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Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on May 9, 2024

The 2024 Elder Law Forum will take place in-person July 19 from 8:30 a.m. to 3 p.m. CDT at the Belmont University College of Law. This annual staple for Tennessee attorneys provides insight from top professionals while allowing attendees to meet with other lawyers in the practice area. This year’s forum features timely topics such as conservatorships, dementia, client intake, ethics, litigation in elder law and much more. Breakfast and lunch will be provided. Don’t miss this once-a-year opportunity to learn and earn CLE with colleagues.

Posted by: Jarod Word on May 9, 2024

The Tennessee General Assembly recently approved a change to the Oath in Conservatorship form, which must be signed by conservators in the state. HB1993/SB2227 amends TCA Section 34-1-109 allowing a clerk to waive an in-person oath if the fiduciary files a written one that is sworn or affirmed in the presence of a notary public or signed and dated under penalty of perjury. The change becomes effective July 1. View the form here.

Posted by: Jarod Word on May 9, 2024

The 2024 TBA Elder Law Forum will take place in-person at the Belmont University College of Law on July 19. An annual staple for Tennessee attorneys, the event provides insight from top professionals while allowing you to meet with other lawyers in the practice area. This year’s forum features timely topics such as conservatorships, dementia, client intake, ethics, litigation in elder law and much more. Breakfast and lunch will be provided. Don’t miss this once-a-year opportunity to learn and earn CLE with colleagues. Register now.

Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on May 8, 2024

On April 4, the Tennessee Supreme Court temporarily suspended Shelia L. Robinson-Beasley. On May 7, Robinson-Beasley petitioned the court for a hearing on dissolution of the suspension. The court notes that the authority cited in the petition for a hearing — Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 30.4(c) — does not govern the process, but that it will proceed with a hearing before the Board of Professional Responsibility or a disciplinary panel in accordance with Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 12.3(d).

Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on May 8, 2024

Virginia lawyer Atina Rizk Stavropoulos filed a petition for reinstatement of her Tennessee law license on April 29. In assessing the petition, the Board of Professional Responsibility found that Stavropoulos has outstanding obligations with the Tennessee Commission on Continuing Legal Education. The Tennessee Supreme Court has directed Stavropoulos to resolve those issues before June 24 or it will dismiss the petition for reinstatement.

Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on May 8, 2024

The Tennessee Supreme Court has directed Hamilton County lawyer Shaheen Iltaf Imami to respond to its request regarding the imposition of reciprocal discipline. The response is due 30 days from receipt of the notice and should address why a public censure with conditions imposed by the state of Michigan should not also be imposed in Tennessee.

Posted by: Stacey Shrader Joslin on May 8, 2024

The Tennessee Bar Foundation, an association of 811 attorneys across the state, recently inducted 29 new fellows. See the full list of this year’s class. The Bar Foundation has a two-fold purpose: to recognize attorneys who have distinguished themselves in the community and the profession, and to administer a grant making program. Through the Interest on Lawyers' Trust Accounts (IOLTA) program, the foundation has awarded grants in excess of $27,000,000 to law-related and public interest projects throughout the state of Tennessee.

Posted by: Tanja Trezise on May 8, 2024

THAPAR, Circuit Judge. Police searched Tommy Kirtdoll’s house with a warrant that was largely accurate. Nonetheless, Kirtdoll argues the warrant’s few mistakes rendered the search unconstitutional. The district court disagreed, and so do we.

Posted by: Tanja Trezise on May 8, 2024

The plaintiffs, who are former employees of a municipal police department, were discharged after the District Attorney General sent an email to the city manager stating that the plaintiffs’ testimony at hearings may be impeached without independent corroboration, thus allegedly “creating challenges for the State in proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” The plaintiffs thereafter brought suit against the District Attorney General and specifically asserted claims for official oppression under a negligence per se theory and for tortious interference with a business relationship and prospective business relationships. The trial court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims on the grounds of qualified immunity and absolute immunity. The plaintiffs appealed, and during the pendency of the appeal, the District Attorney General died. The personal representative of her estate, who was substituted as the appellee in the wake of her death, has argued that this case abated upon her death because the plaintiffs’ lawsuit is “for wrongs affecting the character of the plaintiff” within the meaning of Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-5-102. For the reasons discussed herein, we conclude that the plaintiffs’ claims for tortious interference abated upon the District Attorney General’s death. Assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs’ separate pursuit of recovery under a negligence per se theory did not abate, we nonetheless affirm the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ negligence per se theory due to their failure to raise an effective challenge to the dismissal of the theory in their appellate briefing.

Posted by: Tanja Trezise on May 8, 2024

In this case involving termination of the mother’s parental rights to her child, the trial court found that four statutory grounds for termination had been proven by clear and convincing evidence. The trial court further found that clear and convincing evidence demonstrated that termination of the mother’s parental rights was in the child’s best interest. The mother has appealed. Having determined that the trial court erred by failing to make findings concerning the mother’s affirmative defense of lack of willfulness relative to the statutory grounds of abandonment through failure to visit and support the child, we reverse the trial court’s reliance on those grounds. We affirm the trial court’s judgment in all other respects, including the termination of the mother’s parental rights to the child.


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