THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Karu Gene White has moved pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 41 to stay this court’s mandate pending his petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States. Because White’s own motion demonstrates that he faces no risk of irreparable harm if we do not stay our mandate, we deny his motion.

Defendant, Kevin R. Newman, appeals his Knox County Criminal Court jury convictions of aggravated burglary and vandalism of property valued at more than $1,000 but less than $2,500, arguing that the trial court erred by admitting certain testimony, by refusing to declare a mistrial, and by providing a jury instruction on flight. He also challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Upon review, we find no error and, accordingly, affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Petitioner seeks accelerated review of the denial of his motion to recuse the trial judge in two separate cases. After a de novo review, we affirm.

The Tennessee Supreme Court on April 30 directed Anderson County lawyer Robert Mike Sain to satisfy outstanding obligations with the Tennessee Commission on Continuing Legal Education by June 16 or face dismissal of his petition for reinstatement. Sain petitioned the court for reinstatement on April 7.

Leslie K. Jones (“Mr. Jones”), an at-will support staff employee of Tennessee State University (“TSU”), appeals the termination of his employment. His at-will employment agreement provided for fourteen days-notice prior to termination of his employment. When he received a termination notice on March 1, 2012, Mr. Jones filed a grievance. TSU responded advising Mr. Jones that he could not grieve his termination because he was terminated under the terms of his at-will employment agreement “without cause.” Following extensive delays and a declaratory judgment action in a related proceeding, TSU was ordered to afford Mr. Jones a grievance hearing pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(a)(1). Following an evidentiary hearing, the Hearing Officer found that “[TSU] was not obligated to provide a reason for termination under the terms of the employment contract;” nevertheless, he found that good cause for his termination had been established. Therefore, the Hearing Officer ruled that his termination should be upheld. After TSU’s President upheld the Hearing Officer’s decision, Mr. Jones filed a petition seeking judicial review pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 4-5-322. The chancellor affirmed and dismissed the petition with prejudice. Mr. Jones appeals. On appeal, TSU insists that its compliance with the notice provision of the employment agreement is the substantial and material evidence needed to uphold the Hearing Officer’s ruling. We disagree. As this court explained in Lawrence v. Rawlins, No. M1997-00223-COA-R3-CV, 2001 WL 76266, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2001), “[w]hen the General Assembly enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8-117 in 1993, it modified the employment-will-relationship between the educational institutions in the . . . State University and Community College System [which includes TSU] and their ‘support staff.’” The statute requires these educational institutions to establish a grievance procedure for their support staff, which “must cover employee complaints relating to adverse employment actions[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 49-8- 117(b)(2)(A). Finding that Mr. Jones’s employment could only be terminated “for cause” or as part of “a bona fide reduction in force,” neither of which was the basis of Mr. Jones’s termination, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court and the Hearing Officer and remand with instructions for the Hearing Officer to, inter alia, ascertain the relief and benefits Mr. Jones is entitled to receive.

The Tennessee Supreme Court transferred the law license of Sullivan County lawyer John Sidney McLellan III to disability inactive status on May 13. McLellan may not practice law while on inactive status but may seek reinstatement by showing that the disability has been removed.

Vanessa Faddoul sought an order of protection as a stalking victim pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 against her neighbor, Edward James Beyer, in Williamson County General Sessions Court. After holding an evidentiary hearing, the general sessions court issued a one-year order of protection prohibiting Mr. Beyer from contacting or coming about the victim, Mrs. Faddoul, or her family, and restricting Mr. Beyer’s second amendment rights. Mr. Beyer appealed to the Williamson County Circuit Court. Upon a pre-trial motion of Mr. Beyer, the circuit court modified the general sessions order by restoring Mr. Beyer’s second amendment right to possess firearms. Following three days of hearings on the petition, but before the circuit court could rule on the merits of the de novo appeal, Mr. Beyer filed a “Notice of Voluntary Nonsuit and Dismissal of Appeal” to dismiss his appeal of the general sessions court ruling against him in Case No. 2022OP- 176, purportedly pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41.01(1). Because Mr. Beyer dismissed his appeal, the circuit court entered an order “affirming” the judgment of the general sessions court, save the second amendment issue, dismissing the appeal, and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to apply for an award of attorney’s fees. Thereafter, Mrs. Faddoul requested attorney’s fees in the amount of $168,112.50 under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), discretionary costs in the amount of $5,248.62 under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), and $2,579.37 in “non-discretionary cost expenses.” The circuit court denied her request for attorney’s fees and discretionary costs in toto based on several findings. It found that she was not entitled to an award of mandatory attorney’s fees under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617 because, inter alia, stalking victims are not entitled to the same “enhanced protections” as domestic abuse victims, that it did not complete the hearing on the petition, which it found to be a prerequisite for fees, and that the amount of attorney’s fees requested was unreasonable. The circuit court also declined to award Mrs. Faddoul any discretionary costs. Both parties appeal. Contrary to Mr. Beyer’s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to take any action after he purportedly “nonsuited” his appeal, we find that the circuit court retained jurisdiction and that it did not err in affirming the judgment of the general sessions court and granting Mrs. Faddoul leave to request attorney’s fees. Because Mrs. Faddoul, as a stalking victim, is entitled to the same rights afforded to domestic abuse victims, and as mandated pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3-617(a)(1), we hold that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to recover the reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees she incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings. Thus, we reverse the circuit court’s decision regarding attorney’s fees and remand for the circuit court to award Mrs. Faddoul her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and expenses incurred in the general sessions court and the circuit court proceedings under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3- 617(a)(1). We affirm in part and reverse in part the denial of Mrs. Faddoul’s request for discretionary costs, finding that some of the court reporters’ invoices clearly delineate the discretionary costs that she is entitled to recover pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2). We also conclude that Mrs. Faddoul is entitled to her reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees incurred in this appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-3- 617(a)(1).

The Tennessee Supreme Court transferred the law license of Sumner County lawyer Loretta Madeline Calvert to disability inactive status on May 13. Calvert may not practice law while on inactive status but may seek reinstatement by showing that the disability has been removed.

This case concerns a dispute regarding attorney’s fees. Appellee is the next of kin of the attorney who represented Appellants for a period of time in the underlying wrongful death action. After Appellants terminated his representation, the attorney filed a notice of attorney’s lien. A few years later, while represented by their new counsel, Appellants settled their claims against the underlying defendants. While pursuing the attorney’s lien, the attorney died. Thereafter, the attorney’s estate was substituted as a party. In a previous appeal, we reviewed the trial court’s $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award to the attorney’s estate. We affirmed the trial court’s conclusion that Appellants owe the attorney’s estate fees and that the result the attorney obtained for Appellants was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. In the first appeal, we vacated the $133,333.33 attorney’s fee award and remanded the case with instructions for the trial court to make findings consistent with Rule 1.5(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Professional Conduct. Following remand, the attorney’s estate was closed, and Appellee sought to be substituted, individually, as a party to this action. The trial court allowed the substitution, over Appellants’ objections. Concerning the amount of attorney’s fees, the trial court referred the parties to a special master, who disregarded this Court’s prior opinion, wherein we affirmed that the “results obtained” by the deceased attorney was a $400,000.00 settlement offer. Rather, the special master concluded that the “results obtained” was a $450,000.00 settlement offer and awarded attorney’s fees of $150,000.00 based on that amount. The trial court adopted the special master’s findings. Although we affirm the trial court’s substitution of Appellee as a party, we vacate the award of $150,000.00 in attorney’s fees as this amount is in conflict with the law of the case, i.e., this Court’s previous conclusion that the results the attorney obtained was a $400,000.00 settlement offer.

The U.S. Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules on May 2 advanced a proposal to regulate evidence generated by artificial intelligence (AI), aiming to ensure it meets the same reliability standards as expert witness testimony. Reuters reports that the draft rule would require non-expert-generated AI evidence to be scrutinized under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, while exempting basic scientific instruments. Some committee members expressed uncertainty about adopting the rule, but all emphasized the need to act quickly as AI technology evolves. The panel also voted 8-1 to seek public feedback. The proposal now moves to the conference's Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, which will decide in June whether to publish the proposal for public comment.