings. Therefore, we vacate the court’s alimony award and remand for further proceedings. We decline to award the wife her appellate attorney’s fees.

The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant law firm in this legal malpractice action on the basis that the plaintiff failed to present expert proof in support of his claim that the defendant law firm breached the standard of care. Discerning no error, we affirm.

This appeal arises from a divorce proceeding. Husband asserts that the trial court erred in assigning the entire amount dissipated to Husband. Husband further assigns error to the trial court’s classification of an insurance settlement stemming from the theft of Husband’s pre-marital vehicle. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court as modified by this Opinion.

In this appeal, we clarify the standard of review in workers’ compensation cases. We also explain when an aggravation injury is compensable under Tennessee workers’ compensation law. Plaintiff Jo Carol Edwards sought medical coverage and disability benefits after a work-related accident aggravated her pre-existing arthritis. Following a lengthy administrative process, the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims awarded Ms. Edwards medical coverage and disability benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board reversed. Ms. Edwards appealed. We hold that the standard of review for factual findings in Workers’ Compensation cases is de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness unless the preponderance of the evidence shows otherwise. The standard of review for factual findings applies regardless of whether the finding is based on live testimony or deposition testimony. We also hold that an “aggravation” injury under workers’ compensation law does not require proof of a permanent change or a permanent worsening of conditions to be compensable. Instead, an aggravation injury is compensable when an employee shows, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation injury primarily arose out of and in the course and scope of employment. This means that an employee must show that the employment contributed more than fifty percent in causing the aggravation. Then, the employee must prove, by a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the aggravation contributed more than fifty percent in causing death, disablement or need for medical treatment. Applying these definitions to the record before us, we reverse the decision of the Appeals Board, and reinstate the award granted by the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims in its December 12, 2023 Order.

In this appeal, we consider whether a retail store purchaser of products can be a “statutory employer” of the product vendor’s injured employee under Tennessee’s workers’ compensation statutes, potentially secondarily liable for the employee’s workers’ compensation benefits, and also protected under the exclusive remedy provision. Resolving this issue requires us to answer a threshold question: whether the term “subcontractor” in Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-113(a) includes a product vendor who engages in only the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise. We hold that it does not. We hold that the term “subcontractor” in section 50-6-113(a) refers to a person or entity that performs labor or services for another; section 50-6-113(a) does not apply to a pure vendor-vendee relationship. To determine whether a vendor-vendee arrangement that includes services beyond the sale and ancillary delivery of merchandise is governed by section 50-6-113(a), we adopt a version of the “predominant purpose” test often utilized in connection with the Uniform Commercial Code to ascertain whether a contract is predominantly for the sale of goods or services. In this case, there was an arrangement between a product vendor and the defendant retail store that required the vendor’s sales employee to perform services other than ancillary delivery of purchased merchandise. Applying the predominant purpose test, we hold that the predominant purpose of the arrangement was for the product vendor to sell merchandise to the retail store. Any additional services rendered were incidental to the vendor’s sale of merchandise to the retail store. Accordingly, the relationship between the plaintiff’s employer and the defendant retail store was one of vendor-vendee, not principal-subcontractor, and is outside the ambit of section 50-6-113(a). For that reason, the defendant retail store is not the plaintiff’s statutory employer for purposes of section 50-6-113(a) and is not shielded from the plaintiff’s injury claims by the exclusive remedy provision of the workers’ compensation statutes. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Opinion.

December 15, 2025 - December 19, 2025.