The defendant, Michael Wilder, was convicted by a Madison County Circuit Court jury of robbery, a Class C felony, and sentenced by the trial court as a Range III, persistent offender to fourteen years in the Department of Correction. He raises three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his statement to police; (2) whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction; and (3) whether the trial court imposed an excessive sentence by misapplying enhancement and mitigating factors and erroneously classifying him as a persistent offender.

In this procedurally complex case, a Davidson County jury convicted the Defendant, Arthur Ray Turner, of especially aggravated kidnapping, aggravated robbery, four counts of aggravated rape, and attempted aggravated rape. The trial court sentenced the Defendant to a total effective sentence of seventy years in confinement.

The petitioner, Rodricko O. Thomas, filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the Lauderdale County Circuit Court. The habeas corpus court summarily dismissed the petition for failure to state a basis on which relief could be granted. On appeal, the petitioner challenges the dismissal, contending that the habeas corpus court should have appointed counsel and held a hearing. Upon review, we affirm the judgment of the habeas corpus court.

A Cheatham County jury convicted the Defendant, Aaron D. Ostine, of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder, and aggravated robbery. The trial court merged the two murder convictions and imposed a life sentence. The court then sentenced the Defendant to 00twelve years for the aggravated robbery conviction. On appeal, the Defendant contends that: (1) the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred when it denied a motion to suppress his statements to police; and (3) the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument.

Randall Scott McCoy (“the Defendant”) pleaded guilty to one count of sexual exploitation of a minor, a Class B felony, and was sentenced to eight years’ incarceration. The Defendant reserved a certified question of law concerning the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence. Upon our thorough review of the record and applicable law, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

This post-divorce case involves the application of Supreme Court Rule 40A, which governs the appointment, role and duties of a guardian ad litem. The guardian ad litem in this case, Janice Russell, was appointed on November 7, 2008. She filed a motion requesting the court to hold her ward’s father, appellant Scott D. Paterson (“father”), in contempt. After father filed a response pointing out that Rule 40A, § 9(a)(4) did not authorize a guardian ad litem to file a contempt motion, the trial court, in response, entered an order on March 17, 2010, appointing Ms.

This is a dependency and neglect case. R.P. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s finding that she severely abused her minor daughter, K.P. The Department of Children’s Services petitioned the juvenile court to declare K.P. and her sister, K.J. (collectively, “the Children”) dependent and neglected. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found 1 that the Children were dependent and neglected in the care of Mother and her then-boyfriend, B.J.2 The juvenile court further found that B.J. committed severe abuse against K.P.,3 but that Mother did not. DCS appealed to the trial court.

This appeal involves the termination of a father’s parental rights on numerous grounds. We affirm the trial court’s finding that grounds for termination exist, due to incarceration under a ten year sentence, severe child abuse, persistent conditions, and abandonment by an incarcerated parent, and we affirm the trial court’s finding that termination is in the child’s best interest. We vacate the trial court’s finding of willful failure to pay child support but otherwise affirm the order as modified.

In this post-divorce case, the trial court entered an order on March 12, 2012, incorporating a permanent parenting plan. The order states that “[t]his matter shall be reviewed in one year.” On April 18, 2013, the court entered an order stating that “the Court, sua sponte, finds that the Permanent Parenting Plan attached to the Order of [March 12, 2012], should in fact be a Temporary Parenting Plan and by this Order [the court] corrects such.” We hold that under Tenn. Code Ann.

Because the order appealed is not a final judgment, this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter. Thus, the appeal is dismissed.