Question: In Tenn. Att’y Gen. Op. 06-102 (June 21, 2006) (“the 2006 opinion”), the Office of the Attorney General concluded that no state law requires a county school system to enroll students who are residents of a municipality with a separate school system. The Office also concluded that, “as a general rule,” a county school system would not have to continue providing services for students who are enrolled in municipal school systems. Is that opinion still valid?

Opinion: Op. 06-102 requires supplementation. Local public school systems generally retain discretion over the enrollment of students that live outside of their districts. But in some circumstances, a public school system cannot deny services to a student simply because the student lives in an area served by another system.

Question 1: Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-603(b)(1) or § 67-5-1601(a)(3), can a property assessor conclude that the contributory value of miscellaneous construction—like remodeling, replacing a roof, or upgrading an HVAC—to an existing structure requires a reappraisal of the property as a whole between reappraisal years, and conduct a reassessment based on that conclusion?

Opinion 1: Tennessee Code Annotated § 67-5-1601 does not authorize reappraisals of property as a whole outside the statutorily prescribed appraisal schedule. Under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5- 603(b)(1), however, if an improvement or new building is completed between January 1 and September 1 of any tax year, the property assessor should make a new assessment or issue a corrected assessment based on the value of the improvement at the time of its completion. In doing so, the assessor should value the improvement as similar improvements were valued during the last revaluation period for the assessor’s county as required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1601(a)(3).

Question 2 Does a reappraisal of an existing structure with miscellaneous construction completed between reappraisal years, as described in Question 1, violate the Equal Protection Clause of Article 11, Section 8, or the Equal and Uniform Clause of Article 2, Section 28, of the Tennessee Constitution, or another provision of the Tennessee or United States Constitutions?

Opinion 2: No, the issuance of a new or corrected assessment under Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-603(b)(1) does not violate equal protection or uniformity protections. The assessor is required by Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-1601(a)(3) to value new improvements as similar improvements would have been valued during the last revaluation year.

Question 3: In such a reappraisal, is there legal authority to support a property assessor’s professional opinion that the cost of modifying an existing improvement, standing alone, is insufficient to determine a value change as required by Tenn. Code Ann. 67-5-603(b)(1)? 2

Opinion 3: Not all modifications will constitute improvements to real property requiring a value change. What matters is the nature of the changes, not the cost. For example, mere repairs or replacements to a structure generally will not constitute improvements triggering a new or corrected assessment.

Question 1: Does Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-201-112 allow Tennessee to enforce Tenn. Code Ann. § 68- 201-122 when there is injection, release, or dispersion of the prohibited material into federally controlled airspace, or airspace that is otherwise under the jurisdiction of the federal government?

Opinion 1: It depends. A court would likely find some attempts to enforce Tenn. Code Ann. § 68- 201-122 expressly or impliedly preempted, but not others.

Question 2: If not, in what other manner, if any, can Tennessee enforce Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-201-122 when there is injection, release, or dispersion of the prohibited material into federally controlled airspace, or airspace that is otherwise under the jurisdiction of the federal government, for the purposes of the release of chemicals, chemical compounds, substances, or other apparatus?

Opinion 2: See Response to Question 1. Tennessee can likely enforce Tenn. Code Ann. § 68-201-122 to ground-based activities that involve injection, release, or dispersion of material into the air. But to the extent the question contemplates enforcement of § 68-201-122 to emissions, the federal Clean Air Act may preempt enforcement. And for releases occurring in navigable airspace, a court may find § 68-201-122 impliedly preempted depending on the facts.

The Petitioner, Latosha Starks-Twilley, appeals the Shelby County Criminal Court’s denial of her post-conviction petition, seeking relief from her conviction of first degree premeditated murder and resulting life sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner claims, and the State concedes, that the post-conviction court erred by summarily denying her pro se petition without appointing counsel or holding an evidentiary hearing because the petition alleged a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Based on our review, we reverse and vacate the judgment of the post-conviction court and remand the case to that court for the appointment of counsel and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

This is a defamation action filed by a plaintiff police officer against two defendants concerning allegedly defamatory comments the defendants posted on Facebook about the officer. The defendants, citizens of Ashland City, where the plaintiff had served as a police officer for several years, filed a petition to dismiss the defamation action pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court denied the petition, determining that the officer had successfully established a prima facie case of defamation against each defendant and that the defendants had not met their burden to establish a valid defense. The defendants appealed the denial, arguing that the officer, a public official, had not met the heightened standard of proof necessary to establish that either of them had acted with actual malice when posting their comments to Facebook. During the pendency of this appeal, the officer attempted to nonsuit the underlying defamation lawsuit and moved to dismiss this appeal as moot. Upon review, we determine that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to grant the officer’s voluntary nonsuit, and therefore we deny the motion to dismiss this appeal. We further determine, upon our de novo review of the record, that the trial court should have granted the defendants’ TPPA petition and dismissed the defamation lawsuit, pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 17-20-105(b), because the officer failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that either defendant had acted with actual malice when posting the Facebook comments. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s judgment.

In this interlocutory appeal, the employer contends the trial court erred by ordering the payment of temporary benefits following the treating physician’s determination the employee had reached maximum medical improvement. The employee suffered an injury to his back for which he received authorized medical care for several months before his treating physician placed him at maximum medical improvement and assigned an impairment rating. Several months later, the employee advised his authorized physician that his back pain had returned. His physician provided additional medical treatment before referring him to a neurosurgeon. The employer briefly reinstated temporary disability benefits before ceasing the payments and denying the referral to the neurosurgeon, arguing it constituted a “second opinion” that the employer had no legal obligation to provide. Following an expedited hearing, the trial court determined the employee was entitled to the requested temporary disability and medical benefits. The employer has appealed. Upon careful consideration of the record, we reverse the order compelling the payment of additional temporary benefits, affirm the order in all other respects, and remand the case.

The Managing Director’s Office of the American Bar Association (ABA) Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar released a comprehensive set of data on bar admission outcomes for ABA-approved law schools, including bar pass rates and those admitted through alternative pathways, a growing trend in legal licensure. According to the data, 90.41% of 2022 law graduates who sat for a bar exam passed within two years, with the success rate for alternative pathways reaching 90.52%. The ABA has updated its terminology to refer to "admission" instead of "passage" due to the increasing recognition of alternative pathways by state courts, according to an ABA press release. First-time takers in 2024 had an 82.79% pass rate, more than a 3-percentage point increase over the comparable 79.44% pass rate. The data, which includes demographic information on bar exam passers, is being made publicly available under ABA Standard 509 to provide consumers with reliable information on bar admissions. Spreadsheets of the most recent data are available on the section’s webpage under Legal Education Statistics. Individual school reports for consumers are available at ABA Required Disclosures on a school-by-school basis.

The indigent representation proposal from the Tennessee Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) on behalf of the Tennessee Supreme Court addresses a number of challenges in the current system. This includes using strategic compensation structures for employing and contracting with attorneys. Under the plan, the “Indigent Representation Commission" may use a combination of retainer, flat fee and hourly or other contracts, offering lawyers more competitive and predictable compensation. Among the advantages of this approach are the elimination of caps and the implementation of intermittent payments. Learn more about the plan and indigent representation in Tennessee.

President Donald Trump has nominated John Squires, a former chief intellectual property attorney at Goldman Sachs, to serve as the next director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), Reuters reports. Squires would serve under U.S. Secretary of Commerce Howard Lutnick, who was confirmed by the Senate on Feb. 18. He is currently a partner at Dilworth Paxson in New York, where his practice focuses on artificial intelligence, blockchain technology and cybersecurity. If confirmed, Squires will lead the USPTO as it navigates emerging challenges related to AI’s role in innovation and increasing competition with China. The agency is responsible for issuing U.S. patents and trademarks and advising the government on intellectual property policy.

The U.S. Judicial Conference's Committee on Codes of Conduct last week relaxed ethics guidance issued six months ago. The committee had advised federal judges to restrict their law clerks from seeking post-clerkship employment with political organizations to make clear judges retain "broad discretion" to decide whether to do so on a case-by-case basis, Reuters reports. In the revised advisory, the committee acknowledged that while such employment "may pose a risk" in certain circumstances, judges are now granted broader discretion to assess the situation on a case-by-case basis. This adjustment emphasizes that judges, as appointing authorities, should consider all relevant facts before imposing any restrictions. Additionally, the committee clarified that law clerks may accept stipends for living expenses from law firms if the offer is extended equally to other incoming associates, provided the clerk is not required to work at the firm post-clerkship unless they choose to.