Memphis attorney Julia "Judy" Stokes Sayle died Jan. 30 at age 84. After receiving her degree in elementary education in 1962, Sayle became a legal secretary, but later enrolled in night classes and graduated with a law degree in 1970 from the then-Memphis State University. She worked in private practice with Pope, Sayle & Douglas until she and her husband opened their solo practice, Sayle & Sayle Attorneys, where she served until retirement. Services will be Feb. 8 at Elmwood Cemetery Chapel, 824 S. Dudley St., Memphis 38104 with visitation at 1 p.m. and funeral services at 2 p.m. CST and burial following. In lieu of flowers, the family requests a donation to Daughters of the Nile Endowment Fund benefiting Shriners Children's or a charity of the donor's choice.

The next legal clinic for veterans in Knoxville will take place Feb. 12 from 12-1 p.m. EST at the Knox County Public Defender's Community Law Office, 1101 Liberty St., Knoxville 37919. This is a general advice clinic sponsored by the Knoxville Bar Association, KBA Barristers, Legal Aid of East Tennessee, Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law, the University of Tennessee College of Law, the Knox County Public Defender’s Community Law Office and the local Veterans Affairs office. Attorneys and law students are needed. Sign up to volunteer here.

KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judge. William A. is dyslexic and graduated from high school with a 3.4 grade-point average. Yet even then he could not read. The school now challenges an order that it provide him with compensatory education under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. We affirm the order.

The court delivered an order denying the petition for rehearing en banc. THAPAR, J. (pp. 3–10), delivered a separate opinion dissenting from the denial of the petition for rehearing en banc, in which BUSH, LARSEN, NALBANDIAN, and READLER, JJ., concurred.

NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Juan Grogan of possessing a firearm as a felon, possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking, and possessing fentanyl with intent to distribute. At trial, the judge allowed the government to admit testimony about a series of statements that Grogan made during a proffer session. The statements concerned his ownership of drugs, a firearm, and a wallet, and his involvement in a shooting and a kidnapping. On appeal, Grogan argues the admission of this evidence was an error. Under the proffer agreement, the government could introduce a particular statement from the proffer session if Grogan testified or presented arguments inconsistent with that statement. Grogan contends admission of the evidence was an error because neither of these conditions were met. We agree with him that at least some of these statements should not have been admitted. And because the error was not harmless, we REVERSE.

Petitioner, Donald K. Moore, Jr., appeals the summary dismissal of his petitions seeking post-conviction relief from his 1996 convictions for first degree murder and especially aggravated robbery in case number 96-C-1428 and second degree murder in case number 96-C-1423, for which he was sentenced to life, twenty years, and twenty-one years’ incarceration, respectively. The post-conviction court concluded that, even if Petitioner’s allegations were taken as true, he would not be entitled to relief and summarily dismissed the petitions. Discerning no error, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Defendant, Grover Beverly, was convicted by a Sevier County jury of two counts of rape of a child, for which he received an effective sentence of eighty years' incarceration. On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the convicting evidence. Folowing our review of the record, we affirm the judgments of hte trial court.

In this divorce action the husband appeals the classification of two substantial assets as marital property, each of which he contends are separate property because they were gifted to him by his father. The husband also challenges the trial court’s determination of his income for purposes of child support and alimony. On different grounds, the wife challenges the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for child support purposes. The wife also appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido based upon its finding that her fees had been paid out of marital assets pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-4-121 and that an award of alimony in solido would constitute “double dipping.” She further seeks an award of her attorney’s fees on appeal. We affirm the trial court’s determination of the husband’s income for purposes of child support and alimony. Moreover, we affirm the classification of the 7.6-acre parcel with the cabin as marital property but reverse the classification of the husband’s partnership interest in Berry’s Chapel Ventures, LLC, as marital property and remand with instructions to classify it as Husband’s separate property. We further find that the appreciation in the value of the husband’s interest during the marriage is his separate property. Resultingly, on remand, the trial court is to reconsider the equitable division of the marital estate and enter judgment accordingly. Because of significant changes in the marital estate, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and remand with instructions to reconsider this award upon settling the marital estate and to enter judgment accordingly. We affirm the trial court’s denial of Wife’s request for attorney’s fees as alimony in solido, albeit on different grounds. Each party shall be responsible for their attorney’s fees and expenses incurred on appeal.

Petitioner’s ex-wife became romantically involved with the Respondent. The Petitioner sought an order of protection for himself and his children against the Respondent, asserting that the Respondent stalked him and his children. The Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he had only ever been near the Petitioner for the legitimate purpose of protecting Petitioner’s ex-wife and children from Petitioner, who has a troubling history of violence and who allegedly continued to emotionally harm the children during their online visitation. The General Sessions Court concluded that the Petitioner failed to prove stalking and declined to grant an order of protection. Petitioner advanced the petition to Circuit Court. The Circuit Court also refused to grant an order of protection and found that the Petitioner made knowingly false allegations at the time of filing his order of protection petition. Accordingly, the Circuit Court awarded attorney’s fees and costs to the Respondent. The Petitioner appeals. We affirm.

This is an appeal from a directed verdict in a personal injury lawsuit. Glenya Cole-Jackson (“Plaintiff”) sued Costco Wholesale Corporation d/b/a Costco (“Defendant”) in the Circuit Court for Shelby County (“the Trial Court”) over an incident in which she was hit by a shopping cart pulled by one of Defendant’s employees. The case went before a jury. At the close of Plaintiff’s proof, Defendant moved for a directed verdict. The Trial Court granted the motion, finding that Plaintiff failed to submit evidence that the shopping cart incident caused her injuries. Plaintiff appeals. Contrary to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27 and Rule 6 of the Tennessee Court of Appeals, Plaintiff’s brief fails to cite the record. In addition, the record contains no transcript or statement of evidence of the trial, hence we have no basis for determining that the Trial Court erred. We find that Plaintiff has waived her issues. We affirm.