BLOOMEKATZ, Circuit Judge. In 2022, Condarius Tripplet pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute controlled substances. The district court sentenced Tripplet to 188 months’ imprisonment. He now appeals, contesting the court’s application of a drug-premises enhancement. This enhancement adds two levels to the base offense level when a defendant maintains “a premises (i.e., a building, room, or enclosure) for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing” drugs. U.S. Sent’g Comm’n Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G.) § 2D1.1(b)(12). Tripplet acknowledges he maintained an apartment but disputes that its primary use was for drug distribution, noting that he lived there with his then-girlfriend and her two children. However, our precedent clarifies that the defendant need not maintain the premises only for drug operations; if drug manufacture or distribution is one of the primary or principal uses of the residence, the enhancement may apply. Given the undisputed findings that Tripplet had a significant quantity of various illegal drugs, thousands of dollars in cash, a firearm, and drug manufacturing tools in the residence, and that he regularly distributed drugs to customers from this residence, we affirm the district court’s decision to apply the enhancement.

RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. After a four-day jury trial, Gregory D. Ralston was found guilty of distributing and possessing with the intent to distribute a fentanyl-containing substance. He was, however, acquitted of causing the serious bodily injury of another by distributing the fentanyl. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. But because of an intervening amendment in the Sentencing Guidelines during the pendency of this appeal, we REMAND the case to the district court for consideration of whether Ralston is entitled to a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

In Lucia v. Securities and Exchange Commission, the Supreme Court held that administrative law judges are inferior officers of the United States who must be appointed as prescribed by the Appointments Clause. 585 U.S. 237, 251 (2018). Then-Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration Nancy Berryhill responded to Lucia by ratifying and approving as her own the prior appointments of the Administration’s ALJs. One of the ALJs covered by that order denied plaintiff Joseph Fortin’s claim for benefits. Fortin asserts Berryhill’s actions were invalid and therefore the ALJ lacked the authority to deny his claim, but he does not otherwise take issue with the merits of the ALJ’s decision. The district court rejected Fortin’s arguments and granted summary judgment in favor of the Commissioner of Social Security. We affirm.

The attorneys for a deceased defendant appeal the trial court’s order dismissing this action pursuant to Rule 12.02(6). Because the attorneys do not have standing, this appeal is dismissed.

This appeal arises from a divorce action in which the issues on appeal principally concern the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional school or extracurricular expenses. Prior to trial, the parties agreed to a parenting schedule and that the husband would pay $4,100 per month in child support, but they did not agree on the wife’s claim for alimony, the allocation of optional expenses for the children’s school or extracurricular activities, or the division of the marital estate. Following a multi-day trial, the trial court divided the approximately $12 million marital estate equally between the parties and awarded the wife $2,000 a month in alimony in futuro. The award of alimony in futuro was based, in principal part, on the court’s finding that the wife had an earning capacity of $160,000 a year—although the most the wife had ever earned was $80,000 a year—and that some of the wife’s claimed monthly expenses were “overstated” or unsubstantiated. The court also allocated 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school and extracurricular activities to the wife and 80% to the husband. The wife challenges the award of alimony in futuro and the allocation of the children’s optional expenses, contending that the trial court “grossly overestimated” her earning capacity and erred by reducing her claimed expenses. Finding that the evidence preponderates against the trial court’s determination of the wife’s earning capacity, we vacate the award of alimony in futuro and the court’s order that the wife pay 20% of the children’s optional expenses for school or extracurricular activities, and remand both issues for further consideration. We affirm the trial court in all other respects.

Tenants filed action against their former landlord in the form of a Countercomplaint, alleging that they had suffered emotional distress resulting from slanderous statements that the landlord made to others about the tenants. In response, the landlord moved to dismiss the tenants’ claims under the Tennessee Public Participation Act (“TPPA”). The trial court determined that the landlord had not met its prima facie burden to show that the tenants’ claim fell within the scope of the TPPA and dismissed the landlord’s TPPA petition. Discerning no error, we affirm.

The Appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. On appeal, she argues: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction because the State failed to establish she acted knowingly; and (2) the trial court erred by admitting evidence of three prior acts of domestic violence against the victim. After review, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

The Appellant, Melvin Hudson, pleaded guilty to attempted aggravated sexual battery and violating the sexual offender registry act. The trial court imposed an agreed-upon sentence of eight years and denied the Appellant’s request for alternative sentencing. On appeal, the Appellant argues this denial was an abuse of discretion. After review, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

The Petitioner, Harold Thomas Centers, Jr., pled guilty to aggravated assault and received a sentence of six years. After that, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to conduct an adequate investigation before the plea. The post-conviction court denied the petition by finding that trial counsel was not ineffective. On appeal, the Petitioner argues that the post-conviction court erred in dismissing his petition, asserting that he proved his allegations by clear and convincing evidence. Upon our review, we respectfully disagree and affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.

The Petitioner, Jah’quie Brown, appeals the post-conviction court’s dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief as untimely. He argues he is entitled to tolling of the statute of limitations because his trial counsel failed to inform him of his right to file a direct appeal or petition for post-conviction relief. After review, we affirm the judgment of the post-conviction court.