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Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

Norma Shirk

Owner/Manager

Corporate Compliance Risk Advisor, LLC

 

Insurance – How Boring!

 

Insurance generally ranks as one of the most boring subjects on the planet. Insurance policies have terms and conditions that go on for pages full of confusing terminology, everything that could go wrong seems to be excluded and the definitions make no sense. Try talking about insurance to your co-workers and you’ll clear the room faster than a tornado blowing through the break room. 

But this is your chance to shine in front of senior management because insurance is an integral part of any corporate compliance program. Understand how insurance can help your company save money and you’ll become indispensable. Let’s face it, corporate compliance boils down to recognizing your company’s risks, creating internal controls to lower the chances of a loss from those risks and finding methods to mitigate the losses that inevitably occur. That’s where insurance fits in. It covers the inevitable losses and so can save the company money.

Insurance is organized into two broad categories. One category is property and casualty (P&C) insurance which covers physical damage to property or people.  An example of property damage coverage is a commercial general liability (CGL, or premises liability) policy which protects the landlord and any third parties from physical damage.  Workers compensation coverage is another example and is required of all employers with more than 5 employees. 

P&C also covers non-physical damage to people and property. Some examples are errors & omissions (E&O) insurance which covers wrongful acts by managers or other employees against third parties.  In addition to E&O insurance, your company may have directors’ and officers’ liability (D&O) insurance to protect the board of directors and the senior managers from shareholder complaints.  Your company may also have invested in an employment practices liability (EPL) policy to protect the corporation when managers are accused of wrongdoing by employees. 

The key to understanding your company’s P&C coverage is to remember that coverage does not overlap. A loss covered under one type of policy will be excluded from coverage under a different policy. For example, a D&O policy will cover losses incurred by third parties due to the wrongful or negligent acts of an officer. But if that officer is also a manager who harasses a subordinate, the loss would be excluded under the D&O policy and covered under an EPL policy. 

The second category of insurance is accident, health and life insurance. Accident and health policies are basically medical insurance. Most of us notice this category of insurance only when we enroll or re-enroll in our employer’s group health plan. Group health plan benefits are usually offered to employees with a package of additional benefits, called ancillary benefits, such as long term care, short term care, dental coverage, and life insurance. Life insurance may also be purchased by a company to cover senior managers who are critical to the functioning of the company; this is known as “key man” insurance.

The point of insurance is that it is designed to cover known risks and reasonably foreseeable risks and by so doing, to limit the financial loss to the company. So think of insurance coverage as a giant jigsaw puzzle. Fit the different policies together to address the known risks and reasonably foreseeable risks of your company. 

Then do a cost/benefit analysis. Your company may never have sufficient funds to buy all the insurance coverage that is available. You can shine in front of your bosses by explaining which risks could cause the most harm to the company’s finances and reputation and need to be covered by insurance.

Insurance – not so boring!

_________________________

Norma Shirk, an attorney licensed in Tennessee, Texas, and Colorado, isthe Owner/Manager ofCorporate Compliance Risk Advisor, LLC was formed to educate smaller companies and individuals about the regulatory compliance issues that affect employee benefits programs and corporate insurance risk programs. For smaller employers, our goal is to level the playing field for smaller employers by giving them access to compliance resources available to their larger competitors but without the high cost of replicating an in-house compliance staff. norma.shirk@complianceriskadvisor.com

 

 

Federal District Court Strikes Down

A Significant Aspect Of The Board’s 2011 Posting Requirements

Joshua M. Henderson

In what may be the first of many judicial setbacks for the National Labor Relations Board, on March 2, 2012, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Judge Amy Berman Jackson, an Obama nominee, struck down a significant aspect of the Board’s 2011 rulemaking.  It is no secret that the Board has been pursuing an administrative agenda that heavily favors the interests of organized labor.  In pursuit of this agenda, the Board and its General Counsel, in many cases, have changed decades of established rules and policies.  Employers and other legal groups have challenged many of these changes in the courts, and these legal challenges are slowly wending their way through the litigation process.     

This particular case involved the Board’s promulgation of a new rule in August 2011, with one member dissenting, requiring employers to post a notice enumerating the rights of employees under section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, including the right to organize and to engage in other concerted activity.  The Board prescribed the content, size, and typeface of the notice.  The rule contained an enforcement provision as well.  Failure to post the notice was deemed an unfair labor practice.  In addition, the rule effectively tolled the six-month statute of limitations for filing an unfair labor practice charge against an employer that failed to post the notice.

Employers quickly filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia to block implementation of the notice rule.  The employers argued primarily that the Board lacked the statutory authority to promulgate the rule.

In her decision, Judge Jackson issued a mixed ruling, granting the employers’ summary judgment motion in part and denying it in part.  The court ruled that the Board was within its authority to promulgate Part A of the rule – the notice requirement.  The court observed that the NLRA authorizes the Board to issue rules “to carry out the terms” of the NLRA itself.  And, it was reasonable, according to the court, for the Board to require posting of a notice to raise employees’ awareness of their rights.

Judge Jackson also held, however, that Part B of the rule — making the failure to post an unfair labor practice and tolling the statute of limitations for unfair labor practices when an employer fails to post — is invalid.  Under the NLRA, “Congress specifically defined and limited the conduct that could constitute an unfair labor practice.” (Opinion, p. 27)  In opposing the employers’ motions, the Board argued that failing to post “interfered” with the employees’ exercise of their section 7 rights.  The court rejected that argument, observing that the rule punished employers simply for not facilitating the employees’ exercise of their rights by failing to post information publicizing those rights.  The Board exceeded its authority in doing so, according to the court.  Similarly, the tolling provision was invalid because it “substantially amends the statute of limitations that Congress expressly set out in the statute.”  (Opinion, p. 37) 

The court did leave open the prospect that the Board could find an employer’s failure to post the notice was an unfair labor practice charge if it was intended to interfere with section 7 rights.  To do so, “the Board must make a specific finding based on the facts and circumstances in the individual case before it that the failure to post interfered with the employee’s exercise of his or her rights.”  (Opinion, p. 31)  Consequently, the Board may still make mischief with this rule in the future.

The court also rejected the employers’ contention that posting the notice was “compelled speech” in violation of the First Amendment.  The Court contrasted recent Supreme Court decisions in which a violation was found because a speaker, such as a religious organization, had its own message materially affected by the government’s requirement.  (It remains to be seen whether some religious organizations may avoid the notice requirement.  As an example, the Seventh-day Adventists have an historic teaching that Church organizations cannot recognize unions.)  Here, the District Court held that the NLRA rights notice was not suggesting that employers favor collective bargaining, or restricts what they may say about the NLRA or unions: “[N]othing in the regulation restricts what an employer may say about the Board’s policies” (Opinion pp. 39-40).  It is possible, though not entirely clear from the ruling, that an employer might be able to post a written comment next to the poster.  Under the NLRA, however, an employer cannot engage in threatening or coercive conduct in this regard.

The District Court’s decision may be appealed.  Moreover, there is a separate lawsuit challenging the notice posting rule which is pending in the United States District Court for South Carolina.  Accordingly, employers can expect further developments in this area.  Nonetheless, this is the strongest indication yet that employers covered by the NLRA will need to post a required employee rights notice as of April 30, 2012.

The notice rule was seen by many to be a transparent attempt by the Obama Board to make itself more relevant, particularly in light of the demise in Congress of the Employee Free Choice Act.  Indeed, in its explanation of the enforcement provision of the notice rule, the Board made clear that the possible effect of this new rule would be to increase unionization efforts: “The Board has determined that employees must be aware of their NLRA rights in order to exercise those rights effectively.”  Although the notice rule was couched in terms of merely informing employees of their rights, Judge Jackson concluded that the notice rule was, in part, an invalid arrogation of power by the Board.  The requirement to post the notice stands for now, but with little teeth in terms of enforcement.

_________________________

Josh Henderson is Counsel in the Labor and Employment practice group in the San Francisco office of Seyfarth Shaw LLP.  He began his practice over fifteen years ago in Seyfarth's Chicago office.

Mr. Henderson has a considerable range of experience as trial and appellate counsel for management in complex employment litigation matters, including retaliation and whistleblowing claims, sexual harassment and discrimination, and wage and hour class actions.  Through his OSHA practice, he has advised clients on a myriad of workplace safety standards and rules, and represented employers in administrative litigation before OSHA and Cal/OSHA.  Mr. Henderson also serves as labor-relations counsel for management in connection with collective bargaining, unfair labor practice litigation before the NLRB, strikes and secondary boycotts, and labor arbitrations.  He provides advice and counsel to California and national employers on a broad spectrum of employment issues, including contracts, terminations, leaves of absence (FMLA/ADA), compliance with local employment laws (including the San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance and Paid Sick Leave laws), independent contractors, and social media policies.

A prolific legal writer and sought-after public speaker, Mr. Henderson also is a classically trained musician and baritone.  He has sung with organizations throughout the San Francisco Bay Area.  He is a former judicial law clerk for the Honorable Saundra Brown Armstrong, United States District Court for the Northern District of California.

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

By:  Carol R. Merchant

 

I.            Introduction.

            “Look folks, I’m all for businesses making profits.  It’s how they hire and grow our economy. But enjoying high profits on the back of vulnerable workers is not only unacceptable – it’s illegal! And employers need to play by the rules. Period!”  When she became Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis vowed stricter enforcement of wage and hour laws and has lived up to her word, hiring large numbers of enforcement staff, tightening exemption interpretations and emphasizing employer’s responsibilities in ensuring compliance.   “Call the Department of Labor under the previous administration, and you’d hear crickets.  The time had come to awaken this sleeping giant -- and boy, did we ever.  Why -- because providing information and protecting workers and their wages is not only a moral imperative – it’s my job!”  Solis has declared that she wants to restore some of the enforcement intensity and effectiveness that she believes were taken away in the eight years of the Bush administration.

            Not many people know that the Department of Labor is the second-largest enforcement agency in the federal government.  Only the Department of Justice is larger.  And, even with a proposed budget cut for the Department of Labor of $40 billion for fiscal year 2012, enforcement agencies like the Wage and Hour Division will actually see a budget increase.  Secretary Solis and the administration clearly believe that during these difficult economic times, ensuring that workers receive all the wages required by the law is of vital importance.

            This continued increased focus on enforcement coupled with the explosion of class action litigation, as well as the addition of several hundred new investigators hired at the Department of Labor, make it more likely that bigger numbers of employers will find themselves faced with compliance issues in the coming years.  This makes it all the more important for employers to have a solid understanding of the requirements of the wage and hours laws, and particularly the Fair Labor Standards Act. Of course, each state has its own set of wage and hour laws as well, and these laws must be taken in to consideration for compliance purposes, however, this article will focus on the requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).  The FLSA, enacted in 1938, establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and child labor standards affecting full-time and part-time workers in the private sector and in federal, state, and local governments. 

II.             Hot Buttons

            So, what are those hot buttons that trigger the interest of Wage and Hour and private action attorneys?  A few immediately come to mind:

·Deductions (other than legally required deductions) from the salaries of exempt employees           

·A high percentage of employees considered exempt (probably more than 25%), particularly if a significant number are being considered exempt administrative employees           

·More than one exempt manager at small branches           

·Time records that do not show variations in hours worked           

·Time records that always show exactly 30 minutes for meal periods           

·Employees eating lunch at their work stations           

·Workers paid as independent contractors           

·Drivers of personal vehicles or small trucks not being paid overtime, even if they transport goods across state lines           

It may be that all of these hot buttons could apply to your business and that you are actually in complete compliance with the FLSA, but they are also issues that leave you vulnerable to allegations of noncompliance.  A good understanding of the requirements of the FLSA is vital to your company’s well-being.

III.            The Basics - Minimum Wage and Overtime.

            A.            Minimum Wage.  The Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) requires that most employees in the United States be paid at least the federal minimum wage (currently $7.25/hour) for all hours worked, and overtime pay at time and one-half the regular rate of pay for all hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek.  However, Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA provides an exemption from both minimum wage and overtime pay for employees employed as bona fide executive, administrative, professional and outside sales employees. Section 13(a)(1) and Section 13(a)(17) also exempt certain computer employees.

            B.             Overtime Requirements. Section 7 of the Fair Labor Standards Act contains provisions setting forth overtime pay requirements for employees who are within the general coverage of the Act and who are not specifically exempt from its overtime pay requirements.  It prescribes the maximum weekly hours of work permitted for the employment of such employees in any workweek without extra compensation for overtime.  It sets forth a general overtime rate of not less than one and one-half times the employee's regular rate.  Employees must receive the overtime rate of pay for all hours worked in any workweek in excess of the applicable maximum hours, usually after 40 hours per week.

            Overtime in its simplest form (but not its only form) requires one and one-half times the regular rate of pay for hours worked over forty hours in a work week.  A seven-day workweek is the time measure by which this provision is applied.  In order to compute the overtime premium due an employee, the employee's total straight time pay must be converted to an hourly rate (the "regular rate") and then the employee must then be paid at one and one-half times the regular rate for all hours worked over the maximum (usually forty).

            Overtime pay, generally, must be computed on a weekly basis under the FLSA, i.e., the regular rate must be computed each week.  Except in extremely limited circumstances, each workweek must stand alone.  All payments that are remuneration for employment must be included in determining the regular rate for any workweek, except certain payments which the statute designates as excludable.  An employee’s "regular rate" includes all remuneration for employment, except specified types of payments.  These include:

·Discretionary bonuses,           

·Gifts and payments in the nature of gifts on special occasions,            

·Contributions by the employer to certain welfare plans,           

·Payments made by the employer pursuant to certain profit-sharing,            

·Thrift and savings plans, and           

·Certain kinds of premium pay.             

            Bonuses which do not qualify for exclusion from the regular rate must be added in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime pay must be based.  These include production bonuses, attendance bonuses and longevity bonuses and virtually all commissions.

            There is no absolute limitation in the Act (apart from the child labor provisions and the regulations thereunder) on the number of hours that an employee may work in any workweek.  An employee may work as many hours a week as he and his employer see fit, so long as the required overtime compensation is paid to him for hours worked in excess of the maximum workweek prescribed by Section 7(a).  The Act does not generally require that an employee be paid overtime compensation for hours in excess of eight per day, or for work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or regular days of rest, but employers are advised to consult state law on these issues. If no more than the maximum number of hours prescribed in the Act is actually worked in the workweek, overtime compensation pursuant to Section 7(a) need not be paid.

            There is nothing in the FLSA that will relieve an employer from any obligation he may have assumed by contract or of any obligation imposed by other federal or state law to limit overtime hours of work or to pay premium rates for work in excess of a daily standard or for work on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or other periods outside of or in excess of the normal or regular workweek or workday.  Employee handbooks should be carefully reviewed to avoid unintentional obligations created by the policies.

            The "workweek" is the basis for applying the overtime requirements of the Act.  An employee's workweek is a fixed and regularly recurring period of one hundred sixty-eight hours - seven consecutive twenty-four hour periods.  It need not coincide with the calendar week and may begin on any day and at any hour of the day.  For purposes of computing pay due under the FLSA, a single workweek may be established for a plant or other establishment as a whole, or different workweeks may be established for different employees or groups of employees.  Once the beginning time of an employee's workweek is established, it remains fixed regardless of the schedule of hours worked by him.  The beginning of the workweek may be changed if the change is intended to be permanent and is not designed to evade the overtime requirements of the Act.  When changes are made in the official payroll workweek, care must be taken to use the proper method for computing overtime pay in such a period when a change in the commencement of the workweek is made.            

            Employers often mistakenly presume that only hourly employees must be paid overtime; this is not true. Overtime pay generally must be given to all non-exempt employees who work in excess of 40 hours per week, regardless of how they are paid (salary, hourly, piece rate, commission, etc.). Unless an employee qualifies under one of the exemptions, payment of overtime for hours worked is required.  Overtime is paid at 1½ times the regular rate of pay.  Merely putting someone on a salary does not result in an exemption from the obligation to pay overtime. 

            C.             Exemptions.             The FLSA contains a number of exemptions and partial exemptions from its minimum wage and overtime requirements, but not from the equal pay requirements of the FLSA.  Most of the exemptions are determined by the individual employee's activities; a few are establishment-wide or industry-wide.  Certain retailing, selling, servicing and distributing industries have the advantage of numerous exemptions.  Exemptions are available for some domestic service workers, hospitals, nursing homes and schools, police and firefighters, fishing and seafood processing, transportation, farming, farm processing and forestry, seasonal operations involving processing activities on green leaf tobacco, sugar and cotton, communications, guaranteed employment under union contracts, and overseas employment.  Tolerances may be allowed for inexperienced and disabled workers in some industries or jobs.  Exemptions are construed strictly.

            The exemptions for executive, administrative and professional employees are addressed in detail below, but some of the other, commonly-utilized exemptions by category are the following, some of which are full exemptions from both minimum wage and overtime, while others are only partial exemptions:

1.            Seasonal Amusement and Recreational Establishments.  Employees of summer camps, amusement parks, religious or non-profit educational conference centers, or hotels and restaurants in national parks, forest and wildlife refuges may be exempt from minimum wage and overtime if the establishment does not operate more than 7 months in a calendar year or if average receipts for any six months are no more than 1/3 of average receipts for the other six months.

2.            Fishing and Off Shore Seafood Processing.  Employees in this industry are exempt from minimum wage and overtime.

3.            Agriculture.  Farm workers, harvesters – even those who work in irrigation and cowboys may be exempt from minimum wage and/or overtime. To be exempt from minimum wage and overtime, workers must usually be employed on small family farms.  Employees working exclusively in agriculture are exempt from overtime. Interestingly, forestry is not considered agriculture, and forestry workers such as tree planters are subject to minimum wage and overtime.  Special rules apply to hand harvesters who are paid on a piece rate basis and farm family members.

4.            Learners, Apprentices, Messengers, Disabled Workers and Student.  These workers may be exempt from minimum wage, but only with the Secretary of Labor’s blessing: The employer must obtain a certificate from the Secretary to use this exemption.

5.            Local Newspapers.   Local papers, those with a publication of 4,000 or less and mainly circulated only locally, are exempt from minimum wage and overtime.

6.            Computer professionals.  There is an exemption from both minimum wage and overtime pay for computer systems analysts, computer programmers, software engineers, and other similarly skilled workers in the computer field who meet certain tests regarding their job duties and who are paid at least $455 per week on a salary basis or paid on an hourly basis, at a rate not less than $27.63 an hour.

7.            Outside salespersons.  To qualify for the outside sales employee exemption, all of the following tests must be met: (1) the employee’s primary duty must be making sales (as defined in the FLSA), or obtaining orders or contracts for services or for the use of facilities for which a consideration will be paid by the client or customer; and (2) The employee must be customarily and regularly engaged away from the employer’s place or places of business.  The salary requirements do not apply to the outside sales exemption.

8.            Hospital and Nursing Home Exemption:  Section 7(j) of the Act provides an exemption from the requirement that overtime compensation be computed on a workweek basis for employees of hospitals and (establishments which are) institutions primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, or the mentally ill or defective who reside on the premises.  Section 7(j) permits hospitals and nursing homes to use a 14-day work period, rather than a 7 day workweek period, in computing overtime, if the employees agree to this in advance, and if the employees are paid one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked over 8 in a day and for hours worked over 80 in the 14-day work period.

The agreement required for this exemption does not need to be in writing, but if it is not, the employer must create a memorandum summarizing its terms, and showing the date the agreement was entered into and how long it remains in effect.  29 CFR § 516.23(b).  The 14-day work period can begin at any hour of any day of the week and consists of 14 consecutive 24-hour periods, at the end of which a new 14-day period begins. 29 CFR § 778.601(c).   If a hospital or nursing home utilizes this exemption, employees must be paid time and a-half for all time worked more than 8 hours in a workday, whether or not they work more than 80 hours in the 14-day work period.  However, any payments at the premium rate for daily overtime within a 14-day work period may be credited toward the overtime compensation due for hours worked in excess of 80 during that period.  29 CFR § 778.601(d).

                             9.            Motor Carrier Exemption

The Motor Carrier overtime exemption now applies only to commercial motor vehicles that weigh 10,000 pounds or more, carry more than 8 passengers for hire, transport more than 15 passengers for no compensation or transport hazardous materials.  This exemption generally excludes drivers, drivers’ helpers, loaders and mechanics who drive, load or service such vehicles from entitlement to overtime pay.  However, if an employee drives or works on a non-qualifying vehicle during a week, the exemption is lost for that week.  For example, if Mike the mechanic normally works only on big rigs and is usually exempt under the Motor Carrier exemption, but his supervisor asks him to check out the transmission on someone’s Honda Accord one morning, Mike is entitled to overtime for the week in which he worked on the Accord. 

10.            Other Exemptions.   The following employees may be exempt or partially exempt from overtime under certain circumstances: Independent switchboard operators for small exchanges; seamen; domestic employees; outside buyers of poultry, eggs, cream, or milk; radio and television employees; salesmen, partsmen or mechanics working for automotive, farm implement, boat and aircraft dealers; country elevator operators; sugar processors; harvesters and transporters of fruits and vegetables; taxi cab drivers; house parents for institutionalized children; small forestry and logging operations; overseas employees; and urban transit charter workers may be exempt from overtime.  Railroad workers, airline employees and certain employees of interstate motor carriers are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime requirements but are closely regulated by other governmental authorities.  A partial overtime exemption is available for fire protection and law enforcement employees.  Newspaper deliverers and home workers making evergreen wreaths are exempt from minimum wage, overtime, child labor and equal pay requirements.

                        D.            The “White-Collar” Exemptions. Section 13(a)(1) of the FLSA provides and exemption from overtime for certain employees employed in an executive, administrative, or professional capacity.  This is still one of the most troubling areas for employers made today.  In 2004, the DOL overhauled its regulations for the “white collar” exemptions.  Many employers continue to make the same mistakes with the exemptions that they did before the 2004 revisions.

                        In applying the exemptions, there are several important concepts, beginning with the “salary basis”. To qualify under the executive, administrative or professional exemptions, an employee must be paid on a salary basis rather than on an hourly basis; but remember that merely paying an employee on a salary basis is not enough to constitute an exemption. The salary basis requirement means an employee must receive a full salary for any workweek in which any work is performed without regard to the number of days or hours worked.    

                        As a result of the 2004 overhaul of the FLSA Regulations by the Department of Labor, the “tests” for each of the “White Collar” exemptions are as follows:  

            1.            Executive Exemption

                        a.            Requirements

To qualify for the executive employee exemption, all of the following tests must be met:

·      The employee must be compensated on a salary basis at a rate not less than $455 per week;

·      The employee’s primary duty must be managing the enterprise, or managing a customarily recognized department or subdivision of the enterprise;

·      The employee must customarily and regularly direct the work of at least two or more other full-time employees or their equivalent; and

·      The employee must have the authority to hire or fire other employees, or the employee’s suggestions and recommendations as to the hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status of other employees must be given particular weight.

                        b.            Primary Duty

“Primary duty” means the principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs. Determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.

                        c.            Management

Generally, “management” includes, but is not limited to, activities such as interviewing, selecting, and training of employees; setting and adjusting their rates of pay and hours of work; directing the work of employees; maintaining production or sales records for use in supervision or control; appraising employees’ productivity and efficiency for the purpose of recommending promotions or other changes in status; handling employee complaints and grievances; disciplining employees; planning the work; determining the techniques to be used; apportioning the work among the employees; determining the type of materials, supplies, machinery, equipment or tools to be used or merchandise to be bought, stocked and sold; controlling the flow and distribution of materials or merchandise and supplies; providing for the safety and security of the employees or the property; planning and controlling the budget; and monitoring or implementing legal compliance measures.

                        d.            Department or Subdivision

The phrase “a customarily recognized department or subdivision” is intended to distinguish between a mere collection of employees assigned from time to time to a specific job or series of jobs and a unit with permanent status and function.

                        e.            Customarily and Regularly

The phrase “customarily and regularly” means greater than occasional but less than constant; it includes work normally done every workweek, but does not include isolated or one-time tasks.

                        f.            Two or More Other Employees

The phrase “two or more other employees” means two full-time employees or their equivalent.  For example, one full-time and two half-time employees are equivalent to two full-time employees.  The supervision can be distributed among two, three or more employees, but each such employee must customarily and regularly direct the work of two or more other full-time employees or the equivalent. For example, a department with five full-time nonexempt workers may have up to two exempt supervisors if each supervisor directs the work of two of those workers.

                                                                   g.            Particular Weight

Factors to be considered in determining whether an employee’s recommendations as to hiring, firing, advancement, promotion or any other change of status are given “particular weight” include, but are not limited to, whether it is part of the employee’s job duties to make such recommendations, and the frequency with which such recommendations are made, requested, and relied upon.  Generally, an executive’s recommendations must pertain to employees whom the executive customarily and regularly directs.  It does not include occasional suggestions. An employee’s recommendations may still be deemed to have “particular weight” even if a higher level manager’s recommendation has more importance and even if the employee does not have authority to make the ultimate decision as to the employee’s change in status.

            2.            Administrative Exemption

                        a.            Requirements

To qualify for the administrative employee exemption, all of the following tests must be met:

·      The employee must be compensated on a salary basis at a rate not less than $455 per week;

·      The employee’s primary duty must be the performance of office or non-manual work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers; and

·      The employee’s primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.

                        b.            Primary Duty

“Primary duty” means the principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs. Determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.

                        c.            Directly Related to Management or General Business Operations

To meet the “directly related to management or general business operations” requirement, an employee must perform work directly related to assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as distinguished, for example from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product in a retail or service establishment.  Work “directly related to management or general business operations” includes, but is not limited to, work in functional areas such as tax; finance; accounting; budgeting; auditing; insurance; quality control; purchasing; procurement; advertising; marketing; research; safety and health; personnel management; human resources; employee benefits; labor relations; public relations; government relations; computer network, Internet and database administration; legal and regulatory compliance; and similar activities.

                        d.            Employer’s Customers

An employee may qualify for the administrative exemption if the employee’s primary duty is the performance of work directly related to the management or general business operations of the employer’s customers.  Thus, employees acting as advisors or consultants to their employer’s clients or customers — as tax experts or financial consultants, for example — may be exempt.

                        e.            Discretion and Independent Judgment

In general, the exercise of discretion and independent judgment involves the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses of conduct and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have been considered.  The term must be applied in the light of all the facts involved in the employee’s particular employment situation, and implies that the employee has authority to make an independent choice, free from immediate direction or supervision.  Factors to consider include, but are not limited to: whether the employee has authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement management policies or operating practices; whether the employee carries out major assignments in conducting the operations of the business; whether the employee performs work that affects business operations to a substantial degree; whether the employee has authority to commit the employer in matters that have significant financial impact; whether the employee has authority to waive or deviate from established policies and procedures without prior approval, and other factors set forth in the regulation.  The fact that an employee’s decisions are revised or reversed after review does not mean that the employee is not exercising discretion and independent judgment.  The exercise of discretion and independent judgment must be more than the use of skill in applying well-established techniques, procedures or specific standards described in manuals or other sources.

                        f.            Matters of Significance

The term “matters of significance” refers to the level of importance or consequence of the work performed.  An employee does not exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance merely because the employer will experience financial losses if the employee fails to perform the job properly. Similarly, an employee who operates very expensive equipment does not exercise discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance merely because improper performance of the employee’s duties may cause serious financial loss to the employer.

                        3.            Professional Exemption

                        a.            Requirements

To qualify for the learned professional employee exemption, all of the following tests must be met:

·      The employee must be compensated on a salary basis at a rate not less than $455 per week;

·      The employee’s primary duty must be the performance of work requiring advanced knowledge, defined as work which is predominantly intellectual in character and which includes work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment;

·      The advanced knowledge must be in a field of science or learning; and

·      The advanced knowledge must be customarily acquired by a prolonged course of specialized intellectual instruction.

                        b.            Primary Duty

“Primary duty” means the principal, main, major or most important duty that the employee performs. Determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the employee’s job as a whole.

                        c.            Work Requiring Advanced Knowledge

“Work requiring advanced knowledge” means work which is predominantly intellectual in character, and which includes work requiring the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment. Professional work is therefore distinguished from work involving routine mental, manual, mechanical or physical work.  A professional employee generally uses the advanced knowledge to analyze, interpret or make deductions from varying facts or circumstances. Advanced knowledge cannot be attained at the high school level.

                        d.            Field of Science or Learning

Fields of science or learning include law, medicine, theology, accounting, actuarial computation, engineering, architecture, teaching, various types of physical, chemical and biological sciences, pharmacy and other occupations that have a recognized professional status and are distinguishable from the mechanical arts or skilled trades where the knowledge could be of a fairly advanced type, but is not in a field of science or learning.

                        e.            Customarily Acquired by a Prolonged Course of Specialized Intellectual Instruction

The learned professional exemption is restricted to professions where specialized academic training is a standard prerequisite for entrance into the profession.  The best evidence of meeting this requirement is having the appropriate academic degree.  However, the word “customarily” means the exemption may be available to employees in such professions who have substantially the same knowledge level and perform substantially the same work as the degreed employees, but who attained the advanced knowledge through a combination of work experience and intellectual instruction.  This exemption does not apply to occupations in which most employees acquire their skill by experience rather than by advanced specialized intellectual instruction.

IV.            Common Mistakes and Misconceptions.

            A.             Voluntary Unpaid Overtime.             

            There is no such thing as "voluntary unpaid overtime" or "donated" time under the FLSA.  Any manager who expects or allows his or her staff to put in unrecorded work time, otherwise known as working "off the clock", is a wage claim or lawsuit waiting to happen.  It is simply impossible under the FLSA for an employee to waive the right to receive at least minimum wage and applicable overtime pay for all hours worked.  An agreement to the contrary (other than a wage claim settlement supervised and approved by the DOL) is null, void, and completely unenforceable.  Employers must ensure that all non-exempt employees properly record all time worked and that they are paid for all such time.  If an employer has true volunteers (generally accepted as possible only with governmental entities and non-profit charitable organizations), it should have all such individuals sign a volunteer agreement.

            There is no such thing as "voluntary" overtime.  Even “unauthorized” overtime must be paid if the company actually "permits" it to happen.  The definition of "employ" in the FLSA is "to suffer or permit to work."  Any employer who tolerates employees working is liable under the Act to compensate them.  There is no such thing as "voluntary" overtime and it is not recognized by DOL in any circumstances.  If an employee works “unauthorized” overtime and you let him or her do so, you must pay the overtime.  However, you can discipline the employee for having worked overtime without permission.

            B.             Compensatory time in lieu of overtime.

            Substitution of paid time off in lieu of additional pay for overtime, known as "compensatory time" or "comp time," is popular with both employers and employees, but violates the FLSA except in limited circumstances.  Compensatory time off in lieu of overtime pay is something that public and governmental employers may use, but private sector employers may not use compensatory time to substitute for overtime.  Private employers may use an informal variety of compensatory time by adjusting the schedule within the same workweek to ensure that total hours worked do not exceed 40.  However, overtime hours may not be averaged out over a longer period of time except in exceedingly narrow cases of certain employees of residential care facilities, and in the case of certain police, firefighting, and EMS employees.  Otherwise, any overtime worked within a workweek must be paid for that workweek.

            A private sector employer may use a time-off plan or compensatory time for non-overtime purposes.  Overtime exempt employees can be given paid time off to reward them for “extra” work.  But giving comp time for non-exempt private sector employees who work more than 40 hours in a workweek is flatly prohibited by the FLSA.

            C.             Independent contractors.

            The difficulty here is not that independent contractors should be getting overtime pay for excessive hours they might put in on a project – they do not get overtime pay, regardless of how many hours they work, since independent contractors are not "employees" and are thus not covered under the FLSA.  Rather, the problem occurs when an employer fails to understand that it takes a lot more than a contract to make a worker an independent contractor.  Independent contractor status does not depend upon the existence of a contract specifying that the worker is an independent contractor, or upon what the parties might call the relationship, but rather on the underlying nature of the work relationship.  Some employers hire temporary workers to help them with a rush period and think that they are "contract labor" or "contract employees", when in reality such terms are practically meaningless under wage and hour laws and payroll tax laws.  If such workers are truly employees, and they work more than 40 hours in a workweek, the employer must pay them overtime pay if they do not qualify for one of the overtime exemptions.  There is no way to contract around that; no piece of paper and no amount of explanation will overcome the evidence of an employment relationship if the DOL or the IRS examines the situation.  For this reason, employers must be very familiar with the tests for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.

            There is no single test that determines whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor under the FLSA.  Most courts use a 6-factor “economics realities” test.  These 6 factors are described below.  None of these factors, standing alone, is dispositive.  Courts employ these factors because they are indicators of economic dependence on the alleged employer.  The focus of the economic realities test is whether the individual is economically dependent on the business to which he renders service as an employee or is, as a matter of economic fact, in business for himself as an independent contractor.  The weight of each of the 6 factors depends on the light it sheds on the alleged employee’s dependence (or lack thereof) on the alleged employer:

            1.            The degree of control exercised by the alleged “employer” over the alleged “employee.”

            2.             The degree to which the “employee's” opportunity for profit or loss is determined by the employer.

            3.            The relative investments of the alleged employer and “employee.”

            4.            The degree of skill and initiative required in performing the job.

            5.            The duration or permanency of the working relationship.

            6.            The extent to which the “employee's” work is an integral part of the alleged employer's business

            D.             Voluntary Work.

            The FLSA defines the word "employ" to be any arrangement in which one person "suffers or permits" another person to work.  29 U.S.C. § 203(g).  Any employer who tolerates employees working must compensate them in accordance with the FLSA. When employees “volunteer” to work during a lunch or a break, this is considered work time and must be compensated.  Work not requested but suffered or permitted is work time. For example, an employee may voluntarily continue to work at the end of the shift. He may be a pieceworker, he may desire to finish an assigned task or he may wish to correct errors, paste work tickets, prepare time reports or other records. The reason is immaterial. The employer knows or has reason to believe that he is continuing to work and the time is working time.

            E.             Failure to keep and maintain records

            Some employers fail to strictly follow the FLSA's recordkeeping requirements, which are located in DOL's wage and hour regulations.  An employer that allows employees to keep their own time records may be asking for trouble.  For instance, if an employee files a wage claim for unpaid overtime, and the employer has no time records to dispute the employee's own records showing that overtime was worked, the DOL and the courts may accept the employee's records as valid, unless there is a good reason to doubt the credibility of such records.  Another problem will occur if the DOL audits the employer for compliance with the FLSA; part of any compliance audit is an inspection of the required records, and non-existent records may be cause for further DOL action.

            Employers subject to the FLSA are required to retain records concerning both nonexempt employees and exempt employees so that in the event of investigation by government inspectors, it can be determined whether the conditions for exemption are satisfied.  The irony in all this is that the absence of a record is sometimes no worse than accurate records that document your violation of the law

            The following information is required and must be clearly and accurately recorded by the employer:

            (1)            the employee’s full name and social security number;

            (2)             the employee’s home address;

            (3)             the employee’s date of birth, in the event that such employee is under 19 years of age;

            (4)             the sex of each employee and the occupation in which each employee is engaged;

            (5)              the time of day and the day of the week on which the employee’s workweek begins (if this is the same for all employees, a single notation may be made for the entire work force);

            (6)             the employee’s regular hourly rate of pay for any week in which overtime is worked;

            (7)             the number of hours worked each workday and the total number of hours worked each workweek;

            (8)              the total wages due for hours worked during the workday or workweek, including wages due for overtime;

            (9)             the amount of excess compensation for overtime worked;

            (10)             the total additions or deductions from wages paid;

            (11)              the total wages paid for each pay period; and

            (12)              the date of payments. 

            Payroll records, collective bargaining agreements, certificates, plans and notices and records showing the total dollar volume of business must be retained for 3 years.  Other “supplementary basic records” must be kept by the employer for a period of two years (e.g., basic time cards and time schedules).

            Records also must be kept of retroactive payment of wages.  For example, if an audit of payroll records reveals that a salaried, exempt employee’s pay was improperly docked, the employer can avoid liability by rectifying the error and paying the employee the amount due.   The employer must keep a record of such payments to show compliance with the law.

            F.            “Hours Worked” Problems.

            Among the most expensive potential liabilities under FLSA are a series of situations in which employers do not measure “hours worked” properly, including:

            1.            Making automatic 30-60 minute deductions for “lunch periods” when employees remain on duty of some sort during the “break”, or take the period in several segments so that less than 30 minute “uninterrupted” increments are involved.  Meal periods must be at least 30 minutes to qualify as non-compensable time.  The employee must be completely relieved from duty for 30 minutes or more.  And it’s best not to allow employees to work through lunch or eat at their desks if you want to have unpaid lunch periods.  As noted above, under the FLSA you are liable to pay employees if you “suffer or permit” them to work -- not just when you make them work.  If the employee cannot be required to perform any duties during this period:  even "catching the phone" or requiring the employee to remain at his or her work station while eating will render the period compensable.

            2.            A belief that there is such a thing as an “unpaid break” of less than twenty (20) minutes.  Don’t attempt to reduce payroll costs by "docking" employees for short break or meal periods.  This practice frequently leads to FLSA violations.  Short rest periods (between 5 and 20 minutes) are compensable time and may not be offset against other working time. 

            3.            Not understanding that certain “waiting time” is compensable (you should learn the distinction between “waiting to be engaged” and “engaged to be waiting”).  An employee who appears to be idle and simply waiting for work may in fact be engaged in a compensable activity.  For example, an employee who reads a book while waiting for dictation or plays checkers while waiting for a fire alarm to ring is "engaged to wait" and is due to be compensated for that time.  On the other hand, an employee who is completely relieved of duties for a period long enough to enable him or her to use the time effectively for his or her own purposes, or who has been told in advance that he or she may leave the job and will not have to commence work until a definitely specified later hour, is "waiting to be engaged," which is not compensable.  Special rules apply to some jobs, such as residential care facilities. 

            4.            Not understanding how to calculate “travel time” as “hours worked”, particularly if it is away from the plant or office.  Some travel time is compensable under the FLSA, and some is not.  Study the regulations on travel time, especially if you have employees who regularly travel away from their normal worksite.  The law provides that, subject to certain exceptions, an employer is not liable to pay minimum wage or overtime compensation for time spent traveling to and from the worksite.  The ordinary commute is not compensable, but an employee who is called away from home on an emergency basis or who travels after the work day has begun must be compensated.  For example, an employee who takes a company vehicle home at night (e.g., appliance repair) does not have to be compensated for the time spent traveling to the first assignment of the day.  However, problems may arise when an employee who regularly works at one location is required to work at another for a short time, or when travel is an integral part of the day's work.  In that situation, if the employee has to do any work at all before the travel commences (such as going by the shop or plant to pick up supplies), the travel time is compensable.

            G.            The “Regular Rate” is not (necessarily) the Hourly Rate.

            It is amazing that some otherwise quite sophisticated employers misunderstand (or just forget) that almost all bonuses and shift differentials must be included in calculating the basic hourly rate for overtime.  Commissions are often forgotten, too, and can be a very expensive omission when they involve a significant portion of an employee’s compensation.

            An employee’s "regular hourly rate" includes all remuneration for employment except seven specified types of payments:   These include: (1) truly discretionary bonuses, (2) gifts and payments in the nature of gifts on special occasions, (3) contributions by the employer to certain welfare plans, (4) payments made by the employer pursuant to certain profit-sharing, (5) thrift and savings plans, and (6) certain kinds of premium pay. 

            Few bonuses are deemed “discretionary”, because that definition excludes incentive systems which induce employees to perform better.  Bonuses which do not qualify for exclusion from the regular rate must be added in with other earnings to determine the regular rate on which overtime pay must be based.       

            H.            Time cards.

            If you want to make a DOL investigator’s day, show them time cards that don’t match the payroll records.  Failing to pay employees for all the hours that are recorded on their time sheets is an invitation to a “willful” violation.

            If time card errors are discovered, make a special notation on any time card which shows time recorded but not paid.  While it is quite easy to correct time entry errors when they occur, such as with a supervisor's notation, these errors generally will be presumed to be "fact" at a later date.

            A contemporaneous correction of a payroll error usually will be accepted without question, but one that occurs at some distance in time from the event will immediately arouse an investigator's suspicion.

            I.            Training Time.

            Failing to pay employees for time spent in certain meetings, training sessions and other job-related educational sessions can violate the Act.  Time spent by employees attending lectures, meetings, training programs, and similar activities need not be compensated if:  (1) attendance is outside the employee's regular working hours; (2) attendance is in fact voluntary; (3) the course, lecture, or meeting is not directly related to the employee's job; and (4) the employee does not perform any productive work during such attendance.  Attendance at any program that does not satisfy all four of these criteria is compensable time.

            J.            Deductions against Salaried Employees.

            The rules for permissible deductions from salaried employees differ for overtime exempt and non-exempt employees.

            1.            Pay Deductions from Salaried Exempt Employees: For salaried, exempt employees, employers can deduct from an employee’s salary in seven (7) situations, as follows:

                        a.            Deductions from pay may be made when an exempt employee is absent from work for one or more full days for personal reasons, other than sickness or disability.  Thus, if an employee is absent for two full days to handle personal affairs, the employee's salaried status will not be affected if deductions are made from the salary for two full-day absences.  However, if an exempt employee is absent for one and a half days for personal reasons, the employer can deduct only for the one full-day absence.   

                        b.            Deductions from pay may be made for absences of one or more full days occasioned by sickness or disability (including work-related accidents) if the deduction is made in accordance with a bona fide plan, policy or practice of providing compensation for loss of salary occasioned by such sickness or disability.  The employer is not required to pay any portion of the employee's salary for full-day absences for which the employee receives compensation under the plan, policy or practice.  Deductions for such full-day absences also may be made before the employee has qualified under the plan, policy or practice, and after the employee has exhausted the leave allowance thereunder.  Thus, for example, if an employer maintains a short-term disability insurance plan providing salary replacement for 12 weeks starting on the fourth day of absence, the employer may make deductions from pay for the three days of absence before the employee qualifies for benefits under the plan; for the twelve weeks in which the employee receives salary replacement benefits under the plan; and for absences after the employee has exhausted the 12 weeks of salary replacement benefits.  Similarly, an employer may make deductions from pay for absences of one or more full days if salary replacement benefits are provided under a State disability insurance law or under a State workers' compensation law.                      

                        c.            While an employer cannot make deductions from pay for absences of an exempt employee occasioned by jury duty, attendance as a witness or temporary military leave, the employer can offset any amounts received by an employee as jury fees, witness fees or military pay for a particular week against the salary due for that particular week without loss of the exemption.

                        d.            Deductions from pay of exempt employees may be made for penalties imposed in good faith for infractions of safety rules of major significance.  Safety rules of major significance include those relating to the prevention of serious danger in the workplace or to other employees, such as rules prohibiting smoking in explosive plants, oil refineries and coal mines.

                        e.            Deductions from pay of exempt employees may be made for unpaid disciplinary suspensions of one or more full days imposed in good faith for infractions of workplace conduct rules.  Such suspensions must be imposed pursuant to a written policy applicable to all employees.  Thus, for example, an employer may suspend an exempt employee without pay for three days for violating a generally applicable written policy prohibiting sexual harassment.  Similarly, an employer may suspend an exempt employee without pay for twelve days for violating a generally applicable written policy prohibiting workplace violence.  Such suspensions of one or more days cannot be made for chronic absenteeism or tardiness as these type of performance problems are not considered workplace conduct issues within the terms of the regulations.

                        f.            An employer is not required to pay the full salary in the first or last week of employment.  Rather, an employer may pay a proportionate part of an employee's full salary for the time actually worked in the first and last week of employment.  In such weeks, the payment of an hourly or daily equivalent of the employee's full salary for the time actually worked will meet the requirement.  However, employees are not paid on a salary basis within the meaning of these regulations if they are employed occasionally for a few days, and the employer pays them a proportionate part of the weekly salary when so employed.

                        g.            An employer is not required to pay the full salary for weeks in which an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act.  Rather, when an exempt employee takes unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, an employer may pay a proportionate part of the full salary for time actually worked.  For example, if an employee who normally works 40 hours per week uses four hours of unpaid leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act, the employer could deduct 10 percent of the employee's normal salary that week.

            2.            Pay Deductions from Salaried, Non-Exempt Employees:   With respect to salaried, non-exempt employees who are paid on a “fluctuating workweek” basis, under a 2006 U.S. Dept. of Labor Opinion Letter, it is almost impossible to reduce their salary for absences.  The opinion letter applies specifically to salaried, non-exempt employees who are paid using the fluctuating workweek method, which permits an employer (after entering into an agreement with an employee) to compute overtime by taking the employee’s weekly salary, dividing it by the number of hours worked, and paying an extra half time for the hours worked over 40.  This is a cheaper way of computing overtime than at time-and-a-half their regular rate.  For salaried non-exempt employees who are not paid via this fluctuating workweek method, it may be easier for an employer to make pay deductions when the employee is absent in full-day increments.

            3.            Effect of Improper Deductions from Salary.             An employer will lose the exemption if it has an “actual practice” of making improper deductions from salary. Factors to consider when determining whether an employer has an actual practice of making improper deductions include, but are not limited to: the number of improper deductions, particularly as compared to the number of employee infractions warranting deductions; the time period during which the employer made improper deductions; the number and geographic location of both the employees whose salary was improperly reduced and the managers responsible; and whether the employer has a clearly communicated policy permitting or prohibiting improper deductions. If an “actual practice” is found, the exemption is lost during the time period of the deductions for employees in the same job classification working for the same managers responsible for the improper deductions.  Isolated or inadvertent improper deductions will not result in loss of the exemption if the employer reimburses the employee for the improper deductions.

            4.            Safe Harbor.            If an employer (1) has a clearly communicated policy prohibiting improper deductions and including a complaint mechanism, (2) reimburses employees for any improper deductions, and (3) makes a good faith commitment to comply in the future, the employer will not lose the exemption for any employees unless the employer willfully violates the policy by continuing the improper deductions after receiving employee complaints. 

III.            Miscellaneous Developments Worth Remembering.

            Break Time for Nursing Mothers (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act)

            The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, which took effect on March 23, 2010, amended the FLSA to require employers to provide “reasonable break time for an employee to express breast milk for her nursing child for 1 year after the child’s birth each time such employee has need to express the milk.”  Employers are also required to provide a place, other than a bathroom, that is shielded from view and free from intrusion from coworkers and the public, which may be used by an employee to express breast milk.  Employers are not required to compensate nursing mothers for these breaks unless the employee is not complete relieved from duty during the breaks.

            Highly Compensated Employees (29 C.F.R. § 541.601)

            The 2004 Regulations created a safe harbor for employers with respect to employees earning $100,000 or more a year: these highly-compensated individuals will be presumed to be ineligible for overtime.  The $100,000 amount is a significant increase from the first proposal’s  $65,000 a year.  If the employee performs any exempt duty and makes $100,000 a year, the employee is exempt.  The employer is given a 1-month grace period to make up an employee’s pay to reach the $100,000 mark and preserve the exemption.  For example, if an inside sales person who supervises 2 employees has a poor final quarter in commissions and earnings fall below the magic number, the employer may make up the difference in the month following the end of the year and preserve that employee’s exempt status.

            Law Enforcement and Fire Fighters (29 C.F.R. § 541.3(b)(2))

            Police officers or firefighters whose primary duty is to investigate crimes or fight fires cannot qualify as exempt under the new rules.  Even if the employee directs the work of others in the conduct of the investigation or fighting fires, the employee will not qualify as exempt.  This is a major change: in the past, first-line supervisory officers such as police sergeants and fire captains often qualified for the exemption as executives.  This will make it very difficult to treat any employee actually involved in the investigation of crimes or fighting fires as exempt, even if that employee has supervisory responsibilities.

            Redefine Primary Duty (29 C.F.R. § 541.700)

            In the 2004 Regulations, Wage & Hour adopted a definition of “primary duty” that a number of courts had adopted over Wage & Hour’s objection at the time.  “Primary duty” is now defined as the main, major or most important duty of the employee.  The new regulations affirm that an exempt employee can perform both exempt and nonexempt duties at the same time without losing the exemption.  Wage & Hour notes specifically that an assistant manager in a restaurant who performs both exempt and nonexempt duties at the same time can still qualify for the executive exemption.  Such employees, who may flip burgers, shelve merchandise, or ring sales alongside the hourly employees whom they supervise, have been at the center of a number of lawsuits in recent decades, but this regulatory change certainly clarifies their status and will make such lawsuits less attractive for plaintiffs’ lawyers.

            Eliminate Sole Charge Provision

            The 2004 regulations dropped the “sole charge” provision.  The concept of that provision was that every establishment has at least one manager who can properly be regarded as exempt, even (for example) if he or she supervised just two employees.  Now, employees who are in charge of a small establishment must meet all of the provisions of the regulations to qualify for the exemption.  However, since the definition of “primary duty” has been changed from a time-based definition which many small establishment managers could not meet to one emphasizing the importance of the managerial duties, such managers may still qualify for the exemption.

            Management and General Business Operations of the Employer (29 C.F.R. §541.200(a)(2)

            A March, 2010, interpretation issued by the Deputy Administrator for the Wage and Hour Division has placed more emphasis on this element of the administrative exemption, forcing employers to examine whether a potentially exempt employee is involved in the day-to-day carrying out of the employer’s business rather than administrative work.  In that specific interpretation, the Division found “the typical job duties of a mortgage loan officer comprise a financial services business’ marketplace offerings, the selling of loan products.  Their duties involve the day-to-day carrying out of the employer’s business and, thus, fall squarely on the production side of the business.”  Consequently, it was concluded that mortgage loan officers were not exempt administrative employees.

            The interpretation states that in order for an employee’s duties to be directly related to management and general business operations, they must be related to the administrative as distinguished from the production operations of a business.  In other words, it relates to employees whose work involves servicing the business itself – employees who can be described as staff rather than line employees.  It gives as an example copy editors working for a marketing firm that promotes the sale of books, who read and correct the firm’s marketing promotional materials, as falling squarely on the production side of the line and, therefore, not exempt.

Include Computer Related Administrative Duties (29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b))

            Wage & Hour has acknowledged that employees who are engaged in computer network, internet and database administration may qualify for the administrative exemption.  Employers have long struggled with how to classify certain employees who have very important duties related to the computer, the internet and database management but do not meet the strict definition of computer professional, often because their duties do not meet the technical definition of computer professional or because they lacked college degrees. Now it will be safer to classify such employees as exempt administrative employees.  It should be noted, however, that the courts have generally found that computer help desk employees do not qualify for the exemption.

            Specific Listing of Occupations as Meeting or Not Meeting an Exemption

            In the 2004 regulations, Wage & Hour specifically lists certain occupations which they declare to meet the duties test of the exemption.  Some of the occupations listed as meeting the duties test of an exemption are:

            •            Insurance Claims Adjustors

            •            Financial Service Employees (Not Including Selling)

            •            Major Project Leaders

            •            Human Resources Managers

            •            Purchasing Managers

            •            Buyers

            •            Dental Hygienists

            •            Physician Assistants

            •            CPAs

            •            Athletic Trainers with 4 Year Degrees in the Area

            •            Funeral Directors

            •            Chefs

Some occupations listed as not meeting the duties test are:

            •            Paralegals

            •            Public Sector Inspectors

            •            Ordinary Inspection Work

            •            Comparison Shoppers

            •            Cooks

            •            Examiners or Graders

As previously discussed, mortgage loan officers can now be added to this list.

            Allow for One-day Unpaid Suspension of Exempt Employees (29 C.F.R. §541.602(b)(5))

            One of the inequities of the old regulations was that in order to suspend an exempt employee for misconduct, the employer had to suspend the employee for the entire workweek or not at all:  a suspension of one day could cause the exemption to be invalidated, and trigger liability for up to 3 years unpaid overtime.  This problem has been partially alleviated in the new rules.  An exempt employee can be suspended for a whole day (or days) based on the employer’s good faith belief that the employee has violated written workplace conduct rules.  The written policy must be applicable to all employees.  The workplace conduct rules that come under this allowance are rules which govern actions on such issues as workplace violence or sexual harassment.  It is not applicable for performance or attendance problems.

            Define Effect of Improper Deductions (29 C.F.R. § 541.603)

            Correcting another inequity that developed under the old regulations, in the 2004 regulations, Wage & Hour has limited the impact on an employer of making an improper deduction from an exempt employee’s pay.  Plaintiffs have long argued – often successfully – that a single improper deduction from an exempt employee’s pay voids the exemption for every employee.  Under the updated rules, employers making improper deductions will lose the exemption only for the time period in which the deductions were made, and only for employees in the same job classification working for the same manager.  This may be the most valuable change for employers in terms of limiting dollars-and-cents liability.   However, a company-wide policy of making improper deductions may still impact the applicability of an exemption to all employees potentially affected by the policy.

Redefine the Window of Correction (29 C.F.R. § 541.603(d))

            The window of correction has been redefined.  Under the 2004 regulations, an employer may correct an improper deduction from an exempt employee’s salary (avoiding the liability described above) if it has a clearly communicated rule that prohibits improper deductions and which includes a complaint mechanism, it reimburses the employees when it discovers the improper deduction, and makes a good faith commitment to comply in the future.  The best evidence of a clearly communicated rule is a written rule.

            Clarify the Effect of Additional Compensation to Exempt Employees (29 C.F.R.§ 541.604)      

            Wage & Hour consistently has taken the position that as long as an employee receives a guaranteed salary, the employees could also receive additional compensation without losing the exemption.  In spite of this official position, some courts ruled that such payments caused the exemption to be lost.  In the new regulations, Wage & Hour reinforces its position and specifically allows hourly pay, time and half pay and compensatory time to be paid to exempt employees in addition to their guaranteed salary without jeopardizing their exemption.

            Allow Guaranteed Hourly, Daily and Shift Pay to Be Considered a “Salary” (29 C.F.R. § 541.604(b))

            An employee who is guaranteed a certain number of hours, day pay or shift pay will meet the salary component of the exemption requirement as long as there is a reasonable relationship between the guaranteed amount and the amount actually earned.  For example, guaranteeing an employee 20 hours at $25.00 an hour ($500) would not bear a reasonable relationship to $1,000 (40 hours x $25 an hour).

            Use of Manuals (29 C.F.R. § 541.704)

            Plaintiffs’ lawyers have argued, sometimes successfully, that requiring administrative and professional employees to follow policy manuals divests the employees of independent discretion and judgment necessary for them to qualify as exempt.  The Regulations acknowledge that some manuals are highly technical or complex and require an individual to have specialized knowledge or skill to understand them, and thus such manuals do not preclude the employees from qualifying for the exemption.

            Supreme Court Decision in IBP v. Alvarez

            The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision in IBP v. Alvarez held that employees who work in meat and poultry processing plants must be paid for the time they spend walking between the place where they put on and take off protective equipment and the place where they process the meat or poultry. The Court determined that donning and doffing gear is a “principal activity” under the Portal to Portal Act, 29 U.S.C. 254, and thus time spent in those activities, as well as any walking time that occurs after the employee engages in his first principal activity and before he finishes his last principal activity is part of a “continuous workday” and is compensable under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq. The Court also held that waiting time before the first principal activity is not compensable, unless the employees are required to report to work at a specific time.

            Bonuses

            As noted earlier in this article, employers often make the mistake of failing to pay overtime on some types of bonuses. Certain types of bonuses are included in regular rate computations. Examples of bonuses usually included as a part of the regular rate are production bonuses, bonuses paid for performing work in less than an established time, bonuses paid for the sale of certain types of merchandise, cost of living bonuses, attendance bonuses, and bonuses paid as an incentive to attract employees to undesirable jobs. Moreover, all nondiscretionary bonuses must be considered when determining the regular rate. For a bonus which covers a single weekly period, such bonus is added to the other earnings for that week; however, when a bonus payment is deferred until the amount can be ascertained, such bonus must be apportioned over the workweek(s) of the period during which it was earned. One way to avoid difficulties with including bonuses within regular rate computations is to base the bonuses upon a percentage of the individual employee’s total earnings. This way, the percentage already takes into account both the straight time and overtime pay. For example, an employee who earns $10 an hour and works fifty (50) hours in one week is paid $400 in straight time and $150 in overtime. Therefore, if he receives a ten percent bonus of his total earnings for the week, he is receiving a bonus payment of $55, which already takes into account both straight time and overtime. However, if that employee receives a flat bonus of $55 instead of the percentage bonus, such payment only takes straight time into account and he will be owed an additional $5.50 for the 10 hours of overtime worked ($55/50 = $1.10; $1.10/2 =$.55x10). Bonuses which are discretionary are not normally subject to overtime calculations.            

V.            Conclusion.

            If there is any question of whether your practices are in compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act or state law, always remember that an audit of your pay practices by legal counsel is a good idea and can identify problem areas and solutions before you have the unwelcome visit from DOL or the even more unwelcome experience of being the subject of private litigation.

_________________________

Carol Merchant is a consultant in the Knoxville, Tennessee office of Wimberly Lawson Wright Daves & Jones, P LLC.  She provides consulting services, in conjunction with the firm's attorneys, with emphasis on compliance with regulations under the Fair Labor Standards Act, Family and Medical Leave Act, Davis Bacon and Related Acts, Service Contract Act, Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act, Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act, Employee Polygraph Protection Act and the Federal Wage Garnishment Law.

Carol retired from the US Department of Labor, Wage and Our Division, in December 2007, after 33 years of service with the Division.  From 2000 to the end of 2007, she was the Nashville District Director, supervising enforcement of Wage and Hour laws in the state of Tennessee.  Prior to that she had been Assistant District Director of the Knoxville Wage and Hour office after 11 years as an investigator in Columbia, South Carolina.

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

Welcome to the Spring, 2012 edition of Corporate Counsel Connection.  Your Section Executive Committee has had a very busy Winter, culminating in the recent Corporate Counsel Section CLE on March 23.  The CLE, entitled “I Did It Their Way—Compliance Issues Update”, provided those in attendance with a great day-long refresher and update on those compliance issues of importance to in-house counsel as we try to keep our companies out of trouble (and off the front page and the nightly news—why is it that our mistakes make the front page but our good deeds somewhat go unnoticed?).  Thanks go out to all of our speakers:  Brad Ottinger, Kate Tucker, John Winters, Alexander Davie, Mary Dohner Smith, Norma Shirk, Jim Barry, Andy Branham, and Erik Cole.  The presentations were informative, enlightening, and, yes,  even entertaining!

It’s hard to believe that this Bar year is almost over.  Ira Greer will assume the Chair of this Section in June, and I know he will do a fantastic job!  I would like to publicly thank the Executive Committee for all the work they have done to make sure you find Section membership worthwhile.  So, to David Smith, Grayson Brown, John Bellamy, John Bowles, Justin Martin, Bill Seale, Ira Greer, Shannon Coleman Egle, and Norma Shirk—you guys are the best!  Special thanks to Christy Gibson, Kaisha Bond, and all the staff at the TBA who make the work of being Section Chair fun! 

Now it’s your turn, dear reader.  If you are interested in becoming more involved with the Corporate Counsel section, please reach out to one of the Executive Committee members and make your interest known.  Write an article for the newsletter.  Volunteer to present at next year’s CLE.  Bar membership in general, and Section membership in particular, is much more satisfying when you are involved and active.  Get involved in the corporate counsel pro bono efforts in your community--it truly satisfies the soul.  And, take time to get outside and enjoy our beautiful Tennessee springtime weather.  It won’t hurt to ‘unplug’ for a little while; your Blackberry will still be there for you when you get back from a hike, or a walk around the park, or a bike ride with your kids.  There is more to life than practicing law—enjoy it!

Thank you so very much for the privilege of serving as your Chair this year!

Best,

Sherie

 

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

This is the second installment of the new Section Newsletter, CORPORATE COUNSEL CONNECTION.  We will continue to provide up to date news and articles of interest.   If you have any interest in submitting an article for publication or some humor which may be entertaining to our readers, please contact me by e-mail at bseale@bushbros.comor by phone at (865) 450-4138.  All help will be greatly appreciated, especially great jokes (although, every article/joke may not be published).  We would appreciate articles that would be especially helpful to corporate counsel, however, articles of general legal interest will also be considered for publication.  …And now for the legal stuff -- I would be remiss if I did not mention that while the articles in the Corporate Counsel Connection may express the views of the author of the article, the articles do not express the opinion of the TBA or Corporate Counsel Section.  – Thanks, Bill Seale, Vice President General Counsel, Bush Brothers & Company.

Quotable quote:Sir William Blackstone on judicial restraint:  “If [the legislature] will positively enact a thing to be done, the judges are not at liberty to reject it, for that were to set the judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive of all government.”

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

The TBA has asked me to write a brief review of a book that I’ve found to be useful in my mediation practice.  While my busy schedule undoubtedly affords me the opportunity to keep my review brief, how on earth am I supposed to confine my comments to justone book?!  Should it be one of the classics such as Getting To Yes, A Positive No, or Beyond Reason.  Obviously each of those would be a worthy candidate since I heartily recommend them to trainees quite regularly.  But experienced mediators are surely aware of those books already.  So then what about the more recent cutting-edge books dealing with neuroscience and the brain, such as Thinking Fast and Slow or How We Decide — are they too specialized perhaps?  Then again, maybe I should stick with a more straightforward text like The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict.

On second thought, I’m sure that most mediators already know of the basic texts in the field. Well, since I need to pick just one, here it is — People Skills by Robert Bolton. It is truly utilitarian insofar as it helps develop your reflective listening skills and teaches techniques for avoiding or overcoming the most common communication barriers.  And it also has a section on how to engage in collaborative problem solving.  Quite simply, it is thought-provoking yet practical.

So there it is — one book that I’ve found useful in my mediation practice. 

Stephen L. Shields

Jackson, Shields, Yeiser & Holt

sshields@jsyc.com

_________________________

The most influential book on my practice is Kenneth Cloke’s Mediating Dangerously: The Frontiers of Conflict Resolution

Another more recent book I have found helpful is Laurence J. Boulle, Michael T. Colatrella, Jr., and Anthony P. Picchioni, Mediation Skills and Techniques.

A third recommendation is Dr. David McMillan’s site.  Click on the Third Position link.

Kenneth W. Jackson

kenjaxlaw@comcast.net

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

In 2000 I recognized that the way we practiced law was changing and the way I, in particular, practiced needed to change.  For years I had been a trial lawyer, particularly in the area of juvenile and family law, with an emphasis on elder and divorce law.  Some of the actions I took as a zealous advocate weren’t sitting well with me and I saw clients who were NOT enamored of the idea of litigation.  What they wanted was a resolution to their problem.  Often for the elderly, the problem involved getting their children, grandchildren, nieces, nephews to “do the right thing.”  The right thing didn’t necessarily translate into a rights or legal based issue.  For divorcing parties, it often meant balancing the abilities and schedules of parents with the needs of their children, or finding a way for the members of the family unit to live separately without pushing one or both of them into poverty.  Rights weren’t paramount; the ability to problem solve creatively was what helped the most, as long as it was informed by legal rights and responsibilities.

Coming to the fore just as my thoughts about my practice were coming to a head was an increased interest in mediation.  It was certainly true that a very dear friend of mine, and law school compatriot, Jocelyn Wurzburg, had been practicing mediation for several years by the time my awareness was raised about mediation, and she served as an inspiration, as well as a mentor and trainer for me.  So, I took the plunge and took the training and was listed as a Rule 31 mediator.  I later took the Domestic Violence special training from Carole Berz of Chattanooga.

In 2007, I was lucky enough to be working in Memphis with some lawyers and legal educators who formed a group calling itself the “Lawyers as Peacemakers, Lawyers as ProblemSolvers” and produced a conference of the same name.  Attending that conference opened my eyes to a whole new world of possibilities for the practice of law, and the toolbox of ideas and methodologies expanded beyond anything I ever thought was possible.

Included in my new library of legal books was Julie McFarlane’s book “The New Lawyer: How Settlement Is Transforming the Practice of Law” and J. Kim Wright’s book “Lawyers as Peacemakers: Practicing Holistic, Problem Solving Law”.  I have had the great good fortune to become a friend of Ms. Wright and the opportunity to work with her on a number of projects.  In March of 2012, I look forward to meeting Ms. McFarlane at the Tennessee Association of Professional Mediators training.

Ms. McFarlane’s book begins with a quote from a waiter in Vancouver whose response to Ms. McFarlane’s statement that she was in Vancouver to give a speech was “You’re giving a speech about lawyers and conflict resolution?  Huh?  I don’t usually connect lawyers with conflict resolution”.  Unfortunately for our profession, the sad truth is that the general public associates us with conflict, not with its resolution.  According to McFarlane, the costs of protracted litigation and the delays in getting into court increase a huge disconnect between lawyers and expeditious resolution and, most importantly, the clients.  She goes on to point out that, despite this perception, the reality is that very few cases ever “go to trial.”  The problem is in the lengthy and drawn out process of actually reaching a resolution through the use of the court system, the automatic default to rights based litigation as the premiere methodology for resolving a dispute and the attendant reluctance of lawyers to use alternative dispute resolution methodologies.  Additionally, she points out the ongoing emphasis in legal training on developing appellate argument skills instead of negotiating skills which leaves new lawyers without the requisite skill set most often needed in the real world of the practice of law.

McFarlane’s central thesis resolves around three main or common core beliefs and values shared by most lawyers, and that those core beliefs and/or values should be rethought in light of changes in technology, actual practice and ongoing dissatisfaction by the public with legal services as currently delivered.   The core beliefs are:

  1. The default to rights based dispute resolution through litigation;
  2. The idea that justice is delivered because the process used to adjudicate those rights is used uniformly; and
  3. That lawyers as the “experts” control both the process and the expectations of the clients.

Through her examination of these three common core beliefs, historically and in their current application, McFarlane argues that we, as lawyers, should find ways to maintain them effectively, while at the same time expanding our skill set to include other ways to assist our clients and to determine when, where and how each of these skill sets are best to use at any given time or circumstance.  McFarlane distills this idea down to posit that:

“The key to effective lawyering lies in discriminating between different types of conflict and what are appropriate means of addressing and resolving them in ways that meet the needs of disputant’s and society’s interest in fairness.”

Kim Wright makes a similar type of argument in her best-selling book, “Lawyers as Peacemakers.”   Rights based litigation has a significant and ongoing role to play in enforcing laws with broad application- when someone is polluting a river upstream from me and it’s affecting my drinking water, immediate action needs to be taken-is often an example Ms. Wright cites to demonstrate the importance of litigation.  Equally important to our system of justice is the high regard we should have for the rule of law and its application across the board to everyone; creating or maintaining precedent to achieve continuity of rights and responsibilities also weighs in.  However, a lawyer should develop an ability to deal with individual problems in a more creative, holistic manner that can expeditiously resolve or avoid a legal problem and bring about closure as quickly as possible

These ideas also inform the work of Richard Susskin’s recent book, “The End of Lawyers: Rethinking the Nature of Legal Services.”  Mr. Susskind’s central idea is not that lawyers or practicing law will end as a profession, but that the profound ways our world is changing necessitates a change in how we deliver our services to our clients and what our clients will need from us in the future.

Much of the thinking that goes into the idea of the changing roles of lawyers, along with the changes in the way we practice, has been researched by Professor Susan Daicoff of Florida Coastal School of Law, whose article “Lawyer Know Thyself” spawned a discussion among legal scholars.  This discussion led Professor Daicoff to further refine her thoughts about how different methodologies of practicing were developing- she calls these methodologies ‘vectors in the law.”  A recent conference in Colorado Springs was held by leading promoters of the use of the vectors, and the phrase ‘integrative law movement’ was coined.  A small group of lawyers has coalesced around the vectors, and much of their writing on the subject is found on the web site www.cuttingedgelaw.com.  Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Janice Holder once jokingly told me that courts and lawyers in Tennessee suffer from the “50 Year Rule”- basically we have done things this way for 50 years, why change?  Changes in technology, in information availability, an increasingly better read and more sophisticated client base and research into human beings’ psychologies, decision-making processes and a growing awareness about alternatives and how they can inform our practice will eventually push lawyers and the courts to adopt, if not embrace, the various vectors described by Professor Daicoff.  Though this awareness is still in its infancy, I recently mentioned the concept of collaborative law practice to a group of attorneys who clearly had no clue what I was talking about.   At some point, the legal community in Tennessee will need to grapple with which changes we will adopt.  It would behoove the ADR community to be the leading expert on those vectors of the integrative law movement, their application, their benefits as well as the detriments to adopting a particular methodology, and be prepared to advise attorneys and courts accordingly.  The legal community will need to have some advanced thinking done about how we, as lawyers, and our judicial system will adapt to changing roles, changing technologies and changing ways we enforce rights and resolve disputes.  My sincere hope is that groups such as the Tennessee Association of Professional Mediators and ADR sections of the Bar Associations, along with law schools and other conflict resolution teaching entities, will help Tennessee clarify, modify and adapt, through the exploration of the “vectors in the law,” what types of integrative legal theories and skill sets we will adopt or use or modify for use in our jurisdiction.  We should help the system by becoming informed about ongoing changes, such as the widespread adoption of collaborative law practice in Texas, and what we want to do in Tennessee.  We should be aware of the use of therapeutic jurisprudence, neuroscience theories and restorative justice concepts and how they can impact criminal law.

Now is the time for mediators, arbitrators, holistic lawyers, and collaborative practitioners to continue the conversation we began in 2007.   We can help determine which of the vectors we want to adopt and how we want those to look by becoming informed and creating workgroups to explore the experiences of other jurisdictions and attorneys.  We can shape different and more dynamic processes for our clients while still retaining principles and concepts important to the practice of law.  My charge to you in the next months is to become aware of what other jurisdictions are doing, attend workshops and trainings on the various subjects and then join the “Lawyers as Peacemakers, Lawyers as  Problemsolvers” group for a conference in Memphis in mid-October as we continue our journey to making the practice of law the best it can be.

Linda Warren Seely

Memphis Area Legal Services

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 14, 2012

ABA Mediator Ethical Guidance Opinion on Advocacy Activities of Mediator

In an opinion issued last Fall, the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution Committee on Mediator Ethical Guidance considered “whether a family law mediator, who is a full-time court employee, may engage in advocacy regarding family law policy issues, such as custody and parenting time.  This advocacy may include, among other things, testifying before legislative bodies, lobbying before individual legislators, speaking at conferences that advocate particular policy positions on family law issues, and being a member of groups that advocate positions on particular family law policy issues.”  It determined that the mediator might be able engage in these activities, with a number of caveats.  SODR-2011-1 at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/DR018600/relatedresources/SODR_2011-1.pdf.

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 13, 2012

by Marnie Huff*

I.               U.S.  SUPREME COURT

U.S. Supreme Court Enforces Pre-Dispute Binding Arbitration Clause in CompuCreditCompuCredit Corp. et al. v. Greenwood et al., No. 10–948, ___ U.S. ___ (January 10, 2012 ) involved a class action alleging violations of the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA).  The consumers’ credit card agreement included a pre-dispute binding arbitration clause.  The district court denied the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed.  Reversing the Ninth Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the CROA is silent on whether claims under the Act can proceed in an arbitration.  It held that the Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) re­quires enforcement of the arbitration agreement.  The Court noted the long-standing interpretation of Section 2 as establishing “a liberal federal policy favor­ing arbitration,” citing Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con­str. Corp., 460 U. S. 1, 24 (1983).  Slip op. at 2.  The FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms, even if a federal statu­tory claim is at issue, unless a “a contrary congressional command “overrides the FAA’s requirement, citing Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U. S. 220, 226 (1987).  Slip op. at 2-3.  The Court rejected the consumers’ argument that there is such a congressional command, given the CROA’s disclosure and non-waiver provision.  The disclosure provision requires credit repair organizations to give a written statement to consumers that, “‘You have a right to sue a credit repair organization that violates the [Act],’” 15 U. S. C. §1679c(a).  The CROA’s anti-waiver provision in 15 U.S.C. §1679f(a) states that any waiver of any protection under the CROA “ ‘(1) shall be treated as void; and (2) may not be enforced by any Federal or State court or any other person.’ ”  The Court found that the disclosure provision does not give consumers a right to sue in a court of law - it creates only an “obligation on credit repair organizations to supply consumers with a specific statement . . . in the statute.”  Slip op at 4.  That does not override the FAA’s mandate.  Moreover, the Court’s interpretation does not mean that the CROA “effectively requires that credit repair organizations mislead consumers.”  Slip op at 7.  Lastly, when Congress passed the CROA in 1996, arbitration claus­es such as the one at issue were not rare in consumer contracts.  If Congress wanted to prohibit pre-dispute binding arbitration in the CROA, it would have done so “in a manner less obtuse than what the [consumers] suggest.”  Slip op at 8.  Copy of opinion, concurring opinion and dissent at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-948.pdf.

Piecemeal Proceedings.  In KPMG LLP v. Robert Cocchi et al., 565 U.S. ___, No. 10-1521 (November 7, 2011), the Florida Court of Appeal had upheld a trial court’s decision, denying KPMG’s motion to compel arbitration.  The Supreme Court found that the lower court erred in refusing arbitration solely on the basis that two out of four claims in the lawsuit were nonarbitrable.  The Court of Appeal had failed to determine whether the other two claims were arbitrable.  Therefore, the Court vacated the Court of Appeal’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.  The Court reiterated that arbitration is required for arbitrable claims, “‘even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.’”  Slip op. at 4, quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217 (1985).  Copy of opinion at http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/11pdf/10-1521.pdf.

II.             SIXTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS

In Christopher John Savoie v. Judge James G. Martin, III, et al, No. 10-6529 (6th Cir. March 6, 2012), plaintiff Savoie sued defendant Martin individually, in his official capacity as a judge, in his official capacity as a Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 31 Neutral, and as a party to a Rule 31 mediation contract.   Savoie sued Stites & Harbison, PLLC, in its capacity as employer of Martin when he was a mediator, and a court-ordered parental coordinator.  Before becoming a judge, Martin had served as a court-appointed mediator of a divorce case involving Savoie and his wife.  He later presided as judge over a hearing on Savoie’s motion to modify the parenting plan in that divorce case.  When Martin inquired about his prior role as mediator, the parties’ agreed to have Martin hear the issue.  Subsequently, after Martin ruled in favor of the wife, Savoie sued in federal court on 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law negligence and contract claims.  Affirming the district court’s dismissal of all claims, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in dicta that Martin “probably should have recused himself because of his prior involvement” as the court-appointed mediator in a contested custody dispute.  The Court held that Martin was entitled to judicial immunity for his actions during the court hearing.  Although Rule 31 provided that a person serving as a Rule 31 neutral “‘shall not participate as . . . judge . . . in the matter in which the dispute resolution was conducted,’” the Court held there is no support for the plaintiff’s claim that violation of Rule 31 would result in Martin losing jurisdiction as a judge.  Rejecting the plaintiff’s claim that Martin relied on confidential information learned during the mediation and became a witness in the court proceeding, the Court found that Martin’s remarks during the hearing “served only to clarify his understanding of the matter before him and explain his perspective to the parties,” and Martin was not acting in any non-judicial capacity.  The Court also rejected the argument that Martin’s remarks, allegedly disclosing confidential information learned during the mediation, violated Martin’s obligations as a mediator.  The Court affirmed dismissal of the pendent state court claims because Martin was entitled to judicial immunity on those claims as well.  Regarding the 1983 claim against Stites & Harbison, the Court rejected Savoie’s theory that the firm, as employer of an employee providing court-ordered mediation, was analogous to a private prison which can be treated as a state actor.  The Court also noted that a defendant such as this firm cannot be held liable under 1983 under respondeat superior or vicarious liability theories.  Martin had received the training required under Rule 31; Savoie did not allege that Martin’s law firm had any independent duty to provide additional training of Martin as a mediator.  Lastly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Savoie’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. 

III.           TENNESSEE STATE COURTS

Ex Parte Communication with Arbitrator per Agreement; Award not Vacated.  In Herbal Integrity, LLC, et al. v. Scott Huntley, Jr., et al., No. M2011-00810-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. January 11, 2012), the parties agreed to submit valuation of the defendants' membership in Herbal Integrity LLC to binding arbitration.  An agreed order provided that “All parties may supply the Arbitrator with whatever documents or information that they deem relevant to the process. . . . [Subject to deadlines], the arbitrator shall have the discretion to determine the documents and information that the parties may be required or permitted to produce, as well as how, when, and where such documents and information will be produced.  Each party shall serve counsel for opposing parties with copies of any materials that are submitted to the arbitrator.”  An engagement letter with the arbitrator provided that the arbitrator would provide copies of information provided to him “upon request.”  The defendants moved to vacate the arbitrator's award under T.C.A. § 29-5-313(a) on multiple grounds.  On appeal, the defendants asserted that the arbitrator exceeded his authority because certain documents were not served on them by opposing counsel and they were not given an opportunity to respond to documents and information provided ex parte to the arbitrator.  Given the provisions of the engagement letter, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court’s determination that the arbitrator was not responsible to provide copies of the evidence absent a request from the defendants.  The defendants did not dispute that they received emails advising them that opposing counsel was providing documents to the arbitrator.  They never demanded copies from the arbitrator or opposing counsel.  Copy of opinion at http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/huntleys_011212.pdf.

Impact of Failure to Amend Damages Claim not Avoided through Motion to Compel Arbitration.  In Sheila Brown v. Rico Roland, No. M2009-01885-SC-R11-CV (Tenn.  January 18, 2012), the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals decision inBrown v. Roland, No. M2009-01885-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3732169 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 2010).  The Tennessee Supreme Court held that 1) the amount of damages the plaintiff sought to recover, after an appeal from general sessions to circuit court, was limited to the amount sought in the general sessions warrant because the plaintiff failed to file an amendment to increase the amount of damages; and 2) the circuit court did not err in denying the plaintiff’s motion to compel arbitration.  Copy of opinion at  http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC/2012/browns_011812.pdf.

Divorce Mediation Issues Not Addressed by Court of Appeals. 

In Megan A. Rowe Ellis v. Sammy D. Rowe, Jr., No. E2011-00375-COA-R3-CV-FILED- Tenn. Ct. App. February 8, 2012), two of the issues raised on appeal by the pro se appellant were whether the trial court erred in 1) ordering mediation, and 2) assessing mediation costs to the father who had not appeared for the mediation.  The appellant failed to file a transcript, failed to cite to the record, and failed to cite any legal authority in the argument section of his brief.   The Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.  Copy of opinion at http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/elliism_020812.pdf

In James Fitzpatrick Dendy v. Amy Michelle Dendy, No. E2010-02319-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. March 5, 2012), one of the 20 issues raised on appeal was whether the trial court erred in ordering the mother to attend a mediation without assistance of counsel.  This issue was not properly before the Court of Appeals because the trial court’s order for mediation and the mediation itself occurred after the mother had filed a notice of appeal in the case.  Copy of corrected  opinion at https://www.tba.org/sites/default/files/dendyj_COR_030612.pdf

Mediated Settlement Did Not Resolve All Issues.  InReynaldo Collazo et al. v. Joe Haas d/b/a Haas Construction et al., No. M2011-00775-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. December 15, 2011), the plaintiff sought recovery of uninsured motorist benefits.  The unidentified driver of the defendant’s vehicle left the scene of a two vehicles collision accident. The defendant owner of the vehicle denied knowing the identity of the driver and claimed no one had permission to operate the vehicle at the time of the accident.  Plaintiffs' uninsured motorist insurance carrier was Nationwide Insurance Co. and the defendant owner had coverage through State Farm Insurance Co.  After a mediation in which Nationwide participated with the parties, the plaintiffs settled all claims against the defendant-owner and State Farm for $90,000, which was $10,000 less than the uninsured motorist limits with Nationwide.  The plaintiffs asserted the settlement with the vehicle’s owner did not bar their claims against the uninsured John Doe driver. The trial court granted Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment because there was no “uninsured motor vehicle” under T.C.A. § 56-7-1202(a)(1), given that the defendant vehicle owner had $100,000 of liability insurance, the same amount of coverage as the plaintiffs’ uninsured motorist coverage with Nationwide.  Reversing the trial court, the Court of Appeals noted that a “UM carrier must pay benefits where:  (1) a claimant is legally entitled to recover damages from the uninsured motorist and, (2) the total amount of liability coverage available to the insured is less than the insured’s uninsured motorist coverage limits.”  Opinion at 6.  In this case, notwithstanding the $90,000 settlement and full release of the driver, there was no determination of the allocation of fault between the vehicle’s owner and the John Doe driver.  If the vehicle owner were found to be 100% at fault, there would be no recovery against UM carrier Nationwide.  But that determination has not been made.  On remand, Nationwide will be entitled to a $90,000 credit against any UM liability under T.C.A. § 56-7-1206(i), which is not affected by principles of comparative fault.  Opinion at 11.  Copy of opinion at  http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2011/collazor_121611.pdf.

Another Settlement in a Uninsured Motorist Case.  In Shavon Hurt v. John Doe, et al., No. M2011-00604-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. Ct. App. January 13, 2012), the plaintiff filed a personal injury action naming defendant Brown as the owner of the car that allegedly struck the plaintiff.  After discovery, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add "John Doe/Jane Doe" as a defendant, served process on her uninsured motorist carrier, settled with defendant Brown, and then dismissed the action against Brown.  The trial court erred in dismissing the action against the uninsured motorist carrier.  The carrier did not cite any authority for the proposition that the amended complaint failed to state a claim.  Copy of unpublished Memorandum Opinion at http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TCA/2012/hurts_011712.pdf.

Workers Comp Settlement:  Reconsideration Not Available Due to Voluntary Resignation.

In Rochelle M. Evans v. Ford Motor Company, No. M2010-02254-WC-R3-WC (Tenn. February 10, 2012), the pro se employee sought reconsideration of her 2005 workers' compensation settlement.  She returned to work, was put on medical leave in 2006, and then resigned effective Sept. 1, 2007 to take advantage of a buyout involving an educational opportunity program.  A few months later, the employee was not able to continue in the program and received a lump sum payment from the employer.  She then filed a petition for reconsideration of the previous settlement.  Affirming the trial court, the Court found that she had voluntarily resigned and was therefore not eligible to receive reconsideration.  Copy of opinion at http://www.tba2.org/tba_files/TSC_WCP/2012/evansr_021012.pdf

______________________

* Marnie Huff is past Chair and currently serves on the Executive Council of the TBA Dispute Resolution Section.  She also serves on the elected Council of the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution and chairs the Section’s Membership Committee.  She is an independent mediator, arbitrator and workplace conflict management consultant in Nashville.  Her website is at www.MargaretHuffMediation.com.

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 13, 2012

We again have some very good articles, book reviews and other items of interest in the newsletter.  Thanks much to the contributors.  As always, if you have something you think is worthy of publishing or information you think would be of interest to the Section, please let us know.

You are reminded about the TBA Dispute Resolution Section's Annual Seminar, "Understanding Conflict: Neuroscience and Psychological Concepts and Their Practical Applications in Dispute Resolution," to be held April 12 at the TBA headquarters.  Participants include Chris Guthrie, Dean, Vanderbilt Law School; Dr. David McMillan, Ph. D., Dr. Gary Duncan, M. D., and Dr. Murphy Thomas, Ph. D. and experienced attorney-mediators, including John Blankenship, Stephen Shields, Ken Jackson, Margaret Huff, and Linda Warren-Seely.  Topical sections include Introduction to Neuroscience and Conflict Resolution, Psychological Theories and Conflict Resolution, Mindfulness and Conflict Resolution, Conflict Theories -- Insights for the Mediator, Ethical Issues, and Mediator's tools during each phase of the mediation -- convening, orientation, negotiation, and closing with particular emphasis on impasse.  A reception will follow the program.  You won't want to miss this informative program if you serve as a mediator or represent clients in mediation.  To register, go to https://www.tnbaru.com/CLE/catalog_course_details.php?course=6987.

Wearen Hughes

Editor, Dispute Resolutions

whughes@bassberry.com

Posted by: Christy Gibson on Mar 13, 2012

Description

This ½ day seminar is for experienced immigration attorneys, novice immigration attorneys and those attorneys who just want to know a little about immigration law. Speakers will include government officials from the agencies which handle immigration matters - Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement and the Department of Labor.


Topics include

•Immigrants, Petitions and Investigations
•Hot Topics in Immigration Court and Removal
•Department of Labor’s Role in Immigration Petitions


SAVE MONEY

TBA members receive three hours of TennBarU CLE programming free with their TBA Complete Membership. You can use those credits and take this course for free. Not a TBA member, join now to start saving.

You may park in the Commerce Street Garage. We will be validating parking tickets for this garage only, so please make sure to bring your ticket!

 

The Basics

Credit Hours:                EP:  0.00, Dual:0.00, General:  3.00

Producer(s):                 Bruce Buchanan

Speaker(s):                  Bruce Buchanan, Vinh Duong, Jeremy Jennings, Phillip T. Miller, Glenda Raborn, Sandra R. Sanders

Format:                        On site

Location:                      Tennessee Bar Center - Nashville, TN

Registration:                 April 20, 2012 - 8:00 AM - 8:30 AM

Course Schedule:         April 20, 2012 - 8:30 AM - 11:45 AM

 

The Costs

$100.00 Section Member Price

$120.00 TBA Member Price

$245.00 Non-Member Price (Includes TBA Complete Membership)

TBA Members who are judges, lawmakers and law students can take TennBarU onsite courses at no charge for the programming.  There may be a separate charge if meals, special materials or other premium features are involved. 

If you register for this course iwthin 5 days of the course start date, you may be charged a late fee. 

REGISTER


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