KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Alvin Moore (“Moore”) held various positions at Coca-Cola Bottling Company (“CCBC”) from 2015 to 2018. In March 2017, Moore was involved in an accident at work and underwent drug testing, pursuant to CCBC’s drug and alcohol policy. Moore tested positive for marijuana, although the amount in his sample was less than the amount that CCBC’s drug policy prohibits. CCBC nevertheless negotiated a Second Chance Agreement (“SCA”) with its employees’ union and Moore, which stated that Moore would be subject to twenty-four months of random drug testing. Later, in June 2017, Moore was cited as being insubordinate for swearing and inciting a work slowdown during a pre-shift meeting. Moore was terminated, but his union negotiated a Last Chance Agreement (“LCA”) with CCBC. In a meeting with his supervisor, David Boland (“Boland”), and the union vice president, Frank Arrington (“Arrington”), Moore signed the LCA, which stated that he discharged CCBC from any and all liability relating to his employment. In 2018, while Moore was still under the SCA and the LCA, he tested positive for marijuana. He was terminated from CCBC on July 31, 2018, when he was still subject to the SCA, but at which point Moore’s LCA had expired. He sued CCBC for racial discrimination and retaliation, in violation of Title VII and Ohio law, and CCBC moved for summary judgment. The district court granted CCBC’s motion for summary judgment, and Moore timely appealed. For the reasons explained below, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.

The Petitioner and his co-defendant were convicted by a Lauderdale County jury of two counts of first-degree murder, two counts of first-degree felony murder, two counts of especially aggravated robbery, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, for which the Petitioner received an effective sentence of life in confinement. State v. Alston, No. W2018-00550-CCA-R3-CD, 2020 WL 1972334, at *1 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 24, 2020). This court affirmed his convictions on direct appeal. Based upon the above reasoning and authority, we affirm the coram nobis court’s denial of the petition.

The Defendant, Lawrence E. Hampton, appeals the trial court’s summary dismissal of his third motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.1. Specifically, the Defendant argues that the trial court’s entry of corrected judgment forms changing the order of consecutive service of sentences constituted an ex parte sentencing in violation of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a)(3). Following our review, we affirm.

This appeal arises out of a dispute over commercial real property. The appellees have moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely. Because the appellants did not file their notice of appeal within the time permitted by Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4, we dismiss the appeal.

Florida lawyer April Elaine Rolle was reinstated to the practice of law in Tennessee effective July 25. According to the Tennessee Supreme Court, Rolle filed a petition for reinstatement demonstrating that all delinquent annual registration fees had been paid to the Board of Professional Responsibility. The court issued the order on Aug. 20.

Question 1: Does the General Assembly have the authority to delegate the power to make laws to another department given the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the executive and judicial departments from exercising legislative authority under article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution?

Opinion 1: Under the separation-of-powers doctrine established by article II, sections 1 and 2 of the Tennessee Constitution, the General Assembly generally cannot delegate its power to make laws, except in two narrow instances.

Question 2: Does the General Assembly have the authority to delegate to another department the power to make rules and regulations that have the force of law, including those that have general application to individuals or entities outside the department, given the Tennessee Constitution prohibits the executive and judicial departments from exercising legislative authority under article II, section 2?

Opinion 2: Yes. Although the General Assembly may not delegate its law-making power to an executive branch agency, it may delegate “the authority to implement the expressed policy of particular statutes”—i.e., executive power. That authority “include[s] the power to promulgate rules and regulations that have the effect of law in [an] agency’s area of operation.” The statute delegating the power to make rules and regulations “must contain sufficient standards or guidelines to enable both the agency and the courts to determine if the agency” is permissibly implementing the statute or unconstitutionally exercising legislative power.

Question 3: Does the General Assembly possess the authority to grant emergency powers to the governor under the Tennessee Constitution?

Opinion 3: Yes. The General Assembly can grant emergency powers to the governor under the Tennessee Constitution, so long as the power it grants is executive, not legislative, in nature. Moreover, the governor’s constitutionally vested executive power may inherently include emergency power; if that is correct, then it would not offend the separation-of-powers doctrine for the General Assembly to grant the governor emergency powers beyond mere implementation since the Tennessee Constitution would already vest the governor with these powers.

Question 4: Does article II, section 2 of the Tennessee Constitution prohibit the General Assembly from granting emergency powers to another department of state government? Opinion 4 No. See responses to Questions 2 and 3.

Opinion 4: No. See responses to Questions 2 and 3.

Question 5: Can article III, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution, which grants the governor power only to convene the General Assembly on extraordinary occasions, be fairly interpreted to prohibit the governor from unilaterally acting in extraordinary occasions or emergency situations?

Opinion 5: No. Article III, section 9, of the Tennessee Constitution grants the governor affirmative power to convene the General Assembly in emergencies and other “extraordinary occasions.” It does not limit his authority to exercise constitutionally delegated emergency authority or any emergency authority flowing from his constitutionally vested executive power.

Question 6: Can article III, section 5 of the Tennessee Constitution, which prohibits the governor from acting unilaterally in the case of rebellion or invasion but requires that the governor still defer to the acts of the General Assembly, be fairly interpreted to prohibit the General Assembly from delegating emergency powers to another department?

Opinion 6: No. Article III, section 5, limits the circumstances under which the State’s militia may be called into service. It does not prohibit the General Assembly from delegating emergency powers to another department.

The Tennessee Supreme Court has referred the case of Maury County lawyer Ashlyn Elizabeth Blevins to the Board of Professional Responsibility for “whatever action” it deems warranted. The court took the action after Blevins pled guilty to the Class B misdemeanor of reckless driving in the General Sessions Court for Maury County. She received judicial diversion in that case.

Question: Is a ticketing system to access the House of Representatives chamber gallery permissible under article II, section 22 of the Tennessee Constitution?

Opinion: Article II, section 22 of the Tennessee Constitution does not prohibit the House of Representatives from using a ticketing system to manage public access to the chamber galleries.

The Tennessee Attorney General’s Office is warning consumers about a number of QR code scams. While evolving QR code technology may be convenient, the codes can be exploited by scammers through emails, text messages, mailers, packages, charitable appeals and cryptocurrency payments — all of which take users to fake websites designed to steal personal information. Scams like these can be reported to the Federal Trade Commission at www.ftc.gov/scams if encountered. Learn more about spotting suspicious QR codes.

U.S. District Judge Samuel Mays Jr. has dismissed a lawsuit against Shelby County Sheriff Floyd Bonner Jr. and Chief Jailer Kirk Fields over the October 2023 death of an inmate. The Daily Memphian reports that the suit had been filed in January by the family of Deion Byrd, an inmate at the Shelby County Jail who died after being stabbed by another inmate, Donnie Clay, while waiting for a court hearing at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Center. Clay has been charged with first-degree murder for the death. Mays found that Byrd’s parents failed to show that Bonner and Fields violated Byrd’s constitutional rights by failing to protect him from harm.