Both the state House and Senate Judiciary Committees have passed measures that would amend the state constitution to expand the list of crimes for which judges have discretion to deny bail, the Tennessee Journal reports. Under current law, judges have authority only to decline bail in capital offenses. SJR25, introduced by Sen. Jack Johnson, R-Franklin, passed the Senate Judiciary Committee on Feb. 25, while HJR49, introduced by House Speaker Cameron Sexton, R-Crossville, passed the House Judiciary Committee on Feb. 26. The proposal would allow judges to deny bail on 24 new offenses, mainly violent ones in which 100% of sentences must be served, and another 16 offenses in which 85% of the sentence is mandatory. If considered by the full chambers, the resolutions would have to pass by a constitutional majority in this General Assembly and a two-thirds vote in the 114th General Assembly before being placed on the next gubernatorial ballot. To be adopted by voters, the proposal would have to win a majority of those voting in the governor’s election. According to the Times Free Press, Senate Judiciary Chair Todd Gardenhire, R-Chattanooga, opposes the measure, saying it will pack county jails and put local governments in a financial bind.

MURPHY, Circuit Judge. For many decades, Larry Smith provided valuable service to his employer, Newport Utilities, by repairing downed powerlines during weather emergencies. Eventually, however, Smith began to suffer from seizures. When he had two on-the-job incidents within months of each other, Newport Utilities put him on leave and later forced him to retire. Smith sued Newport Utilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging that it had discriminated against him based on his disability. But the district court held that Smith posed a safety threat in his position and that Newport Utilities could not reasonably accommodate him. We agree and so affirm the court’s grant of summary judgment to the company.

The Defendant, Vincent Olajuan Morrison, appeals his convictions for aggravated burglary, employment of a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony, and especially aggravated robbery, for which he received an effective sentence of thirty years’ incarceration. On appeal, he argues that (1) the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred by admitting certain statements through the victim’s testimony, which violated the rule against hearsay and the Confrontation Clause; (3) the State’s cross-examination of a defense witness improperly shifted the burden of proof to the Defendant; (4) the trial court violated the “spirit” of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), by permitting the Defendant to be tried by an all-white jury; and (5) his sentence is excessive. After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

A Gibson County jury convicted Defendant, Eric Wayne Herndon, of violation of an order of protection and aggravated stalking. Defendant received an effective sentence of two years’ confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for violation of an order of protection and aggravated stalking. After review, we conclude that the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for violation of an order of protection, and we reverse that judgment and dismiss that conviction accordingly. We also conclude the evidence was insufficient to sustain Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, but we determine that the proof was sufficient to support the lesser-included offense of stalking, which was charged to the jury. Accordingly, we reverse Defendant’s conviction for aggravated stalking, and we remand the case to the trial court for entry of an amended judgment reflecting a conviction for stalking and for resentencing on this modified conviction.

A Rutherford County jury convicted the Defendant, Alonzo Fishback, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated assault, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a felony, for which he was sentenced to a total effective sentence of seventy- five years. The Defendant appealed his convictions, and this court affirmed, and he then unsuccessfully sought post-conviction relief. The Defendant filed a motion pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1, arguing that his sentence was illegal because the proven facts of his case did not meet the necessary requirements to be convicted of especially aggravated kidnapping. The trial court denied this motion, stating that the Defendant’s claim was not colorable under Rule 36.1. The Defendant maintains his argument on appeal. After review, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The Petitioner, Christopher Bassett, appeals from the Knox County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his convictions for one count of first degree murder; five counts of attempted first degree murder; three counts of attempted second degree murder; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; eight counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony; and eight counts of employing a firearm during the commission of a dangerous felony having been convicted of a drug offense, and his effective sentence of life plus thirty-five years. The Petitioner alleges that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. We affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

Grandparents brought a criminal contempt petition against Father for alleged violations of a grandparent visitation order. After a bench trial, the trial court found the father guilty on all 23 counts of criminal contempt and sentenced him to the maximum sentence of 10 days per count to be served consecutively. Of the 230 days, 140 days were suspended, with a sentence of 90 days of actual confinement. Father raises multiple challenges on appeal to every count and also challenges the sentences imposed. We affirm 11 of the counts, reverse 12 of the counts, and remand for resentencing.

This appeal concerns the trial court’s dismissal of a will contest for failure to prosecute. We affirm the decision of the trial court.

Defendant appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to quash Plaintiffs’ post-judgment subpoena for financial records he alleges are statutorily exempt from the subpoena process. We determine that the trial court’s order does not constitute a final appealable judgment and that no good cause exists to waive the finality requirement. As a result, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to consider this appeal, and we grant Plaintiffs’ motion to dismiss this appeal.

This appeal involves a property dispute between the decedent’s husband and the decedent’s only daughter, who is a child born of a prior marriage. The chancery court concluded that the husband had no interest in the property under the decedent’s will, as the property had instead passed directly to the daughter, not the decedent, under the terms of the grandmother’s will. Additionally, the chancery court concluded that any claim by the husband was also barred by an earlier settlement agreement reached by the parties. Under the terms of that settlement agreement, the chancery court also awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the daughter. The husband appeals. We affirm.