The April 28 fire that destroyed the Clayborn Temple was set intentionally, the Memphis Fire Department said this week. Officials are looking for a person of interest in the case, the Daily Memphian reports. The church had served as a base of operations for the 1968 strike of 1,300 city sanitation workers and then, once the protest grew, it became the starting point for daily marches to City Hall. Each year, supporters had gathered at the church on April 4 to mark the anniversary of the strike and the assassination of Martin Luther King Jr., who had come to Memphis to lend his support to the cause. A nonprofit group, Historic Clayborn Temple, has committed to restoring the church. In a separate article, the paper reports that the Memphis home of the temple’s director caught fire about two weeks before church fire.

The Shelby County government is directing the City of Memphis to move 11 of its offices out of the county criminal justice center by Dec. 31, 2026, The Commercial Appeal reports. The county says increasing operational demands and the need for more space for law enforcement and judicial functions is driving the decision. Offices impacted include city court judges, court clerks, court coordinators, city prosecutors, bailiff holding and city police dispatch. One city office, the Memphis Police Department's property and evidence room, will remain at 201 Poplar.

The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has changed its local rules to clarify that attorneys may speak on social media and to news media about their cases without fear, The Tennessean reports. In a filing signed by all four judges, the local rules were revised on May 15 to address concerns over a “gag order” that was placed on attorney Daniel Horwitz during litigation against private prison company CoreCivic. Now, the rule simply states that attorneys are bound by Tennessee’s rules of professional conduct. Institute for Justice attorney Jared McClain, who represented Horwitz in challenging the rule, said, “This is a huge win for the First Amendment in Middle Tennessee. Attorneys have a right to discuss their cases, and the public has a right to know what the government and its contractors are doing wrong.” Horwitz had challenged the order and while his appeal is still pending, the court's action resolves the matter according to the paper.

The Tennessee Supreme Court will hear oral arguments in two cases on May 28 before a group of rising high school seniors at the Tennessee American Legion Boys State in Cookeville. The event is part of the Court’s SCALES program, which educates students about the Tennessee legal system and the functions of the judicial branch. The court will hear arguments in State v. Ginny Parker and State v. Antonio Demetrius Adkisson. Then on May 29, beginning at 9 a.m. CDT, the court will hear three cases at the Tennessee Supreme Court building in Nashville. Those cases include Tinsley Properties LLC et al. v. Grundy County, Jo Carol Edwards v. Peoplease LLC et al., and Berkeley Research Group LLC v. Southern Advanced Materials LLC. A fourth case, Connie Reguli v. Board of Professional Responsibility, will be submitted to the court on the briefs. All oral arguments will be livestreamed to the court’s YouTube page.

BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. Tiara Yachts, Inc., hired Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (“BCBSM”) to administer its self-funded healthcare benefits plan. It alleges that BCBSM knowingly squandered plan assets by systematically overpaying some categories of claims. BCBSM then allegedly profited from its mismanagement by implementing a program through which it caught overpayments, clawed them back, and kept a portion of those “savings” for itself. Tiara Yachts sued BCBSM under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq., and BCBSM moved to dismiss. The district court granted that motion, holding that Tiara Yachts hadn’t plausibly alleged that BCBSM acted as an ERISA fiduciary. It also held that ERISA’s remedial provisions couldn’t provide the relief Tiara Yachts sought. Because the district court erred on both fronts, we reverse.

CHAD A. READLER, Circuit Judge. Officers discovered a large-scale drug distribution scheme operating in Toledo, Ohio. From those revelations, Christopher Simpson, Marquise Figures, and Antuan Wynn were charged with a host of federal crimes related to trafficking in cocaine, cocaine base, and fentanyl. The three defendants were tried in a joint proceeding. And except as to one charge against Wynn, the jury returned guilty verdicts as to all three. In this consolidated appeal, defendants challenge their convictions as well as their resulting sentences. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

In June 2021, the Shelby County Grand Jury issued a three-count indictment charging Roy Frazier II (“Defendant Frazier”) with two counts of aggravated rape of a child (Counts 1 and 2) and Bionka McGaughy (“Defendant McGaughy”) with child abuse or neglect of a child eight years of age or less (Count 3). Following a joint trial, a jury convicted Defendant Frazier of aggravated rape of a child in Count 1 and the lesser-included offense of aggravated sexual battery in Count 2, for which he received a sentence of life without parole plus twenty years. The jury convicted Defendant McGaughy of child neglect of a child eight years of age or less, for which the trial court imposed a sentence of two years to be served in the workhouse. On appeal, Defendant Frazier contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions for aggravated rape of a child and aggravated sexual battery; (2) the trial court erred by admitting multiple hearsay statements; (3) the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on identity; (4) the trial court misapplied two enhancement factors in sentencing; and (5) the trial court abused its discretion by imposing consecutive sentencing. For her part, Defendant McGaughy argues that the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction for child neglect of a child eight years of age or less. Following a thorough review, we affirm the judgments of conviction in all respects.

This is the parties’ second appeal before this Court in the above-styled case. In the first appeal, we remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order containing sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law. After this Court’s mandate issued, however, the plaintiffs filed a notice of voluntary nonsuit. The defendants opposed the notice, but the trial court entered an order dismissing the plaintiffs’ action without prejudice. The defendants again appealed to this Court. Because the plaintiffs’ notice of voluntary nonsuit was untimely, and because the trial court’s action exceeds the scope of our instructions on remand, we vacate the trial court’s order and again remand this case to the trial court for entry of a sufficient order.

Deer Hill Village Homeowners Association (“the HOA”) appeals from the order of the Chancery Court granting summary judgment to Plaintiffs Janine M. Lamothe and Matthew T. Davenport (hereinafter “Appellees”). The underlying controversy is a request from Appellees, who own a condominium in Deer Hill Village, to inspect the HOA’s corporate records pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 48-66-102 et seq. After subsequent filings from both parties, including multiple motions to enlarge time for discovery from the HOA, the Chancery Court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. The HOA timely appealed to this Court. Having determined that the Chancery Court failed to state the legal and factual grounds on which it was granting summary judgment, we vacate the order at issue and remand for entry of an order that complies with Rule 56.04 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure.

At issue is a purely legal question, the interpretation and application of “other insurance” clauses in two respective insurance policies that determine which policy provides primary coverage and which provides excess coverage to the property management company in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones, LLC, d/b/a Real Property Management Solutions (“HG Jones”), is the manager of property owned by Jordan Howell (“Mr. Howell”). Both are defendants in the underlying premises liability action. HG Jones is the named insured under a Commercial General Liability Policy issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company (“Auto-Owners”). Mr. Howell is the named insured in a Dwelling and Personal Property Coverage Policy issued by The Cincinnati Insurance Company (“Cincinnati”). In this action, HG Jones sought a declaration that Cincinnati had a duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action as the primary insurer because HG Jones qualifies as an “insured” as that term is defined in the Cincinnati policy. For its part, Cincinnati claimed that its policy only provides excess coverage over HG Jones Auto-Owners’ policy based, inter alia, on the “other insurance” clauses in the two policies and the fact that HG Jones was not specifically listed as an “additional insured” under the Cincinnati policy. The parties filed competing motions for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court determined that there was no legal distinction between the terms “insured” and “additional insured” and HG Jones was an insured under the Cincinnati policy. Therefore, the court ruled that Cincinnati had the primary duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action. Cincinnati appeals. We have determined that the “other insurance” clauses set forth in the two policies must be deemed void because they are mutually repugnant. Because HG Jones is the named insured under the Auto-Owners’ policy and HG Jones is an insured under the Cincinnati policy by virtue of the definition of an “insured” under that policy, both policies afford HG Jones primary coverage. Thus, the duty to defend and indemnify HG Jones in the premises liability action must be prorated between Cincinnati and Auto-Owners. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.